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The signing of the Association Agreement and DCFTA between Ukraine and the 
European Union in 2014 was an act of strategic, geopolitical significance in the 
history of Ukraine. Emblematic of a struggle to replace the Yanukovich regime at 
home and to resist attempts by Russia to deny Ukraine its ‘European choice’, the 
Association Agreement is a defiant statement of the country’s determination to 
become a democratic, independent state.
The purpose of this Handbook is to make the legal content of the Association 
Agreement clearly comprehensible. It covers all the significant political and economic 
chapters of the Agreement, and in each case explains the meaning of the commitments 
made by Ukraine and the challenges posed by their implementation. 
A unique reference source for this historic act, this Handbook is intended for 
professional readers, namely officials, parliamentarians, diplomats, business leaders, 
lawyers, consultants, think tanks, civil society organisations, university teachers, 
trainers, students and journalists.
The work has been carried out by two teams of researchers from leading independent 
think tanks, CEPS in Brussels and the Institute for Economic Research and Policy 
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PREFACE 
his Handbook seeks to explain the contents of a long and 
complex legal treaty – the Association Agreement, which 
includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) 
– between Ukraine and the European Union (EU). Like most 
complex legal texts, it is not intended to be read like a book. Therefore, 
the purpose here is to make it possible for anyone to understand 
basically what each chapter of the Agreement means, in terms of both 
the nature of the commitments that the parties undertake and the 
prospects for their implementation.  
The Handbook has in mind a broad range of readers, including 
officials, parliamentarians, business leaders, lawyers, business 
consultants, think tanks, civil society organisations, university teachers, 
trainers, students and journalists.  
The 30 chapters in this Handbook are mainly the same as those 
in the Agreement, but are not identical. Some chapters of lesser interest 
in the Agreement are not covered here, and there is some 
rearrangement of the various chapter headings. 
The present volume is one of a trilogy of Handbooks that cover 
very similar but not identical agreements between the EU, on the one 
hand, and Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine on the other. All three books 
are available electronically for free downloading in English and the 
respective languages of the three countries at www.3dcftas.eu.  
There are some references in the Handbook to an Association 
Agenda, which is an annual document drawn up jointly by Ukraine and 
the EU, reviewing progress in implementing the Association Agreement 
and which usefully provides updating and some greater detail on 
various topics. The Agreement and Agenda are thus not to be confused. 
The official texts of both documents are also available in English and 
Ukrainian at www.3dcftas.eu. 
A much shorter version of this book is aimed at a wider 
readership, including schools. It is also available online for free 
downloading in English and Ukrainian at www.3dcftas.eu.  
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The Handbook has been prepared by two teams of researchers 
from independent think tanks, the Centre for European Policy Studies 
(CEPS) in Brussels and the Institute for Economic Research and Policy 
Consulting (IER) in Kyiv. Founded in Brussels in 1983, CEPS is a 
leading think tank on European affairs, with a strong in-house research 
capacity and an extensive network of partner institutes throughout the 
world. Its mission is to produce sound policy research leading to 
constructive solutions to the challenges facing Europe. 
The Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting is a 
leading Ukrainian think tank focusing on economic research and policy 
advice in such spheres as international trade, fiscal, social and 
monetary policies, regional development, financial markets, energy 
and infrastructure. The IER has extensive experience in modelling and 
analysing the impact of the DCFTA between Ukraine and the EU. 
While much of the content of the Handbook is of necessity rather 
dry, we hope that the reader will appreciate the lighter touch in the 
artwork of Constantin Sunnerberg.  
Finally, the authors are most grateful to the Swedish 
International Development Agency (Sida) for their support and 
funding for the project, and in particular to Mirja Peterson and Maria 
Liungman for their encouragement from the beginning. 
The views expressed in this book are entirely those of the authors 
and should not be attributed to CEPS, IER, Sida or the European Union. 
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SUMMARY 
What? 
The Association Agreement (AA) 
between the European Union (EU) and 
Ukraine is a comprehensive treaty 
covering Ukraine’s political and 
economic relationship with the EU. The 
trade-related content foresees a Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
(DCFTA), which is an important part of 
the overall Agreement.  
The Agreement was negotiated during several years of the 
presidency of Viktor Yanukovych. It was initialled in March 2012, and 
was due to be signed at the EU’s Vilnius summit in November 2013. 
But at the last minute, President Yanukovych decided not to sign it, 
thereby triggering the Maidan uprising and ultimately Russia’s 
aggression in annexing Crimea and its hybrid war in the eastern 
Donbas region. Its signing therefore took place later in two stages, first 
in relation to its political content in March 2014 by Prime Minister 
Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and then its economic content in June 2014 by the 
newly elected President Petro Poroshenko. The Ukrainian Verkhovna 
Rada and the European Parliament ratified the Agreement in September 
2014, and the EU member states followed in the course of 2015 and early 
2016.1  
The provisional application of the Agreement started in 
November 2014, except for the DCFTA, which entered into force 
‘provisionally’ in January 2016, after a one-year delay at the request of 
Russia.  
                                                        
1 In one EU member state, the Netherlands, the ratification process was 
interrupted by the negative result of a referendum held on 6 April 2016. 
However, the provisional application of the Agreement continues unchanged.  
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Why? 
While much of the contents of the Association Agreement and DCFTA 
are highly technical, its signing in 2014 was an act of strategic, 
geopolitical significance in the history of Ukraine. It became 
emblematic of a vital struggle, to both replace the Yanukovych regime 
at home and resist the attempt by Russia to deny Ukraine its ‘European 
choice’ as a democratic, independent state. The costs of this struggle 
have been tragically high in terms of territory, the economy and above 
all human life, but these losses must strengthen the country’s resolve to 
succeed.  
The political and economic objectives of the Agreement are 
fundamental for the future of Ukraine as an independent and secure 
European state, and can be simply defined. The political purpose is to 
deepen the realisation of Ukraine’s ‘European choice’. This means 
making a reality of fundamental European values, namely democracy, 
the rule of law and respect for human rights and norms of the European 
security order. Membership of the European Union is not pre-figured 
in the Agreement, but neither is it excluded in the longer run.  
The economic purpose is to help modernise the Ukrainian 
economy, by boosting trade with the EU and internationally and 
reforming economic regulations in line with best European practice. 
Combined with an improving business climate, Ukraine has the 
potential to become a good location for foreign as well as domestic 
investment, producing exports for the EU and international markets. 
How?  
The Agreement amounts to a charter for Ukraine’s modernisation 
through alignment on EU norms, which generally correspond to best 
international practice. Ukraine does not have to ‘re-invent the wheel’ in 
many technically complex areas, where the choice of regulations and 
standards that differ from tested international practice would be highly 
costly and inefficient. Still, this normative alignment is far more than a 
technical matter, and it goes to the heart of the urgent task of 
establishing sound, corruption-free governance. 
Since April 2014, the EU has almost completely opened its 
market for tariff-free imports from Ukraine. This means the opening of 
new competitive opportunities for Ukraine’s economy, especially since 
the country will remove its tariffs on imports from the EU only 
gradually over a number of years starting from January 2016. The 
DCFTA is a roadmap for Ukraine to join the ranks of the several 
medium-sized to large European economies with highly developed 
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and diversified industrial structures, like its neighbour Poland as a first 
point of comparison. Ukraine’s trade structure is already substantially 
diversified in favour of EU markets, offsetting losses in trade with 
Russia. The technical requirements for access to the EU market are 
demanding and strict, but they are applied in a professionally fair 
manner, without (as elsewhere) geopolitical manipulation.  
Financial assistance is available to help with technical support 
and investment where there are heavy adjustment costs, with grants 
from the EU and loans or investment from European financial 
institutions.2  
The Agreement, with its DCFTA, is no magic wand with which 
to cure Ukraine’s political system and economy of all their problems. 
However, its provisions do engage with a substantial part of Ukraine’s 
political and economic reform agenda. Since the provisions of the 
Agreement and DCFTA are many and complex, there will be much 
‘learning by doing’ for both Ukraine and the EU. There is some notable 
flexibility in fulfilling the commitments, with procedures for extending 
the timetable and amending the detailed legislative references if both 
parties agree.  
 
*  *  *  * 
 
Part I. Political Principles, the Rule of Law and Foreign 
Policy  
The crucial political objective in the Agreement is for Ukraine’s 
democratic institutions to assure respect for core European values. The 
Agreements provide for the detailed monitoring of democratic 
institutions, including the rule of law and human rights. Respect for 
democratic values is considered in the Agreement to be of such 
‘essential’ importance that in the event of their grave violation the 
Agreement may be suspended.  
After the Maidan uprising in 2013–14, Ukraine returned to the 
objective of becoming a truly democratic state, which has since been 
evident in free and fair elections of the parliament and presidency. But 
there is a pressing need to continue improvements in the functioning of 
the democratic institutions. The Association Agenda document 
                                                        
2 Notably, these include the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).  
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particularly urges constitutional reforms to achieve effective checks 
and balances between the institutions and a strengthening of local and 
regional government.  
Success in anti-corruption policy is a prerequisite for the overall 
success of the Agreement and Ukraine’s economic future. Many 
chapters of the Agreement will contribute to this, such as transparency 
in public procurement, but there are still central challenges for Ukraine 
to address regarding the functioning of the judiciary, the prosecution 
office and the role of the Anti-Corruption Bureau.  
Regarding the objective of visa-free travel to the EU, Ukraine has 
been implementing a comprehensive Visa Liberalisation Action Plan. 
In December 2015, the European Commission was able to recommend 
that the visa-free regime go ahead. At the time of writing, the final 
decision on this by the Council of the European Union is pending.  
Cooperation between Ukraine and the EU in the foreign and 
security domains has been gradually building up for over a decade. Yet 
since 2014, with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and war in the eastern 
Donbas region, the question of security cooperation with the EU has 
moved up to the highest strategic level. Operational collaboration is 
envisaged in EU security and defence missions, and in some instances 
is already underway (for example, through the EU Border Assistance 
Mission on the borders of Moldova and Ukraine with the Transnistrian 
region), and there are plans to develop cooperation with EU security 
agencies. 
Part II. Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
The elimination of tariffs is the classic basis for a free trade area. The 
EU largely liberalised access to its market in April 2014 by providing 
Ukraine with ‘autonomous trade measures’ and eliminating 94.7% of 
its tariffs. Under the full provisional application of the DCFTA, which 
began on 1 January 2016, Ukraine is to eliminate its tariffs on imports 
from the EU progressively, mostly within seven years. 
These measures have so far had only a limited impact on 
Ukraine’s exports to the EU, because of the suspension of production 
in the occupied territories, logistical problems and the downward price 
trends on world commodity markets. At the same time, the EU’s share 
of Ukrainian exports and imports has increased, owing to steep 
declines in trade with Russia. The structure of exports to the EU has 
shifted towards machinery, fats and oils, prepared foods and animal 
products. The utilisation of tariff-rate quotas for agricultural products 
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has been limited, as Ukrainian producers have experienced problems 
with food safety and weak demand for its products. 
The main sectoral safeguard is for Ukraine’s car industry, which 
will continue to be protected against a significant growth of imports 
from the EU for up to 15 years. This will help Ukrainian producers in 
the short run, but involves costs for consumers.  
There are provisions on anti-dumping measures, subsidies and 
safeguards to protect the importing economy from serious damage or 
threats thereof. Anti-dumping duties have been applied in the past 
quite extensively by the EU against Ukrainian supplies of metallurgical 
and bulk chemical products, but currently this occurs at a much 
reduced level, given that Ukrainian industry no longer profits from 
artificially low input costs for energy.  
The DCFTA also includes important measures to ensure fast and 
efficient customs services. Ukraine is advancing towards fulfilling its 
legislative commitments, with the new Customs Code broadly aligned 
with EU legislation. But the main task is for border posts with the EU 
to function with less delay and without corruption.  
The adoption of European technical standards for industrial and 
agri-food products is vital for the modernisation and competitiveness 
of the economy. Ukraine has outlined a strategy aimed at eliminating 
technical barriers to trade with the EU, through harmonising its 
legislation with key EU directives and adopting the very large number 
of EU standards. For the agri-food sector, Ukraine is embarking on a 
comprehensive strategy for applying EU sanitary and phytosanitary 
regulations. In due course, this will assure high health and safety 
standards for Ukraine’s consumers, as well as position Ukrainian 
enterprises to export to the EU and other international markets. 
A competitive and diversified service sector is of huge 
importance for the Ukrainian economy. The Agreement is detailed and 
comprehensive in commitments to liberalisation as well as 
reservations, but with more liberalisation and fewer reservations on the 
Ukrainian side than the EU side. The Agreement makes provisions for 
a few service sectors to attain ‘full internal-market treatment’ by the EU 
as a long-term objective.  
Work is in progress on the Agreement’s requirement for Ukraine 
to approximate related EU directives in its public procurement 
legislation. The government is already conducting e-procurement, 
which is proving effective in enhancing efficiency and reducing 
corruption. There are some shortcomings in Ukraine’s system for 
intellectual property rights compared to best EU and international 
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practices, provoking many concerns on the part of the EU and the US. 
These gaps are expected to be addressed by forthcoming legislation.  
Ukraine already has largely aligned its competition policy on EU 
and international standards, and further legislative and institutional 
reforms are envisaged.  
Part III. Economic Cooperation 
As regards the macroeconomic context, in the years since independence 
Ukraine has made only slow progress in economic policy reforms, with 
poor results except for periods of very favourable commodity prices. In 
2014–15, Ukraine suffered a severe recession and losses of 
infrastructure as a result of Russian aggression, on top of the effects of 
the global recession. Nevertheless, the country is now engaged in 
introducing major reforms to its economic policy (for example in the 
energy sector) under the combined influence of an IMF support 
programme and the DCFTA. The EU is supplying significant financial 
assistance through multiple channels, including macroeconomic loans 
alongside the IMF, budget grants and investment from the EIB and 
EBRD. For the period 2014–20, these could total €11 billion.  
Ukraine’s financial sector has been under extreme pressure to 
maintain the stability of the banking system and to service external 
debt. The government and central bank have nonetheless proceeded 
with a comprehensive, long-term programme for updating regulations, 
anchored on EU legislation, as an important part of the general process 
of economic modernisation.  
The energy provisions of the Agreement are crucial from both an 
economic and geopolitical perspective and entail the commitment to 
approximate many EU laws, although implementation so far through 
the associated Energy Community Treaty is behind schedule. That 
notwithstanding, Ukraine’s energy policy is now at long last seeing 
radical and long overdue reforms. Gas supplies are now being 
diversified away from the former total dependence on Russian 
supplies, with the aid of reverse-flow pipelines linked with 
neighbouring EU countries. Energy-saving programmes, in line with 
EU standards, are vital to ultimately achieving the independence of gas 
supplies. Yet for the domestic residential market this is going to be a 
long-term and very costly process, for which the European financial 
institutions are starting to assist. The major programme of securing the 
destroyed nuclear reactor site at Chernobyl is proceeding with 
significant funding from the EU, the EBRD and other international 
donors. 
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The effective implementation of the ambitious environment 
chapter of the Agreement will see a huge upgrade in Ukraine’s 
environmental performance. This can only be achieved in the long run. 
The EIB and EBRD are among the financial institutions capable of 
contributing to the necessary investment.  
Ukraine has huge capacity and potential in the agri-food sector. 
Reforms in the post-Soviet period got off to a slow start, but they are 
now seriously underway. The Agreement contains many references to 
EU agricultural legislation, but there is flexibility in the extent to which 
this should be applied, with no binding timetables. 
The DCFTA sets out the EU’s detailed standards and regulations 
for road, rail, inland waterways, sea and intermodal transport, which 
Ukraine will progressively adopt. Ukraine occupies a pivotal place in 
the pan-European corridors for road and rail connections. The EBRD 
and EIB are providing investment funding for improvements in these 
and other major aspects of the transport infrastructure. 
The broad digital sector, embracing electronic communications 
and the entire ICT economy, is an essential part of the economic reform 
and modernisation process. Ukraine has considerable human capital in 
this field, which is the basis for rapid development of the sector, 
including earnings from business outsourcing. The Agreement 
provides for alignment on EU regulatory practices. 
Ukraine started introducing a regime for consumer rights 
protection upon independence, but so far with questionable success. 
The Agreement requires the approximation of EU legislation on 
product safety and official procedures for protecting consumers and 
enforcing consumer rights.  
The Agreement does not impose strict obligations on Ukraine in 
the area of company law, corporate governance or accounting, but still 
provides a framework of EU company law that will improve Ukraine’s 
business climate.  
Both a new draft Labour Code that is before parliament at the 
time of writing and a new Law on Employment mostly comply with 
EU legislation. Attention should be focused not only on legislative 
work, but also on measures to ensure legal enforcement.  
The Agreement sets out basic aims for the reform and 
modernisation of the education system, especially for higher education 
in line with the ‘Bologna process’. Ukraine’s educational standards are 
ranked in international comparisons as ‘high’ and comparable with its 
Central European neighbours in the EU. Over the period 2014–20, more 
than 4,000 Ukrainians are expected to participate in exchanges with EU 
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universities under the Erasmus+ programme, and 7,000 in youth 
exchanges.  
There are now opportunities for Ukraine to participate in many 
of the EU’s numerous specialised agencies and initiatives, for example 
under the research programme ‘Horizon 2020’, in which Ukraine is 
now a full participant.  
Sharing land borders with four EU member states (Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia and Romania) and Moldova, Ukraine has a keen 
interest in EU-sponsored cross-border cooperation. Several projects are 
underway, typically on facilitating the cross-border labour market, 
environmental interests and matters of common historical heritage. 
Civil society in Ukraine has long been at the forefront of pressure for 
democratic reforms, good governance and the fight against corruption. 
The Agreement provides for support and official status for civil society 
forums. 
Part IV. Legal and Institutional Provisions 
A comprehensive and joint institutional framework, including an 
Association Council, will monitor fulfilment of the Agreement and 
provide a platform for political dialogue. There are well-defined 
procedures for settling disputes that may arise in implementing the 
Agreement.  
 
  
 
PART I. 
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES, THE 
RULE OF LAW AND FOREIGN 
POLICY 
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1. POLITICAL PRINCIPLES 
Provisions of the Association Agreement  
The Association Agreement is premised 
on a commitment to pursue and respect: 
…the common values on which the 
European Union is built – namely 
democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms 
and the rule of law – [which] are 
essential elements of this 
Agreement.  
The phrase “essential elements” 
links to Art. 478 of the Agreement, which provides that in the case of 
abuse of these principles the Agreement may be suspended.  
Art. 6 provides for “dialogue and cooperation on domestic 
reform”. This political dialogue is conducted through regular meetings 
at different levels, including at summit, ministerial and senior official 
levels. 
On the substantive implementation of the basic principles, the 
jointly agreed Association Agenda of 16 March 2015 is more explicit.3 
Priority matters for short-term action include constitutional reform, 
election reform, judicial reform, human rights and public 
administration reform. These challenges are addressed in considerable 
detail. 
Constitutional reform. The Ukrainian government is urged to 
embark on a transparent process of constitutional reform that aims to 
develop effective checks and balances between state institutions. The 
                                                        
3 The “EU-Association Agenda to prepare and facilitate the implementation of 
the Association Agreement”, as endorsed by the EU-Ukraine Association 
Council on 16 March 2015. 
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functioning of local and regional governments should be strengthened, 
including through decentralisation, in line with the European Charter 
on Local Self-Government and with the delegation of substantial 
competences and related financial allocations. 
Electoral reform. Electoral legislation should be improved and 
harmonised, including the laws on referenda, on the Central Electoral 
Commission and the financing of political parties. 
Human rights and fundamental freedoms. Ukraine has 
committed itself to a swift implementation of the judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights. Awareness-raising among the 
judiciary, prosecution and law enforcement bodies is given special 
attention. The Association Agenda outlines measures regarding 
freedom of expression, assembly and association. On freedom of 
expression, best practices should be developed in public broadcasting 
and media access for electoral competitors, and freedom for journalists 
to work without the threat of violence, protected by law enforcement 
agencies. There is a need for legislation in line with best European 
practice on the freedom of assembly, and also to strengthen the 
awareness of law enforcement agencies. Regarding the freedom of 
association, the Agenda pays particular attention to ensuring the rights 
of minorities; the equal treatment of men and women; children’s rights; 
and combating torture and inhuman treatment. 
The texts of the Agreement and Agenda are silent on the future 
political status of the occupied eastern Donbas region, although the 
Minsk II agreement raises the issues of decentralisation and elections. 
The issues of judicial reform and corruption are taken up in 
chapter 2.  
Implementation perspectives 
The Constitution. According to its Constitution, Ukraine is a 
democratic state that adheres to the principles of the rule of law, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. Ensuring respect for these 
principles, however, has proved to be problematic. Ukraine has been 
an unstable democracy so far. After gaining independence in 1991, the 
country experienced two periods of disguised authoritarianism (1995-
2004 and 2010-14), which were ended only by massive public protest. 
After the last wave of protests, known as Euromaidan, Ukraine 
embarked on a path of democratic development, but the reform process 
has been slow. 
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An overview of democratic governance. The most resilient 
component of the democratic system in Ukraine has been the ballot box. 
Although many of the elections in the 1990s and 2000s were not 
considered to be completely free and fair, they were still able to ensure 
a sizeable representation of the political opposition in the Parliament. 
They even produced electoral victories for the opposition in 1994, 2005, 
2006, 2007 and 2010. After the Euromaidan the election process 
improved substantially. Despite a number of problems, most observers 
considered the elections in 2014 and 2015 to be generally compliant 
with international standards. Problems remain with the non-
transparent financing of election campaigns, which allows wealthy 
businessmen and corrupt politicians to improperly influence the results 
with vote-buying and the abuse of power by officials.  
Other components of the democratic system are weaker, 
however. After gaining independence, there was a power struggle 
between representatives of the executive and legislative branches of 
Ukraine’s government. The Constitution of 1996 established Ukraine as 
a semi-presidential republic, with a strong role for the president. But in 
the Constitution of 2004, adopted after the pro-democratic protests 
known as the Orange Revolution, the balance of power shifted towards 
a parliamentary system. Yet the new political system was flawed. A 
fierce struggle for power between President Viktor Yushchenko and 
Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko in 2007-09 reversed the gains of the 
Orange Revolution, and caused the country’s democracy to backslide 
in the subsequent years. In 2014, the Constitution of 2004 was 
reinstated, but once again power imbalances posed risks to democracy. 
For most of Ukraine’s independence period, the principle of the 
separation of powers has not been implemented properly. The judiciary 
and the prosecutor’s office were prone to political influence by the 
executive and the legislative branches of government. The failure of the 
system was epitomised by the ‘general supervision’ function of the 
prosecutor’s office, which was allowed to check any individual or 
entity for compliance with the country’s laws. This function was the 
backbone of corrupt regimes. Recent amendments to the Constitution 
and plans to overhaul the justice sector are hopeful signs that 
improving the rule of law and fighting corruption are finally being 
taken seriously (see chapter 2). 
Ukraine’s system of government is highly centralised, but with 
three levels of administrative, territorial entities: oblasts, rayons and 
towns/villages, each of which has elected representative bodies 
(councils). In reality the powers of these bodies are minuscule. Oblasts 
and rayons are governed by executives that are directly appointed by 
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central government. As noted above, this system is currently under 
review. 
Finally, the participation of Ukrainian citizens in politics and 
civic life is not effective. Although the share of Ukrainians who work in 
political parties or action groups is higher than in most EU countries, 
activists have little influence over their parties’ decisions. Ukrainian 
parties typically lack coherent ideologies and are just vehicles for their 
leaders and financial patrons. Most parties have a short lifespan (four 
out of the six parties that won the 2014 elections have been around for 
less than five years), and politicians often change party affiliation. As a 
result, political parties do not adequately represent large strata of 
society. Public trust in political parties, which grew in the 1990s and the 
first half of the 2000s, has fallen to 19% in recent years and has not really 
improved since the Euromaidan (24%).4 The share of Ukrainians 
working in civil society organisations was lower than in EU countries,5 
although since the Euromaidan volunteer activities have accelerated.6  
Reform of democratic governance. The scope of reforms since 
Euromaidan has been limited, and their pace slow. The reforms focused 
primarily on the decentralisation and independence of the judiciary, 
and less on contentious issues such as electoral rules. The problem of 
power distribution was not even mentioned in key strategic documents 
such as the parliamentary coalition agreement or the government 
action plan. 
In March 2015, President Poroshenko established a 
Constitutional Commission with a mandate to draft amendments to the 
Constitution. The Commission, which was composed of legal experts 
                                                        
4 The figures represent the share of Ukrainians believing that at least one party 
in the country deserves to be entrusted with power, and come from surveys 
conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of 
Ukraine. Source: UA Pershyi TV channel (the First National TV channel), 5 
November 2015 (http://1tv.com.ua/news/73487 - in Ukrainian). 
5 In 2004-12, the share of Ukrainians who worked in political parties or action 
groups in the past 12 months varied from 3.6% to 4.1%. The corresponding 
medians for the EU countries ranged from 3% to 3.8%. However, in that period 
only 1.4-2.3% of Ukrainians worked in other organisations or associations. The 
median for the EU countries ranged from 6.6% to 13.9%. Source: own 
calculations based on the data from the European Social Survey for 2004, 2006, 
2008, 2010 and 2012 (www.europeansocialsurvey.org/). 
6 In 2015, 13% of the population participated in various volunteer activities, 
according to a survey conducted by Razumkov Centre and Democratic 
Initiative Fund (www.ufb.org.ua/poslugi/poshyrenya_informacii/ 
vidavnicha-iniciativa.htm?id=4636). 
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and politicians, decided not to prepare a comprehensive bill to amend 
the Constitution at once. Instead, it began to draft separate bills aimed 
at resolving particular issues. In 2015, the Commission prepared three 
bills. The first one dealt with decentralisation, the second concerned the 
judiciary and the third revised the chapter of the Constitution on 
human rights. Another bill – on the procedure to remove parliamentary 
immunity – had been prepared prior to the creation of the 
Constitutional Commission, but it ran into problems with the Venice 
Commission of the Council of Europe. 
The bill creating a framework for the decentralisation of power 
was completed by the Constitutional Commission in June 2015. It made 
provision for the establishment of local governments (executive 
committees) subordinated to the councils at the rayon and oblast levels. 
The local governments were intended to replace centrally directed local 
state administrations, which had to be dissolved. The bill provided few 
details on the powers with which the local governments had to be 
entrusted. Those details would have to be determined by later laws. 
The bill also established a framework for the modification of the 
administrative division of Ukraine, namely for the consolidation of the 
lowest- level administrative units. It was expected that 1,500-2,000 
communities would be created instead of about 11,000 villages, towns, 
and cities (while higher-level units, rayons and oblasts, would be 
preserved). The decentralisation was planned for after the local 
elections, scheduled for October 2017. 
The proposed amendments regarding decentralisation sparked 
two serious controversies, however. First, the bill determined that local 
self-government in the occupied areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions 
might have special features, which was a requirement of the Minsk II 
agreement aimed at settling the conflict in the Donbas. A number of 
MPs and political activists vigorously opposed that provision, fearing 
that it might undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty. They believed that 
Donbas insurgents were effectively controlled by Russia, and that 
granting privileges to them would provide Moscow with a long-term 
lever to destabilise Ukraine and influence its policies. Second, the bill 
expanded the powers of the president, who would have the right to 
terminate the powers of locally elected officials and bodies if their 
decisions posed a threat to the national security or territorial integrity 
of Ukraine. Certain MPs deemed that this posed a risk of usurpation by 
the president. 
With respect to the reform of electoral legislation, the authorities 
have so far fallen short of implementing the plans called for in the 2014 
coalition agreement. The latter provided for a replacement of mixed 
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proportional-majoritarian electoral systems with open-list proportional 
systems, for both parliamentary and local elections. The majoritarian 
component (single member constituencies) was widely seen as a key 
weakness of the electoral system, because that component created 
favourable opportunities for vote-buying and abuse of power by local 
officials. However, in July 2015, the Parliament introduced a 
proportional system for local elections that was not an open-list system. 
The new system preserved a strong degree of party control over 
candidates and did not resolve campaign financing issues. The 
question of parliamentary election rules was postponed. Nevertheless, 
the Parliament took a step to arrange party financing by passing laws 
that allow for public (budget) financing of parties that win elections. 
Human rights. The Constitution of Ukraine proclaims that the 
main duty of the state is to affirm and ensure human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. The list of respected civil and political rights 
mentioned in the Constitution is consistent with international human 
rights norms. In practice, the majority of those rights and freedoms are 
generally protected. Notable exceptions concern the right to a fair trial, 
the right to an effective remedy before a national authority and the 
prohibition of torture. In the periods of backsliding on democracy, 
political rights were also significantly curtailed. 
The Constitutional Commission has drafted a bill that revised the 
chapter of the Constitution on human rights. It is intended to align the 
contents of the chapter with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, and to extend the protection of human rights. 
Specifically, it reduces the term for judicial approval for taking a person 
into custody from 72 hours to 48 hours. The bill explicitly prohibits the 
death penalty. The law on local elections that was passed in July 2015 
determined that at least 30% of candidates on party lists should be 
women. 
As a member of the Council of Europe alongside all EU member 
states, Ukraine adheres to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) and Fundamental Freedoms and is bound by the rulings of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
Open issues regarding Ukraine’s record are set out in detail in 
the Association Agenda document. According to the Agenda, Ukraine 
had to adopt and implement a National Human Rights Strategy, with 
a view to improving its record of treating both individual cases 
pertinent to human rights and issues concerning international law 
instruments. The latter includes swift implementation of all judgments 
of the Strasbourg-based Court of Human Rights. To be able to 
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implement judgments, the Ukrainian government is now analysing the 
possibility to issue special state government bonds to pay back to 
Ukrainians who won trials in the European Court of Human Rights.  
The National Human Rights Strategy of Ukraine was approved 
by the president in August 2015.7 The document was drawn up by a 
working group that included civil servants, civil society groups, the 
Ombudsperson, with the support of international organisations 
(including the UNDP, the OHCHR and the Council of Europe). The 
Strategy contains 24 strategic areas that include the entire spectrum of 
human rights, in particular anti-discrimination and the protection of 
persons that belong to national minorities.8 According to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the Strategy is in line with the provisions 
of the EU Strategy for Human Rights and Democracy.9 Some of its 
provisions, however, are rather declarative. It is too early to evaluate 
the impact of the Strategy on actual human rights protection as the 
Action Plan for its implementation, which clarified most provisions of 
the Strategy, was adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers only on 23 
November 2015. This document was also drafted with the participation 
of civil society groups.10 
As regards anti-discrimination, there have been some noticeable 
achievements. In November 2015, the Verkhovna Rada approved 
amendments to the Labour Code, which explicitly prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,11 which was required 
in the framework of the implementation by Ukraine of the Visa 
Liberalisation Action Plan (VLAP). There was progress in delivering 
training on anti-discrimination for law enforcement officials, 
prosecutors and judges with a more systematic and permanent 
approach. The number of staff in the Non-Discrimination Unit of the 
Ombudsman’s Secretariat was increased.  
                                                        
7 The Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 501/2015, from 25 August 2015. 
8 See www.ua.undp.org/content/ukraine/en/home/presscenter/articles/ 
2015/08/31/un-welcomes-adoption-of-the-national-human-rights-
strategy.html.  
9 See http://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-news/39699-
komentar-mzs-ukrajini-shhodo-nacionalynoji-strategiji-u-sferi-prav-lyudini.  
10 The Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 1393-р, 23 
November 2015. 
11 The respective provision is still to be incorporated into the new version of the 
Labour Code, which is now pending in the Parliament.  
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The Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group (KhPG) has noted 
that human rights protection in Ukraine (excluding the occupied 
territories) improved in 2015, as there was a higher level of political 
freedom, freedom of speech and freedom of media, assembly and 
association.12 The situation with human rights protection in 2015 also 
appeared to have improved, based on statistics from the European 
Court of Human Rights. In particular, the number of applications 
allocated to a judicial formation declined from over 13,000 in each of 
preceding two years to 6,010.13  
In particular, Ukraine’s political rights rating, conducted 
annually by Freedom House, rose in 2015 from 4 to 3 and its freedom 
rating improved from 3.5 to 3.14 According to the KhPG, the situation 
about the right to protection from torture and abuse and the right to 
freedom and personal inviolability has also improved due to 
enforcement of a new Criminal Procedure Code and the development 
of a free legal aid system. At the same time, the difficult economic 
situation and military conflict in the East resulted in increased crime 
levels.  
The percentage of criminal trials that end in convictions is 
extremely high. In 2005-12, only 0.2-0.3% of the defendants were 
acquitted by first instance courts. The validity of verdicts was 
systematically called into question by the ECtHR. In 2000-15, the 
Strasbourg-based Court rendered 1,052 judgments in cases against 
Ukraine. In 765 judgments it found violations of the right to a fair trial. 
The next two most common infractions exposed by the Court were 
violations of the right to an effective remedy before a national authority 
(188 judgments), and violation of the prohibition of torture (130 
judgments). The latter is linked to harsh conditions in prisons and pre-
trial detention facilities, as well as cruel treatment by law enforcement 
officers. Enterprises also suffer. Since the 1990s, Ukraine’s government 
has been heavily criticised for its poor protection of property rights and 
its failure to provide equal opportunities to private businesses. 
According to the Ukraine 2014 Human Rights Report issued by 
the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour of the US 
Department of State, the problems with human rights protection 
decreased in 2014 but remained high (likely the same is true for 2015).15 
                                                        
12 See www.khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1455478937.  
13 See www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CP_Ukraine_ENG.pdf.  
14 See https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/ukraine.  
15 See www.state.gov/documents/organization/236800.pdf. 
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Excluding the problems related to the annexation of Crimea and the 
war in the East, systemic problems include: 
abuse of persons in custody, in particular beatings and 
alleged torture of detainees and prisoners; harsh 
conditions in prisons and detention facilities; a corrupt 
judicial system; societal violence against women and 
abuse of children; societal discrimination against and 
harassment of ethnic minorities; trafficking in persons; 
discrimination toward persons with HIV/AIDS that 
endangered their prospects for treatment; limitations on 
workers’ right to strike, and forced labour.16  
Protection of the Roma minority was improved in 2013, with 
approval of a ‘Strategy of integration of Roma minority by 2020’.17 In 
2014, Crimean Tatars were recognised by the Ukrainian Parliament as 
indigenous people of Crimea/Ukraine. 
The situation in Crimea and Donbas. The political and human 
rights situation is far worse in Crimea, which was annexed by Russia 
in 2014, and in a part of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Donbas), 
controlled by Russia-backed insurgents. The political regimes in those 
territories are de facto authoritarian, with limited freedoms and 
systematic human rights violations. The human rights situation in 
Donbas is also aggravated by the military conflict that has been there 
since April 2014. The conflict undermined the most basic rights – to life 
and security. As of April 2016, a conservative estimate of the number 
of causalities from the conflict reached 30,729, including 9,333 people 
killed and 21,396 injured.18 Evidence has also revealed that Ukrainian 
civilians and military personnel have been tortured and ill-treated by 
armed groups controlled by Russia.19 The rights of some Ukrainians are 
                                                        
16 See Ukraine 2014 Human Rights Report 
(www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper). 
17 See http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/201/2013. 
18 The figures include casualties among Ukrainian armed forces and police, 
insurgent groups, and civilians. Source: Associated Press, “9,333 Killed since 
Ukraine Conflict Began, U.N. Says”, New York Times, 28 April 2016 
(www.nytimes.com/2016/04/29/ 
world/europe/9333-killed-since-ukraine-conflict-began-un-says.html). 
19 According to the mission of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, by the end of October 2015, about 8,000 people were killed and 
more than 17,000 injured as a result of the armed conflict. The number of people 
shot without trial or missing is not known; however, according to estimates, it 
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also violated in the criminal proceedings conducted against them by 
the Russian authorities (see the cases, for example, of Oleh Sentsov, 
Nadia Savchenko and Oleksandr Kolchenko). In this context, the 
European Parliament adopted a resolution requiring Russia to release 
all illegally detained Ukrainian citizens.20 
Masses of people were forced to leave their homes. The number 
of internally displaced persons (IDPs) who fled to government-
controlled areas is estimated at about 1.7 million. In addition, according 
to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR), over 1 million Ukrainians sought asylum or 
protection abroad, primarily in Russia and Belarus.21 Individuals 
registered as IDPs are not eligible for extensive government support.22 
Instead, civil society, churches, volunteers and international donors 
make tremendous efforts to support them. Moreover, during the local 
elections in 2015, IDPs were not able to vote. The effectiveness of the 
State Agency on Donbas Recovery, established in autumn 2014, with 
the aim inter alia to ensure social and professional adaptation of the 
IDPs, seems to be low. The Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) called on Ukraine’s 
government to establish more effective systems to protect the human 
rights of IDPs, many of whom left behind all they had.23 In April 2016, 
the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and IDPs was 
established, replacing state agencies dealing with Donbas and Crimea 
issues. 
The rule of law is virtually absent in the territories controlled by 
insurgents. Some 2.7 million people living in the area are without access 
to a fair trial. Numerous allegations of killings, arbitrary detention, 
torture and ill-treatment are reported. Freedoms of expression, religion, 
peaceful assembly, and association are substantially limited. Freedom 
                                                        
might reach 750-1,200 individuals. There are also numerous military and 
civilian prisoners kept in prisons in the occupied territory. 
20 See www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20150903IPR91536/ 
Human-rights-Russia-Azerbaijan-and-Angola.  
21 OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine (16 November 
2015 to 15 February 2016) (www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/ 
Ukraine_13th_HRMMU_Report_3March2016.pdf). 
22 For the description of government policies on IDPs, see H. Brenzel, O. Betliy 
and R. Kirchner, “Economic issues of internally displaced people in Ukraine”, 
Policy Paper Series, PP/06/2015, GAG/IER, December 2015. 
23 See http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/070/53/PDF/ 
G1507053.pdf?OpenElement.  
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of movement is also restricted as crossing the contact line between 
Ukrainian armed forces and insurgent groups is complicated. Human 
rights are structurally violated in Crimea post-annexation, as there are 
cases of deprivation of liberty and the alleged ill-treatment of 
Ukrainians belonging to the Crimean Tatars ethnic group. In particular, 
in April 2016, the so-called Supreme Court of Crimea banned the 
activities of the Mejlis, a self-governing body of the Crimean Tatars, 
thereby violating basic rights of this ethnic group. The local authorities 
harass and intimidate Crimean Tatars, pro-Ukraine activists and 
journalists. The administration initiated criminal proceedings against a 
number of Crimean Tatars on fabricated charges such as terrorism and 
extremism, carried out intrusive searches at mosques and homes and 
shut down media outlets. The authorities also failed to properly 
investigate cases of killings, torture and beatings by para-military 
groups.24 Ukraine has lodged three inter-state applications against 
Russia at the European Court of Human Rights.25 Besides, more than 
1,400 individual applications related to the events in Crimea or the 
hostilities in Eastern Ukraine are currently pending before the Court.  
 
Political principles at a glance 
After the government changeover that followed the Euromaidan protests, 
Ukraine embarked on a path of democratic reforms. 
The most notable reforms aim to change the Constitution to enhance the 
rule of law and curb corruption, and to substantially increase the powers of 
local authorities via decentralisation. Changes to electoral legislation are 
also expected. 
Overall, Ukraine’s human rights record is now relatively positive, while 
still needing improvements.  
On the other hand, Crimea and the eastern Donbas, which are not controlled 
by the government, see a return to authoritarianism and systematic human 
rights violations. 
 
                                                        
24 Human Rights Watch, “Ukraine: Fear, Repression in Crimea”, 18 March 2016 
(www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/18/ukraine-fear-repression-crimea). 
25 “European Court of Human Rights communicates to Russia new inter-State 
case concerning events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine”, Press release, ECHR 
296 (2015), 01.10.2015 (http://goo.gl/Ibd0J9).  
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2. RULE OF LAW AND MOVEMENT 
OF PEOPLE 
This chapter deals with a nexus of 
related issues, notably the fight against 
organised crime, corruption and 
terrorism, and policies for border 
management and the movement of 
people, including the key issue of visa-
free travel between Ukraine and the EU. 
The fight against crime, 
corruption and terrorism 
The Association Agreement underlines the paramount case for a sound 
rule of law, but it does not provide any detailed guidelines. The 
Association Agenda document of March 2015, however, is far more 
explicit on the need for judicial reform and improvement in the rule of 
law more generally.26  
The rule of law is the weakest component of democratic 
governance in Ukraine. One aspect of this is that law enforcement is 
biased. For instance, groups of top officials and wealthy businessmen 
seem to enjoy low levels of accountability and high levels of illicit 
privileges, while others cannot have certain rights protected (see also 
chapter 1).  
Another aspect is the high level of corruption. Over the last 15 
years, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index has 
ranked Ukraine in the range of 21 to 28 on a scale of 0 (the highest level 
of corruption) to 100 (an absence of corruption). The judiciary, police 
                                                        
26 See Joint Press Release, “EU-Association Agenda to prepare and facilitate the 
implementation of the Association Agreement, as endorsed by the EU-Ukraine 
Association Council on 16 March 2015”, 16 March 2015.  
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and public administration have largely been perceived as the most 
corrupt institutions in the country. The situation has not yet improved 
since the revolution of 2013-14.  
Still, the authorities have launched a series of reforms aimed at 
enhancing the rule of law and curbing corruption.  
First, parliament passed long-awaited and comprehensive 
reforms to the judiciary in June 2016, inter alia, amending the 
constitution and the Law on Judicature, and adopting a new law on the 
enforcement of judgements. According to the new legislation, judges 
will henceforth be selected on a competitive basis by the High Council 
of Justice, composed mainly of the judiciary and the association of 
lawyers. This applies to the selection of judges for local courts, the 
regional Appeals Courts and a new Supreme Court that should start 
hearing cases in 2017. Parliament has been stripped of powers to 
appoint judges, and neither the parliament nor the president will have 
the right to dismiss judges. The bill also provides for checks on the 
powers and integrity of incumbent judges, while at the same time 
dramatically increasing their salaries. Importantly, judges who cannot 
verify the legality of their assets and those of their family can now be 
dismissed. The state’s monopoly on the enforcement of judgements will 
be abolished through the introduction of private bailiffs. The changes 
to the constitution were approved by the Venice Commission, and the 
launch of the judicial reforms has been positively assessed by EU and 
US officials. Nevertheless, the risk of reforms stalling remains high, as 
further legislation and effective implementation efforts are both 
necessary to ensure that the reforms achieve their aims, namely to 
establish the rule of law in the country. 
Second, reform of the prosecutor’s office is underway. In 
December 2015, a new system of local prosecutors’ offices began 
operating. Local prosecutors are now selected through a competitive 
process. Amendments to the constitution and relevant laws are 
intended to increase the independence of prosecutors while narrowing 
their mandate, notably depriving them of their ‘general supervision’ 
function. 
Third, the government has embarked on reforms to police 
administration. In November 2015, the police force, officially called 
‘militia’, was replaced by the National Police of Ukraine. Some of the 
police officers have been hired on a competitive basis, but most of them 
will be re-categorised following a competency check, which will 
involve civil society representatives. The EU Assistance Mission 
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(EUAM),27 together with the other international donors, recently 
announced the creation of a new structure designed to assist reform of 
the country’s National Police, which is expected to help bring about 
crucial changes in four main areas: community policing, criminal 
investigation, human resources and public order.28 Moreover, EU-
compliant criminal analysis and risk analysis systems will be 
established within the Counter-Trafficking Department of the National 
Police, with the support of the International Organisation for Migration 
and funding from the US Department of State.29 
Fourth, reforms of Ukraine’s civil service have been enacted. The 
new law on the civil service entered into force in May 2016, with the 
selection of civil servants subsequently to be based on an open 
competition. Civil society representatives will be involved in the 
selection process. In addition, the law seeks to de-politicise the civil 
service. 
Fifth, the authorities have started work on a set of reforms aimed 
at curbing corruption. These include opening state registers and 
databases to the public, introducing an electronic public procurement 
system and establishing anti-corruption bodies (the National Anti-
Corruption Bureau, the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office 
and the National Agency for Prevention of Corruption). 
The National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) was created on 
time,30 and its head appointed in April 2015, following an open and 
competitive selection process. Yet, its full operational start was delayed 
owing to the late establishment of a specialised anti-corruption 
prosecution office, the head of which was not appointed until the end 
                                                        
27 The European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine is a non-executive 
mission of the EU that formally began operations from its headquarters in Kyiv 
in December 2014, following the Revolution of Dignity (2013–14) and an 
invitation issued by the Ukrainian government. EUAM Ukraine seeks to assist 
the Ukrainian authorities to undertake sustainable reforms of civilian security 
through strategic advice and hands-on support for specific reform measures 
based on EU standards and international principles of good governance and 
human rights.  
28 See “EUAM Ukraine: New structure to assist national police reform” 
(www.enpi-info.eu/maineast.php?id_type=1&id=43519&lang_id=450). 
29 See “IOM supports Ukrainian national police in developing counter-
trafficking criminal analysis and risk analysis systems” 
(http://iom.org.ua/en/iom-supports-ukrainian-national-police-developing-
counter-trafficking-criminal-analysis-and-risk). 
30 The Bureau was set up in accordance with the timetable in the Visa 
Liberalisation Action Plan. 
24  PART I. POLITICAL PRINCIPLES, THE RULE OF LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 
 
of November 2015. Amendments to the Law on Prosecution were 
passed in February 2016, making this office independent of the general 
prosecutor.  
Also, by the first quarter of 2016, the majority of the members of 
the National Agency for Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) had been 
nominated, thus enabling the Agency to be fully operational. Unlike the 
NABU, which has the power of investigation, the NAPC monitors (the 
lifestyles of) officials, for instance by way of the electronic system for 
the declaration of property. 
Several other important legislative acts were passed with the aim 
of reducing corruption. Notable in particular are the laws on asset 
recovery, on seizure and special confiscation, and on electronic 
declarations for civil servants.  
Furthermore, in February 2015, parliament gave its preliminary 
approval to the abolition of parliamentary immunity. But that decision 
drew criticism from the Venice Commission, which spoke in favour of 
limiting immunity to ensure the protection of MPs against abuse of 
power by officials. 
The pace of reforms, however, is widely considered inadequate 
by the public, with complaints persisting, for example, about 
appointment procedures for local prosecutors. Re-establishing people’s 
trust in the justice sector is arguably one of the most daunting 
challenges to put Ukraine firmly onto the reform track.   
Movement of persons and visas 
In the Association Agreement, the movement of persons is dealt with 
only in summary terms, but the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan (VLAP) 
goes into much more detail.31 The Agreement confirms that Ukraine is 
required to fully implement the visa facilitation and readmission 
agreements and to take gradual steps on the road to visa liberalisation 
(i.e. visa-free access). In December 2015, the European Commission 
formally recommended to the Council of the EU that the EU apply the 
visa-free regime to Ukrainians for short trips to the EU.32 In April 2016, 
                                                        
31 The VLAP is applied in two phases: first through legislation and institutional 
arrangements, and then implementation. Successful completion of these 
conditions is now at the top of the political agenda.  
32 See the “Sixth Progress Report on the Implementation by Ukraine of the 
Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation”, December 2015 (https://ec.europa.eu/ 
transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2015/EN/1-2015-905-EN-F1-1.PDF). 
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the European Commission proposed issuing a visa waiver for 
Ukrainian citizens with biometric passports.33 It is now up to the 
Council of the EU and the European Parliament to give their final 
backing for visa-free travel. However, the EU continues to pay much 
attention to the policy agenda in Ukraine, in particular to issues related 
to fighting corruption.  
In its latest report, the Commission concluded that Ukraine has 
met all the benchmarks set in the four blocks of the VLAP’s second 
phase:  
1) document security, including biometric passports (see section 
below);  
2) integrated border management, migration management and 
asylum (see section below);  
3) public order and security (see chapters 1 and 3); and 
4) external relations and fundamental rights (see chapters 3 and 
1, respectively).  
Document security, including biometric passports. Significant 
progress was made in 2015, when Ukraine began issuing biometric 
passports that comply with the requirements of the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation. A second line of control was introduced at Kyiv 
Boryspil airport, which can access information on fingerprints stored in 
Ukrainian passports. Since January 2016, new biometric ID cards have 
been issued, but they are currently only available to Ukrainians who 
apply for a passport for the first time. 
Migration and border management. The Agreement sets the 
stage for comprehensive dialogue and cooperation on legal and illegal 
migration, trafficking and smuggling of people, border management, 
asylum, return policies and the movement of persons. Ukrainian 
policies on migration and border management have been amended 
during recent years as part of implementing the VLAP.  
Of particular importance was the approval by the Ukrainian 
parliament of the law on external labour migration in November 2015. 
This law sets the parameters for regulating reintegration, which is 
essential when taking into account the large number of external labour 
migrants from Ukraine (1.3–2.5 million people according to different 
estimates). The Agreement also protects Ukrainian workers legally 
employed in the EU against discrimination (Art. 17).  
                                                        
33 See the Commission’s proposal of April 2016 (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-236-EN-F1-1.PDF). 
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As mentioned in chapter 3 (on foreign and security policy), the 
EU has established special advisory missions to assist the Ukrainian 
authorities on border management issues. For example, in the context 
of the EUAM, in May 2015 it set up a Border Management Assistance 
Group with Ukrainian partners, which is currently confronted with 
exceptional challenges on its borders with Russia and the separatist 
regions of eastern Donbas. Another mission, the EU Border Assistance 
Mission (EUBAM), is part of the EU’s combined effort to help Moldova 
and Ukraine meet the mandatory requirements of Title III of the 
Agreement (Justice, Freedom, and Security).34 EUBAM provides 
assistance on harmonising legislation, ensuring skills transfer for 
border professionals and helping institutions to build the processes, 
infrastructure and contacts for intra-service, inter-agency and 
international cooperation. The Ukrainian authorities have ensured 
access to Interpol databases at border crossing points and have taken 
further steps to cooperate on border control and border surveillance 
with neighbouring countries. The government also approved an 
Integrated Border Management Strategy for the period 2016–20.35 The 
State Border Guard Service is advancing towards its transition to a 
modern law-enforcement agency aligned with EU best practices. 
 
Justice, freedom and security at a glance 
Success in improving the rule of law and anti-corruption policy is 
universally considered to be indispensable to the overall success of the 
Association Agreement and Ukraine’s economic future.  
Significant reforms were at last underway by mid-June 2016, notably to the 
judiciary and prosecutor’s office.  
Border management has become a matter of increasing and indeed strategic 
significance for Ukraine, for which the EU has introduced specific 
programmes. 
The objective for Ukraine to obtain visa-free access for its citizens to travel 
to the EU is of the highest political and practical importance, and the official 
criteria for granting visa-free access have been fulfilled.  
  
                                                        
34 See EUBAM, “What we do” (http://eubam.org/what-we-do/#2). 
35 See the CMU Resolution No. 1149-р of October 2015 
(http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1149-2015-%D1%80). 
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3. FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
The Association Agreement aims to 
facilitate the gradual alignment of 
Ukraine’s foreign, security and defence 
policies with those of the EU at bilateral, 
regional and multilateral levels. These 
include areas covered by the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 
the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP).  
The CFSP encompasses the 
objectives and issues of strategic interest to the EU, the joint actions and 
common positions adopted by the Union and the procedures for 
implementing these actions and positions. In 2014, Ukraine aligned its 
position to 73% of the CFSP declarations.  
The CSDP may undertake a wide range of tasks, including 
humanitarian, conflict prevention, disarmament and peacekeeping 
operations; the deployment of combat forces in crisis management; and 
post-conflict stabilisation. 
Provisions of the Agreement  
Conflict diplomacy. The parties undertake to work together for the 
peaceful resolution of regional conflicts and reaffirm their commitment 
to the international canons of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the 
inviolability of borders in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. The Association Agenda 
goes further by stating that the parties will make use of the bilateral and 
multilateral fora to achieve a sustainable political solution for the 
conflicts caused by Russia’s “illegal activities” on Ukrainian territory.  
Examples include the Geneva Joint Declaration between 
representatives of the EU, the US, Ukraine and Russia (17 April 2014) 
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and diplomatic efforts undertaken in the ‘Normandy format’ 
(Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia), which led to the adoption of 
the Berlin Declaration in July 2014, the Minsk Protocol and 
Memorandum in September 2014, and the Minsk II declaration of 
February 2015. The EU has supported these efforts and maintained 
pressure on Russia by applying targeted and sectoral sanctions. It 
supports the role given to the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in overseeing the implementation of the 
Minsk protocols, with the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission and the 
OSCE Observer Mission tasked with monitoring the borders and 
ceasefire agreement.  
In parallel, a series of trilateral talks were held between the 
European Commission, Russia and Ukraine in support of the Package 
of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements and with 
the aim of “finding practical solutions to Russian concerns about the 
implementation of the DCFTA”.36 Russia raised “concerns” about 
customs cooperation, technical barriers to trade (TBTs) and sanitary 
and phytosanitary issues (SPS). In response, it was agreed to delay the 
provisional application of the DCFTA until 1 January 2016 while talks 
continued. However, Russia made various proposals that would have 
effectively destroyed the DCFTA, or delayed its implementation 
further. In a series of trilateral meetings, the European Commission and 
Ukraine sought clarification on the alleged problems for Russia, and 
offered various formulae to give reasonable reassurances, but no 
agreement could be reached. The trilateral negotiations were 
discontinued at the end of 2015, and the DCFTA entered into 
provisional force on 1 January 2016. 
CSDP missions in Ukraine. The EU carries out a Border 
Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM), which aims to 
strengthen border control facilities, including, notably, at the borders 
of the Transnistrian region of Moldova. It is a contribution to efforts in 
the 5+2 framework aimed at the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. 
Ukraine and the EU are part of the ‘5’ together with Russia, the US and 
the OSCE; and the ‘2’ consists of Moldova and Transnistria.   
The EU has also deployed an Advisory Mission for Civilian 
Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM). The role of this 160-person 
strong mission is to provide strategic advice on the planning and 
implementation of sustainable reforms to the civilian security-sector 
bodies responsible for the rule of law and law enforcement. Examples 
of early action include support for the implementation of a new law on 
                                                        
36 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-15-5603_en.htm. 
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the police, and the sharing of French expertise for an electronic case 
management system with 400 prosecutors of the Odessa region. The 
EUAM advises on the reform of the judiciary and public prosecution. 
In terms of regional outreach, EUAM experts work with the police in 
the Khmelnytsky and Lviv regions, advise on civil security reform and 
provide strategic communications advice in the Dnipropetrovsk 
region, support the law enforcement inter-agency cooperation in the 
Kherson region, and provide free legal aid in Poltava. 
Ukraine in CSDP operations elsewhere. The Association 
Agreement envisages Ukraine and the EU cooperating in conflict 
prevention and crisis management elsewhere in the world. In 2005, 
Ukraine and the EU adopted a framework agreement facilitating the 
participation of Ukraine in EU crisis management operations and an 
agreement on security procedures for the exchange of classified 
information. Ukraine contributes to the EU-led Naval Military 
Operation for combating piracy off the east coast of Africa 
(EUNAVFOR Atalanta). After the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine kept 
its forces at EUNAVFOR Atalanta’s headquarters but pulled out its 
frigate ‘Hetman Sahaydachny.’ 
The Association Agenda calls for consultations with a view to 
increasing the inter-operability of peacekeeping forces through 
advancing military and technical cooperation. Ukraine is able to 
collaborate with CSDP agencies and bodies, including the European 
Defence Agency, the European Union Satellite Centre and the 
European Security and Defence College. 
Weapons of mass destruction and disarmament. Ukraine and the 
EU have also agreed to advance the non-proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, combat terrorism and the illegal arms trade, and 
cooperate on arms controls, arms export control and arms trafficking, 
including small arms. 
International Criminal Court. The Association Agreement 
focuses on the ratification and implementation of the 1998 Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, which Ukraine has signed.  
Implementation perspective 
The basic framework for the alignment of Ukraine’s foreign and 
security policy with that of the EU began to be developed in 2000.37 
                                                        
37 See address by the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of 6 March 
2001, “On the internal and external situation of Ukraine in 2000” 
(http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0002100-01 (in Ukrainian)). 
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Since then, the EU and Ukraine have signed several bilateral 
agreements aimed at strengthening their cooperation. Specifically, they 
agreed on the Mechanisms for consultations on crisis management 
(2002), concluded the Agreement on the security procedures for the 
exchange of classified information (2005) and the Agreement 
establishing a framework for the participation of Ukraine in the EU-led 
crisis management operations (2005).38 Those steps reflected Ukraine’s 
intention to expand cooperation with the European Union, even if the 
intensity of coordination efforts was uneven due to a variation in 
positions of subsequent Ukrainian governments. 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its ‘hybrid’ war in Donbas in 
2014 dramatically changed the focus for joint cooperation efforts in the 
foreign and security policy domains. As Russia officially denied its 
involvement in the military conflict in Donbas, Ukraine was not able to 
achieve any de-escalation through bilateral negotiations. The ‘Minsk’ 
peace process was launched with the support of the EU. Active 
diplomatic efforts by the EU and its member states, combined with 
sanctions imposed on Russian individuals and entities, contributed 
significantly to the reduction of hostilities, which in principle should 
lead towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict. 
Ukraine supports the EU’s sanctions imposed on Russian targets 
and considers them as a tool to curb the aggression. It joined in certain 
EU decisions by imposing several sets of sanctions, which included 
travel bans and asset freezes on individuals and entities responsible for 
action against Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Ukraine has also imposed 
an embargo on the import and export of certain goods from/to Russia, 
including arms and related materials, and it has banned flights of 
Russian airlines to the country. Ukraine also advocates a tightening of 
international sanctions against Russia. In December 2015, the 
Parliament of Ukraine called on the Parliaments of other countries to 
extend and strengthen sanctions against Russia for organising terrorist 
acts in Ukraine.39 
                                                        
38 MFA of Ukraine. Foreign and security policy, see http://ukraine-
eu.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-eu/dialogue/foreign-policy. 
39 Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine No. 892-VIII of 11 December 2015, 
“On appeal of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the Parliaments of foreign 
states, the European Parliament and the parliamentary assemblies of 
international organizations to continue and strengthen sanctions against the 
Russian Federation for organizing terrorist acts in Ukraine” 
(http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/892-viii (in Ukrainian)). 
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Building on the Association Agreement, Ukraine intends to 
enhance the convergence of its foreign policy with the CFSP/CSDP.40 
This does not mean that Ukraine is willing to embrace EU positions 
unconditionally, however. Some approaches proposed by the EU might 
not be acceptable for Ukraine, for example, over constitutional 
amendments providing for special rules for local self-government in 
Donbas, which have been virtually blocked in the Parliament for fear 
of undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty.  
According to the AA implementation plan, Ukraine intends to 
advance proposals for joint EU-Ukraine positions based on a 
monitoring of the security situation in Eastern Europe. Ideas for such 
proposals have been outlined by Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Pavlo Klimkin. In November 2015, he expressed the view that giving a 
membership perspective to the Eastern Partnership countries would 
strengthen strategic security in Europe.41  
EUBAM and EUAM. Ukraine generally views cooperation with 
the EUBAM Mission to Moldova and Ukraine as fruitful and valuable, 
for many reasons. First, it has helped the State Border Guard Service of 
Ukraine (SBGS) to draft strategic documents, including the 
Development Strategy of the SBGS and the Integrated Border 
Management Concept. Second, it provided technical assistance in 
improving the low level of border and customs standards with 
procedures to harmonise them with those in EU member states. Third, 
it has contributed to the development of border infrastructure (border 
crossing points). Fourth, joint border control operations, carried out at 
the Transnistrian segment of the Moldova-Ukraine border, were 
instrumental in fighting cross-border crime. Fifth, a monitoring 
presence of the EUBAM and its conﬁdence-building measures 
contributes to ensuring security in that region. Sixth, the EUBAM 
facilitated development of the cooperation between Ukraine and 
                                                        
40 See Cabinet Order No. 847-r, 17 September 2014, “On the implementation of 
the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European 
atomic energy community and their member states, of the one part, and 
Ukraine, of the other part” (http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/847-2014-
%D1%80 (in Ukrainian)). 
41 MFA, Pavlo Klimkin’s speech at the Warsaw Security Forum, 5 November 
2015 (http://mfa.gov.ua/ua/press-center/news/41662-pavlo-klimkin-dlya-
stabilynosti-v-jevropi-vazhlivoju-je-rishuchisty-u-nadanni-jevropejsykoji-
perspektivi-krajinam-skhidnogo-partnerstva (in Ukrainian)). 
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Moldova, as well as between Ukrainian and EU law enforcement 
bodies.42 
Views on the EUAM, which started working in December 2014, 
are more mixed.43 On the one hand, the mission’s work is considered 
as beneficial by its Ukrainian counterparts. EUAM assists in developing 
strategic documents and bills for a number of government bodies, 
including the Ministry of the Interior, the SBGS and the National 
Security and Defence Council. The mission also provides technical 
assistance and facilitates communication between Ukrainian officials 
and their counterparts in Brussels. On the other hand, EUAM’s 
mandate and operational capacity are considered to be insufficient. In 
certain cases, EUAM has declined to provide assistance, arguing that 
its mandate is advisory, not operational. Ukrainian bodies would also 
like the mission staff to include more experts from Eastern Europe with 
experience in dealing with post-Soviet law enforcement problems (e.g. 
the nexus of organised crime and law enforcement bodies). 
EU-led crisis management operations. Ukraine is willing to take 
measures to enhance military and technological cooperation with the 
EU. Ukraine is participating in an EU Battle Group in 2016,44 and is 
ready to participate in more developed European military formations, 
if established.45 Ukraine plans to develop cooperation with the EU 
Institute for Security Studies, the EU Satellite Centre and the European 
Security and Defence College. Negotiations were launched in June 2015 
for an agreement between Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence and the 
European Defence Agency, with a view to boosting military and 
technical cooperation. Furthermore, in September 2015, the National 
Security and Defence Council adopted a new Military Doctrine of 
Ukraine reflecting the country’s objective of integration into the EU. 
 
                                                        
42 EUBAM, “Annual Report 1 December 2014-30 November 2015”, 2015 
(http://eubam.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Report_2015_ENGL.pdf). 
43 Kateryna Zarembo, “EUAM’s First Year: Ambitions versus Reality”, Policy 
Brief, Institute of World Policy, 2015 (www.dropbox.com/s/ 
8085urds2mxogtz/policy_brif_EUAM_all_2.pdf?dl=0). 
44 According to MFA of Ukraine, Foreign and security policy (http://ukraine-
eu.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-eu/dialogue/foreign-policy). 
45 Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Pavlo Klimkin in 
Evropeiska Pravda, 3 March 2015 (www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2015/ 
03/11/7031701/ (in Ukrainian)). 
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Foreign and security policy at a glance 
Cooperation between Ukraine and the EU in the foreign and security 
domains has been building up for over a decade.  
However, since 2014, with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its ‘hybrid’ 
war in Donbas, the question of security cooperation with the EU has been 
raised to the highest strategic level.   
Increased alignment with EU foreign and security policies will reframe 
Ukraine’s relations with Russia and the rest of the world.  
Operational collaboration takes places in two missions (EUBAM and 
EUAM), and there are plans to develop cooperation with EU security 
agencies. 
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4. MARKET ACCESS FOR GOODS 
Tariff liberalisation is the basic starting 
point for a free trade area. The DCFTA 
almost completely liberalises trade in 
goods between the EU and Ukraine, but 
with a significant asymmetry in that the 
EU liberalises totally and immediately 
for most products, whereas Ukraine 
liberalises for many products, over three 
to seven years. This means exceptional 
opportunities for Ukrainian producers 
to boost their exports to the EU market 
before facing full competition on the home market.  
Provisions of the Agreement 
The DCFTA establishes a free trade area for trade in goods over a 
transitional period of a maximum of 10 years. Quantitative restrictions 
on imports and exports are also prohibited, unless allowed by the 
relevant WTO rules (i.e. Art. XI GATT). 
The DCFTA tariff liberalisation is asymmetrical; the EU needs to 
abolish its customs duties faster than Ukraine. This should give 
Ukrainian exporters the time to prepare for competition from the EU 
and support the Ukrainian market. This asymmetrical pace of 
liberalisation started with the EU’s ‘autonomous trade measures’ 
(ATM) towards Ukraine, which entered into force on 23 April 2014,46 
and unilaterally reduced the EU’s tariffs on Ukrainian goods in line 
with the EU’s DCFTA commitments. These autonomous trade 
measures expired on 1 January 2016, when the DCFTA as a whole 
entered provisionally into force, after a delay under a trilateral 
agreement between Ukraine, the EU and Russia on 12 September 2015. 
                                                        
46 Regulation 374/2014.  
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Five years after the AA’s entry into force, the parties may consider 
broadening the scope of tariff liberalisation by a decision of the Trade 
Committee. 
According to the European Commission, Ukraine and the EU 
will eliminate 99.1% and 98.1%, respectively, of their duties in trade 
volume. Ukrainian exporters will save €487 million annually due to 
reduced EU import duties, whereas Ukraine will remove around €391 
million in duties on imports from the EU.47  
Industrial products and raw materials. Existing EU tariffs for 
industrial goods exported from Ukraine will be removed immediately 
for 94.7% of the tariff lines. For the remaining handful of products, the 
tariffs will be eliminated after a transitional period.48 For example, a 
transitional period is envisaged for a limited number of minerals (three 
years), chemicals (up to five years), fertilisers (up to seven years), wood 
products (up to five years), footwear (up to five years) and several 
copper articles (five years) and aluminium articles (seven years). 
Significantly, cars and most of the motor vehicles for the transport of 
goods will only be liberalised after seven years. 
Ukraine, on the other hand, will grant immediate preferential 
treatment to only 49.2% of EU exports of industrial products. After a 
transitional period of seven years, the share of EU exports liberalised 
by Ukraine will increase to 96%. For example, Ukraine will apply a 
gradual liberalisation on several minerals (up to seven years), organic 
chemicals (up to three years); fertilisers (three years), rubber tyres (up 
to five years), leather articles (up to five years) and textiles such as 
headgear (three years).  
The DCFTA includes specific rules for Ukraine’s car sector, 
which has already had to digest Ukraine’s WTO accession that reduced 
import tariffs from 25% to 10%.49 Ukraine’s motor vehicles sector (both 
for passenger and goods transport) will enjoy a particularly long 
transitional period of 10 years. Moreover, Ukrainian negotiators 
                                                        
47 European Commission, “The EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area”, 2013 (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/april/ 
tradoc_150981.pdf).  
48 European Commission, “European Commission proposes temporary tariff 
cuts for Ukrainian exports to the EU”, press release, 11 March 2014 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-250_en.htm). 
49 WTO, “Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Ukraine to the 
WTO”, WT/ACC/UKR/152, 25 January 2008. 
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managed to include specific safeguard measures on passenger cars (see 
below) in the agreement.  
Agricultural products. Ukraine has committed to fully eliminate 
tariffs for 88.5% of the tariff lines on agricultural products. Around half 
of its agricultural products will be liberalised immediately. For the 
other products, a transitional period of up to seven years is envisaged. 
However, not all the import duties will be reduced to zero; 8.7% of 
agro-food tariffs will be subject to limited linear reductions by 20-60% 
over 5-10 years (for example dairy, eggs, sugar, animal oils and fats). 
After this transitional period a residual tariff will remain. Moreover, for 
2.8% of the agro-food tariff lines (e.g. types of meat and sugar groups), 
tariff-rate-quotas will be applied. 
The EU liberalisation process for Ukrainian agricultural products 
is rather different. Where the EU commits to reducing agro-food tariffs, 
in almost all cases it will fully abolish them. Moreover, the EU uses 
shorter transitional periods than Ukraine: 82.2% of the relevant tariffs 
will be nullified immediately and only 1.2% will be reduced to zero in 
a transitional period of up to seven years. 
However, the EU will apply more tariff quotas than Ukraine, 
especially on specific types of cereals, pork, beef, poultry and sugar. 
The quantities shall enter on a first-come, first-served basis. This 
reduces the scope of the liberalisation process. Nevertheless, in total, 
regarding agro-food products, the simple average EU tariff will drop 
from 9.8% to 0.4% by the end of the tenth year, whereas for Ukraine this 
will be from 8% to 0.9%. According to the European Commission, the 
DCFTA will lead to a tariff reduction of €330 million for Ukrainian 
agricultural products and €53 million for processed agricultural 
products. 
Export duties. Ukraine applies export duties on a number of 
products, such as types of livestock and hide raw materials, sunflower 
seeds and types of metal. The EU has been contesting these export 
duties as it claims that they are used as an indirect subsidy to Ukraine’s 
domestic industry. The DCFTA now prohibits export duties in 
principle. However, existing export duties applied by Ukraine on 
products such as livestock and raw hide materials, seeds of some types 
of oil-yielding crops and types of scrap metal, will be phased out over 
a transitional period of 10 years in accordance with a schedule included 
in Annex I-C. Moreover, a specific safeguard measure mechanism is 
provided for Ukraine’s export duties during a period of 15 years 
following the entry into force of the agreement. This mechanism allows 
Ukraine to impose a surcharge on the export duty on several goods 
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such as raw hide materials, sunflower seeds and types of metal, steel 
and copper, if during a yearly period the cumulative volume of exports 
from Ukraine to the EU exceeds a trigger level (set out in Annex I-D).  
A standstill clause states that neither party may increase any 
existing customs duty or adopt any new customs duty on goods 
originating from the territory of the other party. This was effectively 
broken by Ukraine in February 2015, when it imposed a surcharge of 
5% on imports of industrial goods and 10% on imports of agricultural 
goods as a crisis measure to tackle its significant reduction of monetary 
reserves and to restore its balance of payments. Although the DCFTA 
was not – provisionally – in force at the time of the adoption of this 
measure, this import surcharge violated the spirit of the DCFTA. 
Moreover, the EU’s current autonomous trade measures regarding 
Ukraine are conditional on abstention by Ukraine from introducing 
new duties or increasing existing levels of duties on EU products.50 
Nevertheless, considering Ukraine’s economic crisis, the EU did not 
object to this measure. Also at the level of the WTO, most members 
considered this measure to be in line with the WTO rules concerning 
balance of payments (Art. XII GATT). However, they encouraged 
Ukraine to terminate this import surcharge by the end of 2016,51 and 
Ukraine cancelled this surcharge on 1 January 2016. 
Rules of origin. These are laid down in Protocol I of the 
Association Agreement. Rules of origin confirm when a product is 
wholly obtained from the territory of one of the parties, or when 
products have undergone “sufficient working or processing” in order 
to obtain a movement certificate ‘EUR.1’ or an invoice declaration. An 
annex to the Protocol defines four different criteria for “sufficient 
processing” for each product (i.e. tariff heading): i) a change of tariff 
heading (e.g. a screw will originate from Ukraine if it is made from 
imported materials of any other heading); ii) a minimum value added 
(e.g. for passenger cars, the value of all the non-originating materials 
used to manufacture the car may not exceed 40% of the total value of 
                                                        
50 Art. 2(d) Regulation (EU) No 374/2014 of 16 April 2014 on the reduction or 
elimination of customs duties on goods originating in Ukraine. 
51 WTO, “Members adopt report on Ukraine’s import surcharge imposed for 
balance-of-payments reasons”, press release, 19 June 2015 (www.wto.org/ 
english/news_e/news15_e/bop_19jun15_e.htm). The report was considered at 
the WTO General Council Meeting held on 27-28 July 2015; however as one 
member (Russia) was not in agreement, it was decided to conclude the 
consultations. Download report at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/ 
FE_Search/DDFDocuments/132826/q/WT/BOP/R110.pdf. 
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the product); iii) specific processing or working requirements or iv) a 
combination of the first three requirements. The DCFTA also allows 
bilateral cumulation, meaning that producers in the EU and Ukraine 
can use materials and components originating in each other’s country 
as if they originated in their own country when seeking to qualify for 
preferential treatment. For example, when a Ukrainian car producer 
imports intermediate parts from the EU to manufacture a car, those 
intermediate parts will be considered as Ukrainian and will not have to 
be taken into account in the calculation of the maximum threshold of 
the non-originating materials (i.e. 40%, as explained above).  
Implementation perspectives 
The provisional application of DCFTA started on 1 January 2016. 
However, even before this, in April 2014, the EU provided Ukraine with 
the autonomous trade measures (ATMs) to support its economy in 
times of crisis. Application of ATMs meant that the EU lowered its 
import tariff protection to the level of the first year of DCFTA 
implementation and provided Ukrainian exporters with certain tariff 
quotas.  
Since the DCFTA provisionally entered into force, Ukraine also 
started the tariff-reduction process on EU goods and introduced certain 
tariff quotas. In addition to the DCFTA trade regime, Ukrainian 
exporters will be able to sell goods to the EU under the Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP) for two more years. According to the 
Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, the GSP would provide more 
liberalised access for 547 Ukrainian goods in 2016 and 424 goods in 
2017.   
In 2014, at the height of the economic and political crisis in 
Ukraine, exports to the EU increased by 1.5%, despite an overall 
contraction of exports by 14.9%. In 2015, despite the suspension of 
production in the occupied territory and defective logistics, Ukraine’s 
exports to the EU increased by 2% in volume terms;52 but the 
downward price trend in world commodity markets resulted in a fall 
of 23.4% in nominal terms in US dollars (see Table 4.1). Despite a 
contraction of nominal trade with the EU, the share of the EU in total 
                                                        
52 Mykola Ryzhenkov, Veronika Movchan and Ricardo Giucci, “Trade 
liberalisation with the EU and its impact on Ukrainian exports in 2015”, 
German Advisory Group in cooperation with the IER Kyiv, Policy Briefing 
Series [PB/10/2016], Berlin/Kyiv, April 2016 (www.beratergruppe-
ukraine.de/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/PB_10_2016_en.pdf). 
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Ukrainian exports of goods increased from 26.5% in 2013 to 34.1% in 
2015, as nominal exports to the EU contracted at a slower pace than 
overall exports of Ukraine (see Table 4.3). 
The huge depreciation of the hryvnia (32.8% in 2014 and 45.6% 
in 2015) and contraction of both consumer and investment demand 
resulted in lower imports of goods from the EU. Imports from the EU 
fell by 22.1% in 2014 and by 27.2% in 2015 (see Table 4.1). As imports to 
the EU decreased at a slower pace than overall imports, the share of the 
EU in Ukraine’s imports increased from 35.1% in 2013 to 40.9% in 2015 
(see Table 4.2). 
The commodity trade structure also changed during 2013-15. 
Exports shifted mainly from mineral products and base metals to 
machinery, animal or vegetable fats and oils, prepared foodstuffs and 
animal products. Imports from the EU have shifted to minerals in 
favour of vehicles and machinery and equipment (see Table 4.3).  
Table 4.1 Trade turnover between Ukraine and the EU, 2008-15 ($ mn) 
Period 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Total turnover 152,489 85,138 112,170 151,002 153,467 140,276 108,330 75,637 
Turnover w. EU 46,997 24,892 32,153 43,722 43,237 43,805 38,072 28,361 
Growth % 30.1 -47.0 29.2 36.0 -1.1 1.3 -13.1 -25.5 
Share % 30.8 29.2 28.7 29.0 28.2 31.2 35.1 37.5 
         
Total exports 66,954 39,702 51,430 68,394 68,809 63,312 53,901 38,134 
Exports to EU 18,129 9,499 13,051 17,970 17,081 16,758 17,002 13,017 
Growth % 30.3 -47.6 37.4 37.4 -4.9 -1.9 1.5 -23.4 
Share % 27.1 23.9 25.4 26.3 24.8 26.5 31.5 34.1 
         
Total imports 85,535 45,435 60,740 82,608 84,658 76,964 54,428 37,502 
Imports from 
EU 
28,868 15,392 19,101 25,752 26,156 27,046 21,069 15,343 
Growth % 29 -46.7 24.1 34.8 1.6 3.4 -22.1 -27.2 
Share % 33. 33.9 31.4 31.2 30.9 35.1 38.7 40.9 
         
Balance with EU -10,738 -5,893 -6,049 -7,782 -9,075 -10,287 -4,066 -2,326 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine. 
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Table 4.2 Ukraine’s trade structure by country or region, 2013 and 2015 
  2013 2015 
  Exports 
($ mn) 
Exports 
(%) 
Imports 
($ mn) 
Imports 
(%) 
Exports 
($ mn) 
Exports 
(%) 
Imports 
($ mn) 
Imports 
(%) 
EU 16,758 26.5 27,046 35.1 13,017 34.1 15,343 40.9 
Russia 15,065 23.8 23,234 30.2 4,829 12.7 7,485 20.0 
Other 
CIS 
6,998 11.1 4697 6.1 2,978 7.8 2,988 8.0 
Other 
Europe 
467 0.7 1582 2.1 294 0.8 1,342 3.6 
US 888 1.4 2,759 3.6 481 1.3 1,480 3.9 
China 2,726 4.3 7,900 10.3 2,399 6.3 3,770 10.1 
Rest of 
world 
20,407 32.2 9,743 12.7 14,133 37.1 5,092 13.6 
Total 63,312 100.0 76,964 100.0 38,134 100.0 37,502 100.0 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine. 
Table 4.3 Commodity structure of Ukraine’s trade with the EU, 2015  
  2015 
  
Exports 
($ mn) 
Exports 
(%) 
Imports 
($ mn) 
Imports 
(%) 
Total 13,017 100.0 15,343 100.0 
Animal products 164 1.3 272 1.8 
Vegetable products 2,444 18.8 405 2.6 
Fats and oils 678 5.2 47 0.3 
Prepared foodstuffs 762 5.9 777 5.1 
     
Mineral products 1,477 11.3 3,492 22.8 
Chemical products 416 3.2 2,641 17.2 
Plastics, rubber 94 0.7 1,283 8.4 
Leathers, skins 106 0.8 91 0.6 
     
Wood 713 5.5 102 0.7 
Pulp, paper 61 0.5 571 3.7 
Textile 508 3.9 529 3.4 
Footwear, headgear 118 0.9 40 0.3 
     
Articles of stone 106 0.8 191 1.2 
Precious stones and metals 14 0.1 40 0.3 
Base metals 3,066 23.6 777 5.1 
Machinery and equipment 1,797 13.8 2,664 17.4 
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  2015 
  
Exports 
($ mn) 
Exports 
(%) 
Imports 
($ mn) 
Imports 
(%) 
Vehicles, aircraft 158 1.2 871 5.7 
Instruments and apparatus 57 0.4 206 1.3 
Misc. manufactured articles 259 2.0 214 1.4 
Other goods 10 0.1 124 0.8 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine. 
Tariff-rate quotas (TRQs). Ukrainian exporters were able, under 
the ATM regime, to export to the EU under TRQs for almost two years 
before the provisional application of the DCFTA started.  
Ukraine’s experience of TRQs utilisation during 2014-15 shows 
that Ukraine was not able to fully use their potential. In 2014 Ukraine 
fully utilised only six out of 36 TRQs (natural honey, cereals, processed 
tomatoes, grape and apple juice, wheat, maize), whereas 12 more TRQs 
were only partially utilised. In 2015 the situation improved slightly as 
the number of fully utilised TRQs increased to 9 out of 36 (oats, sugar 
and poultry in addition to quotas fully utilised in 2014). As a result, 
almost half of the tariff-rate quotas remained unused. Movchan, Kosse 
and Giucci (2015)53 identify a number of factors limiting the use of 
TRQs, including non-compliance with EU food safety and SPS 
standards, insufficient domestic production, orientation towards other 
export partners, low demand in the EU, and lack of trading partners in 
the EU.  
Another important issue is whether the TRQs are binding, i.e. 
whether import tariffs outside the quotas are so high that it is too costly 
to ship goods to the EU above TRQs volumes. Comparison of actual 
exports to the EU and fully utilised TRQs shows that many quotas are 
not binding as exports significantly exceed TRQs volume (Figure 4.1). 
The only clear exception is sugar, where exports in 2015 were equal to 
the quota amount and the import tariff above quota can reach €507 per 
tonne for selected product categories. Also, there is a group of products 
(wheat, processed tomatoes, poultry and oats) where the exports only 
moderately exceed the TRQs volumes and given data deficiencies, 
exports still could be bound by the TRQs volumes. Geographical 
                                                        
53 Veronika Movchan, Iryna Kosse, and Ricardo Giucci, “EU Tariff Rate Quotas 
on Imports from Ukraine”, German Advisory Group in cooperation with the 
IER Kyiv, Policy Briefing Series [PB/06/2015], Berlin/Kyiv, June 2015 
(www.beratergruppe-ukraine.de/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/ 
PB_06_2015_en.pdf). 
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diversification helps make the EU’s TRQs less onerous. For example, 
wheat and maize are actively exported to Asia and Africa. 
Figure 4.1 Ratio of Ukraine’s actual exports to the EU vs. amount of fully 
utilised TRQs, 2014 and 2015 
 
Since 1 January 2016, when the provisional application of the 
DCFTA began, both the EU and Ukraine actively used TRQs. As of 11 
May 2016, Ukraine has already fully utilised six ‘first come, first served’ 
TRQs. Both TRQs for honey and juice were utilised on 4 January 2016. 
In February Ukraine utilised quotas for sugars (17 February) and barley 
groats (29 February). The quota for processed tomatoes was closed on 
16 March, whereas the TRQ for oats was exhausted on 11 April 2014. 
Another eight TRQs are partially utilised at the moment. As of 11 May 
2016, EU exporters have already fully utilised Ukrainian tariff-rate 
quota for poultry and semi-finished poultry and partially used the 
quotas for sugar and pork.  
Safeguards. As mentioned above, the car industry received 
special treatment under the DCFTA. At the start Ukraine’s import 
tariffs are brought down mostly into the 9-10% range, with further 
gradual elimination during the period from 7 to 10 years. The EU car 
market also remains relatively closed with the most import tariffs at 
10%, which will be gradually eliminated during the seven-year period. 
However, Ukraine can also apply a special safeguard measure on 
passenger cars. Starting from the second year of the DCFTA’s 
1.01.4
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implementation, Ukraine can hold its import tariff at the level of 10% 
for up to 15 years if during the previous year: i) imports from the EU 
exceeded 45,000 cars or ii) imports from the EU amounted to 25% newly 
registered cars. 
During non-crisis years the imports of passenger cars exceeded 
45,000 cars and account for more than 25% of new cars in the domestic 
market; for this reason, the Ukrainian market is likely to remain 
protected for EU passenger cars for an additional 15 years. On the one 
hand, this will create favourable conditions for Ukrainian car 
producers, but there is only one Ukrainian passenger car producer, 
ZAZ, which has a full production cycle. The remaining producers, 
including Bogdan, Eurocar, KrASZ and Vipos, assemble passenger cars 
under the trademarks of foreign companies. Foreign producers can 
therefore choose to produce cars in Ukraine in order to avoid the high 
protection against imports. On the other hand, expensive imports will 
negatively affect both Ukrainian consumers and the prospects for 
Ukrainian producers to become integrated with competitive European 
supply chains.   
Ukraine also has other safeguard mechanisms provided by the 
DCFTA, such as an entry price for worn clothes. Measures for export 
duties are mentioned above. 
Rules of origin. The general rules have been outlined above. In 
order to be eligible for exporting to the EU, Ukrainian goods should be 
issued with the certificate of origin ‘EUR.1’. However, for the first years 
of the DCFTA’s application, Ukrainian producers can obtain Certificate 
of Origin Form A, and export goods under the GSP trade regime, as for 
some goods GSP is more beneficial than DCFTA. Initially, when under 
the ATM system, the EUR.1 certificates were issued by Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry. The State Fiscal Service of Ukraine started to 
issue EUR.1 certificates in 2016 in accordance with the Agreement. 
The medium-term priority of Ukraine in the framework of 
DCFTA is also to join the Regional Convention on Pan-Euro-
Mediterranean preferential rules of origin (PEM). As the Convention is 
based on a network of FTAs with identical origin protocols, joining it 
allows parties to apply a principle of diagonal cumulation when 
determining the country of origin of goods. Currently, the parties of the 
Convention include 42 countries: the EU, EFTA states, Faroe Islands, 
the Republic of Moldova, participants in the Barcelona Process 
(Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, 
Tunisia and Turkey), and participants in the EU's Stabilisation and 
Association Process (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former 
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Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo). 
According to the Final Provisions of Protocol I, the Customs Sub-
Committee may decide to replace the rules of origin set out in the 
DCFTA by the preferential rules of the PEM when Ukraine joins the 
Convention. 
 
Market access for goods at a glance 
Due to political pressure by Russia, the EU and Ukraine postponed the 
provisional application of the DCFTA to 1 January 2016. However, the EU 
liberalised access to its market in April 2014 by providing Ukraine with 
Autonomous Trade Measures (ATMs). 
These measures have so far only had a limited impact on Ukraine’s exports 
to the EU due to the suspension of production in the occupied territories, 
logistical problems and downward price trends for world commodity 
markets. 
However, the EU’s share in Ukrainian exports and imports has increased 
because of a sizeable fall in trade with Russia. The structure of exports to 
the EU has shifted towards machinery, fats and oils, prepared foods and 
animal products.  
The utilisation of tariff-rate quotas for agricultural products was limited 
because Ukrainian producers experienced problems with food security and 
weak demand for its production. 
Safeguards for Ukraine’s car industry constitute a major source of 
protection, which will help Ukrainian producers in the short run, but at the 
expense of their integration into competitive European supply chains, and 
with costs for consumers.   
Joining the Pan Euro-Mediterranean system for rules of origin is an 
important issue for Ukraine as it will allow the country to apply diagonal 
cumulation among its members. Ukraine intends to join this system, but so 
far made no significant progress.  
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5. TRADE REMEDIES 
This DCFTA chapter includes rules on 
‘trade defence’ measures that the EU 
and Ukraine can take against imports 
from the other party that cause or 
threaten to cause injury to the domestic 
industry, notably anti-dumping, anti-
subsidy and safeguard measures. These 
DCFTA provisions essentially 
incorporate the relevant WTO rules. 
Anti-dumping and countervailing 
measures. The anti-dumping provisions 
that are most actively used rely on Art. VI of GATT (1994), the WTO 
Anti-Dumping Agreement and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM). If a company exports a product at a 
price lower than the price it normally charges on its own home market, 
it is considered to be ‘dumping’ the product. The WTO agreement 
allows governments to act against dumping where there is a ‘material’ 
injury to the competing domestic industry. In order to do that the 
government has to be able to show that dumping is taking place, 
calculate the extent of dumping (how much lower the export price is 
compared to the exporter’s home market price) and demonstrate that 
the dumping is causing injury or threatening to do so. The importing 
country may then impose an anti-dumping duty to correct any damage 
to its industry.  
The DCFTA adds specific features of the EU’s trade defence 
practice that go beyond the WTO Agreements, such as the ‘public 
interest’ and the ‘lesser duty’ rules. The former implies that a party may 
decide not to impose anti-dumping or countervailing measures if it is 
not in the public interest to do so, for example if the interests of 
consumers or the employment situation were negatively affected. The 
lesser duty rule implies that the amount of a (provisional) anti-
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dumping duty shall not be higher than adequate to remove the injury 
in the domestic industry. This rule stresses the remedial rather than 
punitive character of the EU’s approach to trade defence.   
Until 2005, several Ukrainian exports to the EU were subject to 
anti-dumping measures, mainly metallurgical and chemical products, 
in which Ukraine has large production capacities that until recently 
have benefited from artificially low energy input costs.54 The large 
number of these anti-dumping measures against Ukrainian products is 
also a reflection of the fact that Ukraine had not yet obtained Market 
Economy Status (MES) recognition by the EU. This meant that the EU 
was entitled to use a rather flexible procedure (the analogue country 
procedure) to determine the dumping margins. After Ukraine obtained 
the MES in 2005, the calculation of dumping margins had to be done 
strictly on the basis of costs and prices observed with the Ukrainian 
producers or the Ukrainian market. More recently the energy costs for 
its industry have also been aligned to international market prices. As a 
result the number of EU anti-dumping cases against Ukraine has 
decreased. Currently, the EU is imposing anti-dumping measures on 
certain Ukrainian steel pipes, tubes, ropes and cables.55 
Safeguard measures. This is a separate instrument, reliant on Art. 
XIX of GATT (1994) and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. These 
rules regulate when and how WTO members may take a safeguard 
action (e.g. quantitative restrictions or duty increases higher than 
bound tariffs) to protect a specific domestic industry from an increase 
in imports of any product that is causing, or threatening to cause, 
serious injury to the industry. The key difference here, compared to the 
anti-dumping provisions, is that it does not require an 'unfair' practice 
to be found by particular supplying enterprises or countries. 
Correspondingly, the safeguard action has to be applied to all WTO 
member states, and the country imposing these measures may have to 
pay compensation to other members whose trade is affected. This 
largely explains why anti-dumping measures are much more used than 
safeguard measures. 
The DCFTA contains one specific safeguard measure protecting 
that Ukrainian automobile industry. The agricultural sector is also 
covered by other specific provisions (see chapter 4 for both cases). 
                                                        
54 For an overview of all the EU’s anti-dumping measures against Ukrainian 
products, see http://trade.ec.europa.eu/tdi/completed.cfm  
55 For an overview of ongoing EU trade-defence investigations against 
Ukrainian products, see http://trade.ec.europa.eu/tdi/completed.cfm  
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The EU and Ukraine will establish an expert-level ‘Dialogue on 
Trade Remedies’ which will serve as a forum for cooperation on these 
questions. However, the DCFTA provisions on safeguard, anti-
dumping and countervailing measures cannot be challenged under the 
DCFTA’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism.  
 
Trade remedies at a glance 
There are provisions for anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard 
measures to protect the importing economy from serious damage, or threats 
thereof. 
Anti-dumping duties have been applied quite extensively in the past by the 
EU against Ukrainian supplies of metallurgical and bulk chemical products, 
but this now occurs less frequently,  as Ukrainian industry no longer profits 
from artificially low energy input costs.    
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6. CUSTOMS SERVICES 
For the DCFTA to work well there have 
to be a high quality customs services at 
the frontiers with efficient and speedy 
facilitation of traffic, avoiding delays and 
corruption with long queues of heavy 
trucks. This chapter of the DCFTA seeks 
to fix key principles for customs 
legislation and procedures and to 
enhance operational cooperation 
between the customs services of the EU 
and Ukraine.  
 
Provisions of the Agreement 
Key principles for customs legislation and procedures. At a general 
level, the EU and Ukraine commit to ensure that their customs 
legislation and procedures will be stable and comprehensive, 
proportionate, transparent, predictable, non-discriminatory, impartial 
and applied uniformly and effectively, and will prevent fraud. They 
also aim at reducing and simplifying the data and documentation 
required by customs agencies. 
At the legal and operational levels, the parties undertake the 
following commitments:  
 Adopt the EU’s customs code, establish modern transit 
conditions and cooperation between customs services (see 
details below). 
 Apply relevant international instruments, including those 
developed by the World Customs Organization and the revised 
Kyoto Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of 
Customs Procedures. 
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 Apply a single administrative document for customs 
declarations. 
 Provide for advance binding rulings on tariff classification and 
rules of origin. 
 Adopt rules that ensure that any penalties imposed for the 
breach of customs regulation or procedural requirements are 
proportionate and non-discriminatory. 
 Provide effective and transparent procedures guaranteeing the 
right of appeal against the administrative actions, rulings and 
decisions of customs and other agencies.  
 With regard to fees and charges imposed by customs authorities, 
Ukraine must prohibit administrative fees having the equivalent 
effect of import or export duties. Moreover, fees and charges 
have to be transparent and made publically available and may 
not exceed the cost of the service provided by the customs 
authority. 
Customs code. Ukraine will approximate the Modernised 
Community Customs Code (CCC), laid down in Regulation 
450/2008/EC, which sets out the general rules and procedures 
applicable to goods brought into or out of the customs territory of the 
EU. The CCC was mainly drafted to implement IT solutions for a 
simple and paperless environment for customs and trade. It introduces 
electronic data-processing techniques for all required exchanges of 
data, accompanying documents and notification between customs 
authorities and between economic operators and customs authorities. 
Ukraine is not obliged to implement the entire CCC, however, as Annex 
XV identifies provisions that are excluded from approximation or 
where approximation is based only on the ‘best endeavours’ principle.  
The CCC provisions that Ukraine is obliged to implement relate 
mainly to data protection obligations, information requirements in 
customs procedures, transparency rules (including procedures to 
appeal), customs controls, methods of customs valuation, customs 
declaration, the release of goods, storage of goods, free zones and 
temporary admission of goods. The CCC was replaced in October 2013 
by the Union Customs Code (in Regulation 952/2013/EU).56 The new 
                                                        
56 See Regulation 952/2013/EU laying down the Union Customs Code. The 
Regulation entered into force on 30 November 2013 and repealed Regulation 
450/2008/EC. In 2015, the European Commission adopted the Delegated Act 
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Code will complete the progression to a paperless and electronic 
customs environment and introduces several new procedures. The new 
procedures will need to be transposed in the DCFTA by the Customs 
Sub-Committee.  
Within three years, Ukraine also has to implement the EU rules 
on the relief of customs duties as set out in Regulation 1186/2009/EC57 
and on actions against goods suspected of, or actually infringing, 
certain intellectual property rights in Regulation 1383/2003/EC.58 
Transit traffic. The EU and Ukraine are to ensure progressive 
interconnectivity of their respective customs transit systems, with a 
view to Ukraine acceding to the Convention of 20 May 1987 on a 
common transit procedure. This procedure is used for the movement 
of goods between the 28 EU member states, the EFTA countries, Turkey 
and Macedonia. Ukraine already has observer status in relation to the 
Convention and has to fully implement it within a year after the 
Agreement enters into force.  
An action plan for Ukraine’s accession to the EU’s Common 
Transit Convention was approved in May 2015.59 A crucial step in this 
regard will be Ukraine’s adoption of the New Computerised Transit 
System, which enables an economic operator to submit common transit 
declarations electronically.60 In addition, Ukraine will have to apply the 
relevant WTO provisions, such as Art. V of GATT, and adopt any future 
WTO measures for improving trade facilitation. 
                                                        
and Implementing Act allowing the Union Customs Code to enter into force on 
1 May 2016.  
57 See Regulation 1186/2009/EC of 16 November 2009 setting- up a Community 
system of reliefs from customs duty. 
58 See Regulation 1383/2003/EC concerning customs actions against goods 
suspected of infringing certain intellectual property rights, and the measure to 
be taken against them. This regulation was repealed in 2013 by Regulation 
608/2013/EU concerning customs enforcement of intellectual property rights.  
59 See Government of Ukraine, “Ukraine begins the process of integration into 
the EU common transit system”, 26 May 2015 (www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en/ 
publish/article?art_id=248186862). 
60 On the accession procedure of EU neighbouring countries to the Convention 
on a common transit procedure, see European Commission, “Strategy to 
prepare certain neighbouring countries for accession to the 1987 EC–EFTA 
Conventions on a common transit procedure and the simplification of 
formalities in trade in goods”, COM(2010) 0668. 
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Customs cooperation. The EU and Ukraine are also to strengthen 
their customs cooperation. The EU and Ukraine have to exchange 
information concerning customs legislation and procedures, cooperate 
on the automation of customs procedures, exchange relevant 
information, best practices and data, cooperate in the planning and 
delivery of technical assistance, etc. In particular, the DCFTA outlines 
a procedure for “Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs 
Matters”, foreseeing information exchange in cases of suspected or 
actual fraud under customs legislation.  
The DCFTA has also established a Customs Sub-Committee to 
monitor the implementation and administration of this customs and 
trade facilitation chapter.  
In addition to the DCFTA, the EU and Ukraine have developed 
other instruments for customs cooperation, notably in the context of the 
Eastern Partnership. For example, in May 2012 the EU and Ukraine 
adopted a “Strategic Framework for customs cooperation”.61 This 
initiative identified various priority areas, most of which have been 
taken over by the DCFTA. One particular point of interest relates to safe 
and fluid trade lanes to achieve maximum trade facilitation and enable 
reliable business, with customs acting as a link in the supply chain. For 
example, the EU and Ukraine intend to create fast lanes to move pre-
approved eligible goods across the border quickly. Recognition of 
authorised economic operators (AEOs) could be part of this process. In 
the EU, economic operators can apply for AEO status to benefit from 
reduced controls and simplified customs procedures. The AEO status 
is granted to reliable operators that comply with security and safety 
standards.  
Another important instrument in EU–Ukraine customs 
cooperation is the EU Border Mission (EUBAM), launched in 2005 (see 
chapter 2).62 As an advisory, technical body mandated to enhance the 
border-management capacities of Moldova and Ukraine, EUBAM 
plays an important role in strengthening the customs procedures and 
institutions of these two countries. For instance, EUBAM monitors 
customs clearance and border guard checks, provides assistance in 
                                                        
61 See the Strategic Framework for customs cooperation (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
taxation_customs/resources/documents/customs/policy_issues/internation
al_customs_agreements/geomoldukr/strategic_framework_ukraine.pdf). 
62 This mission is based on a Memorandum of Understanding between the 
European Commission and the Government of Ukraine and Moldova 
(http://eubam.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/ 
memorandum_of_understanding_en.pdf). 
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preventing the smuggling of goods and persons, examines border 
control documents and makes unannounced visits to any locations on 
the Moldovan–Ukrainian border, including border units, customs posts 
and revenue accounting offices.  
EUBAM’s mandate has already been extended four times, with 
the current mandate expiring on 30 November 2017. The new EUBAM 
phase will see a strong focus on assisting with the implementation of 
the DCFTA customs and trade facilitation rules. Much of this work is 
accomplished using the Mission’s Trade Facilitation Working Group 
set up in 2015 as a platform for communication and cooperation 
between the relevant national agencies, business and international 
development partners, such as USAID, the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Ukraine and the European Business Association. In 
collaboration with, among others, the EU Directorate-General for 
Taxation and Customs Union, EUBAM helped to promote reforms 
related to the AEO (see above).63  
Finally, in 2013 the European Anti-Fraud Office and Ukraine 
signed an Administrative Cooperation Agreement. It sets out a 
framework for practical cooperation between the EU and the Ukrainian 
authorities on measures to prevent and detect cigarette smuggling, 
which include information exchange and joint investigations.64  
Implementation perspectives 
Moving products across the border of Ukraine remains a cumbersome 
and costly process compared with neighbouring countries. Frequently, 
vehicles are forced to queue at border crossings for hours, or even days 
for commercial trucks, waiting for customs clearance and other 
controls. 
According to the World Bank Group’s report, “Doing Business 
2016”, Ukraine is ranked 109 out of 189 countries in the category 
“Trading across borders”, mostly due to the lengthy and costly process 
of documentary compliance. Problems with documentary compliance 
were similarly reported by exporters and importers surveyed by the 
                                                        
63 See the 2015 EUBAM report (http://eubam.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/ 
12/Report_2015_ENGL.pdf). 
64 http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/international-cooperation/ 
list_signed_acas_en.pdf  
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IER in mid-2015.65 While the State Fiscal Services (SFS) of Ukraine 
claims that 96% of customs declarations were submitted electronically 
in 2015,66 business respondents reported that they occasionally provide 
both electronic and paper copies of declarations. Moreover, most of the 
other necessary documents are submitted in paper form, which largely 
undermines the positive impact of introducing electronic declarations.  
Customs valuation remains a problematic issue. Business 
complains that the customs authorities are still reluctant to use Method 
1 of valuation, based on the actual paid price, and tend to apply other 
methods resulting in artificial changes in customs value. According to 
the SFS, the transaction cost method was used in 82% of cases in 2015,67 
while in the EU this method is applied to over 90% of imports. 
Importers of agro-food products and textiles suffer the most as Method 
1 was applied only in 62% and 70% of cases. 
Inefficient and corrupt customs are reported to be among the 
most significant trade barriers by both international observers and 
Ukrainian business. Customs inefficiency is partly explained by poor 
equipment and an insufficient number of customs officers working on 
the border. For instance, in the Lviv oblast, where joint customs 
controls take place at three out of six vehicle customs checkpoints at the 
Ukraine–Poland border, there are 20% fewer Ukrainian customs 
officers than Polish officers. The low wages of customs officers are an 
additional factor discouraging efficient work and create incentives for 
corruption.  
Corruption scandals have recently stimulated the government to 
advance reforms to the customs service. In August 2016, ‘single 
customs windows’ are due to be launched, the duration of controls 
reduced and additional monitoring equipment introduced to ensure 
transparency and accountability.68 Also, 20 mobile groups composed of 
representatives of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, the National 
                                                        
65 The survey was conducted as part of the project “Trade Facilitation 
Dialogue”, funded by the EU (http://tfd.ier.com.ua/wordpress/en/home/). 
66 See the “Report on the implementation of the plan by the State Fiscal 
Service” (http://sfs.gov.ua/data/files/131201.pdf). 
67 Ibid. 
68 See the website of the Cabinet of Ministers on the introduction of single 
customs windows (www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/ 
article?art_id=249056564&cat_id=244274130). 
DEEPENING EU-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS: WHAT, WHY AND HOW?  55 
 
Police and the SFS are to be introduced to fight smuggling schemes on 
the border.  
Ukraine has gradually moved forward in fulfilling its DCFTA 
customs and trade facilitation commitments. Since 2013, the SFS has 
published binding advance rulings on tariff classification,69 although 
with some delays. Since 2016, the SFS has been responsible for issuing 
EUR1 certificates for rules of origin, using a procedure equivalent to 
that of the EU. A status of approved exporter, further simplifying the 
procedures for complying with the rules of origin, was introduced in 
2015, and the Odesa Sparkling Wine Company was the first exporter 
that obtained this status in February 2016.70 
In December 2015, a pilot of online administrative services for 
exporters and importers was launched.71 It is expected to substantially 
reduce costs and time spent on documentary compliance in cross-
border trade. 
The draft law on AEOs was agreed by the government in spring 
2016, but still needs to pass through parliament. The AEOs were 
envisaged in the Customs Code passed in 2012, but the institutional 
setup was insufficient to make them operational.  
The new Customs Code was passed 2012 to bring the Ukrainian 
legislation closer to international and in particular EU norms. Still, it 
was amended several times and further changes are in the pipeline to 
harmonise requirements for AEOs in the EU and Ukraine, further 
simplify customs clearance and increase the IPR protection in line with 
EU norms.72 
                                                        
69 See the SFS “Registry [of] previous decisions on the classification and coding 
of goods in the Nomenclature” (http://sfs.gov.ua/baneryi/mitne-
oformlennya/subektam-zed/klasifikatsiya-tovariv/62835.html); see also the 
SFS “list of products on which classification decisions [have been] taken” 
(http://sfs.gov.ua/baneryi/mitne-oformlennya/subektam-
zed/klasifikatsiya-tovariv/62834.html). 
70 See “First authorized exporter to Odesa customs” 
(http://customs.odessa.gov.ua/otrymaty-status-upovnovazhenogo-
eksportera-na-odeskij-mytnytsi-ne-skladno/). 
71 See “Foreign Trade”, Unified State portal administrative services 
(https://poslugy.gov.ua/info/services/byservicescope/82)  
72 See the “Report on Implementation of the Association Agenda and the 
Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine” (2015) 
(www.kmu.gov.ua/kmu/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=248115804&cat_
id=247749488). 
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Customs and trade facilitation at a glance 
The DCFTA includes key measures to ensure fast and efficient customs 
services. 
Ukraine is progressing towards fulfilling its legislative commitments, with 
the new Customs Code (2012) being broadly aligned with EU legalisation, 
although several amendments are still required. 
The main task for Ukraine is to ensure efficient implementation of existing 
legislation. Both public authorities and businesses have responsibilities in 
this regard. There remain serious problems of long queues and delays at 
crossing points with EU member states. 
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7. TECHNICAL STANDARDS FOR 
INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
Customs tariffs between the EU and 
Ukraine are set to disappear almost 
completely, so non-tariff barriers such as 
technical standards will become the 
main obstacle to trade. In order to tackle 
these barriers, Ukraine will adopt the 
relevant EU legislation, standards and 
procedures. This will be a long and 
complex process, but one that is 
fundamental to modernising and 
making Ukraine’s industry 
internationally competitive.  
Provisions of the Agreement 
Basic features of the European system. While the system for setting 
technical standards is highly complex and has been changing over time, 
its basic, two-level system can be summarised as follows: 
- First level: EU harmonisation laws, of which a few ‘horizontal’ 
regulations or decisions cover the general methodology and 
institutional framework, and around 30 directives cover broad 
‘sectoral’ product groups such as ‘machinery’. For the product 
groups the directives outline the ‘essential’ health and safety 
requirements they have to meet before they can be placed on the 
EU market.  
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- Second level: around 5,00073 product-specific ‘harmonised 
standards’ that provide the technical means to comply with the 
essential health and safety requirements defined in the sectoral 
product directives. These standards are produced at the request 
of the European Commission by one of the three technical 
organisations (CENELEC for electrical products, ETSI for 
telecommunications equipment and CEN for the largest number 
of other products).74 When the Commission is satisfied with the 
proposed standards it publishes them in the Official Journal of the 
European Union, so they then have official status as ‘harmonised’, 
which are presumed to meet the ‘essential requirements’ of the 
applicable directive. 
An overview of the harmonised standards, grouped by the 
existing sectoral product directives, can be found on the European 
Commission’s website.75 For example, for the very important category 
of ‘machinery’, there is the applicable directive that defines the health 
and safety requirements, followed by several hundred harmonised 
standards for specific products or components.  
The qualitative difference between directives and standards is 
that while directives are binding laws, the harmonised standards, while 
having official recognition, are voluntary for manufacturers who may 
choose to use them or to apply their own specifications. However, in 
the latter case the manufacturer still has to prove ‘conformity’ with the 
directive, which will usually be a more costly procedure than adopting 
the harmonised European standards that give automatic conformity 
with the relevant directive.  
When placing a product on the EU market covered by the EU’s 
harmonisation legislation, the manufacturer has to draw up and sign 
an ‘EU Declaration of Conformity’ in which he ensures and declares 
that the products concerned satisfy the ‘essential requirements’ of the 
relevant product directive and that the relevant conformity assessment 
                                                        
73 Author’s own calculation on the basis of data in the 2014 annual report of the 
three European standardisation organisations 
(www.cencenelec.eu/Pages/default.aspx and www.etsi.org/)  
74 CEN: European Committee for Standardisation; CENELEC: European 
Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation; ETSI: European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute. 
75 European Commission, Harmonised Standards Index (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
growth/single-market/european-standards/harmonised-
standards/index_en.htm). 
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procedures have been fulfilled. By signing the EU Declaration of 
Conformity, manufacturers assume responsibility for the compliance of 
the product. Only then can a manufacturer affix the ‘CE’ marking to the 
product. Products bearing the CE marking are presumed to comply 
with the applicable EU legislation and benefit from free circulation in 
the European Market.  
Horizontal methodological directives. Important horizontal EU 
legislation to which Ukraine must approximate are two legal acts of 
2008 known as the New Legislative Framework, namely a Decision on 
a common framework for the marketing of products76 and a Regulation 
on the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance.77 The 
former sets out a common framework of general principles and 
reference provisions for the marketing of products. It establishes 
criteria for EU sectoral legislation by providing the definitions of 
fundamental concepts (e.g. what is “placing on the market” and what 
are “harmonised standards”?). It also defines the obligations for 
manufacturers, importers and distributors and defines several modules 
of conformity assessment procedures, explained below, together with 
the accreditation requirements. This decision is to be approximated by 
Ukraine within one year.  
In addition, Ukraine has to approximate to a Directive on general 
product safety,78 which imposes general safety requirements on any 
product placed on the market and defines criteria for when a product 
is considered safe. Ukraine has to ensure that producers comply with 
these rules and monitor product compliance with the applicable EU 
requirements. It will have to identify products that pose a serious risk 
to health and safety and prohibit such products from being marketed. 
It also has to put in place a system of liability for defective products, in 
line with the relevant EU rules. 
Sectoral directives. According to Annex III of the Agreement, 
Ukraine has to approximate to 27 sectoral directives covering a wide 
range of products such as machinery, lifts, safety of toys, medical 
devices and simple pressure vessels (see Box 7.1). This task is 
complicated by the fact that these directives are currently being 
updated in light of the New Legislative Framework, in particular of the 
EU’s Decision of 2008 on a common framework for the marketing of 
                                                        
76 Decision 768/2008/EC. 
77 Regulation 765/2008/EC. 
78 Directive 2001/95/EEC. 
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products, which aims to improve market surveillance and boost the 
quality of conformity assessments (see further below on conformity 
rules and procedures).79 The 27 directives define ‘essential’ health and 
safety requirements for each product group and the specific conformity 
assessment procedures to be followed (explained further below). Most 
of the directives have to be approximated within two to three years, 
although some have four to five years. Annex III lists the 27 sectors but 
does not indicate the legal references of the directives in question. This 
is presumably because of the changes under way.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
79 In order to bring product harmonisation legislation into line with the 
provisions of Decision 768/2008/EC on common framework for the marketing 
of products, the EU adopted on 26 February 2014 – thus after the AA was 
negotiated – an ‘Alignment Package’ consisting of eight directives beginning to 
revise those listed in Box 7.1, namely:  
- Low Voltage Directive 2014/35/EU  
- Electromagnetic Compatibility Directive 2014/30/EU  
- ATEX Directive 2014/34/EU  
- Lifts Directive 2014/33/EU  
- Simple Pressure Vessels Directive 2014/29/EU 
- Measuring Instruments Directive 2014/32/EU  
- Non-Automatic Weighing Instruments Directive 2014/31/EU  
- Civil Explosives Directive 2014/28/EU  
In addition, legislation aligned on Decision 768/2008/EC has also been 
adopted for: 
- pyrotechnic articles (Directive 2013/29/EU) 
- toy safety (Directive 2009/48/EU)  
- restriction of hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment 
(Directive 2011/65/EU)  
- recreational craft (Directive 2013/53/EU)  
- radio equipment (Directive 2014/53/EU)  
- pressure equipment (Directive 2014/68/EU)  
Further aligning proposals are pending on:  
- medical devices  
- gas appliances  
- cableways 
- personal protective equipment  
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Box 7.1 Sectoral product legislation for approximation by Ukraine 
Cableways 
Construction products 
Diagnostic medical devices 
Electrical equipment 
Electromagnetic compatibility 
Equipment for explosive atmospheres. 
Explosives for civil use 
Gaseous fuels 
High-speed railways 
Hot-water boilers 
Implantable medical devices 
Labelling of energy consumption 
Lifts 
Machinery 
Marine equipment 
Measuring equipment 
Medical devices 
Packaging 
Personal protective equipment 
Pressure equipment 
Radio & telecomm terminals 
Recreational crafts 
Refrigerators, freezers 
Simple pressure vessels 
Toys 
Transportable pressure 
equipment  
Weighing machines 
 
European standards. The Agreement requires Ukraine to adopt 
the ‘corpus’ of European standards, which includes, in addition to the 
5,000 harmonised standards, around 24,000 European standards (i.e. 
standards developed by CEN, CELELEC or ETSI). Clearly, this will be 
a huge challenge for Ukraine. Because the Agreement does not provide 
for a transposition timetable, it will have to prioritise its efforts. Ukraine 
must also repeal any conflicting national standards, such as the GOST 
standards developed before 1992.  
Ukraine has to ensure that its relevant national bodies participate 
fully in the European and international organisations for 
standardisation and conformity assessment, including accreditation. 
Ukraine is also obliged to progressively fulfil the membership 
conditions for the European standardisation organisations (CEN, 
CENELEC and ETSI).  
Conformity and surveillance procedures. The Agreement 
envisages wide-ranging cooperation between the two parties in the 
fields of market surveillance and conformity assessment procedures. 
Moreover, the parties have to promote cooperation between their 
respective public or private organisations responsible for these matters.  
As noted above, Ukraine has to approximate to the Decision of 
2008 on a common framework for the marketing of products.80 This 
Decision establishes a highly complex set of differentiated models 
(called ‘modules’ in the text) for conformity assessment procedures. 
The sectoral directives covering the different product groups identify 
                                                        
80 Decision 768/2008/EC. 
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which module of conformity assessment is required. For certain groups 
of products that could pose a risk to the public (e.g. pressure vessels, 
lifts and certain machine tools), a conformity assessment by a third 
party is required before placing the product on the market. These third 
parties are laboratories, inspection and certification bodies, which are 
known generally as ‘conformity assessment bodies’, or more formally 
as ‘notified bodies’. When implementing this decision, Ukraine will 
have to guarantee that its notified bodies offer all guarantees of 
independence, objectivity, impartiality, confidentiality and 
professional integrity. For various low-risk products, manufacturers 
can make the ‘declaration of conformity’ themselves.  
Ukraine also has to approximate to the EU’s 2008 Regulation81 
that lays down rules on the requirements for accreditation of 
conformity assessment bodies and for market surveillance of products 
to ensure that products placed on the EU market fulfil the specific 
health and safety requirements defined in the sectoral EU legislation. 
This regulation includes detailed rules on how a national accreditation 
body (i.e. the body that evaluates whether a conformity assessment 
body meets the specific requirements) should be organised. There has 
to be a single national accreditation body, operating with impartiality 
and objectivity, and on a non-profit basis.  
Ukraine will have to establish and maintain surveillance 
authorities that monitor and control whether products placed on its 
market meet EU health and safety requirements. These market 
authorities must perform checks on the characteristics of products 
through documentary, physical and laboratory checks. The 
surveillance authorities must have the competence to withdraw 
products from the market that pose a serious risk. However, a decision 
to withdraw products from the market has to be proportionate, 
communicated to the relevant economic operators and must state the 
exact grounds on which it based. Moreover, Ukraine would have to 
notify the Commission of such a decision and notify it to Rapid Alert 
System for dangerous non-food products (RAPEX). 
The Agreement also aims to conclude an Agreement on 
Conformity and Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products 
(ACAA). ACAAs are a type of mutual recognition agreement 
envisaged by the EU for any country of the eastern or southern parts of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Western Balkan 
countries. By concluding an ACAA, the parties agree that industrial 
products listed in the annexes of an ACAA and fulfilling the 
                                                        
81 Regulation 765/2008/EC. 
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requirements for being lawfully placed on the market of one party may 
be placed on the market of the other party, without additional testing 
and conformity assessment procedures. However, before concluding 
an ACAA, Ukraine would first have to fully implement its obligations 
related to EU directives, including the harmonised standards, and 
accreditation and conformity assessment institutions, described above. 
These reforms will be closely monitored by the EU institutions. An 
ACAA would consist of a framework agreement, providing for the 
recognition of equivalence of the conformity assessment, verification 
and accreditation procedures, and one or more annexes setting out the 
products covered. The sectors to be covered by the first ACAA between 
the EU and Ukraine are simple pressure vessels, low voltage 
equipment, electromagnetic compatibility and machinery. More sectors 
can be added later.  
Relations with third countries. Ukrainian producers are entirely 
free to manufacture for export to third-country markets, such as Russia, 
according to those countries’ own technical standards. On the import 
side, the question is more sensitive, as exemplified by the difficult 
‘trilateral’ dialogue between Ukraine, the EU and Russia on the 
implications of the DCFTA for Russia. Once the sectoral EU directives 
are implemented, imports, including those from Russia, will have to 
meet the essential health and safety requirements of those directives 
before they can be placed on the Ukrainian market. These products do 
not have to be produced according to the EU’s harmonised standards 
per se as they are voluntary. However, only products from third 
countries that follow the EU’s harmonised standards will have the 
‘presumption of conformity’ to be placed on the Ukrainian – and EU – 
market.  
Implementation perspectives 
Recently, Ukraine has progressed significantly with harmonisation 
with relevant EU legislation, the transposition of EU standards, the 
elimination of outdated Soviet norms and the development of the 
relevant structures. In August 2015, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted a 
Strategy for the Development of the Technical Regulation System until 
2020 (the TBT Strategy),82 aimed at the elimination of technical barriers 
in trade with the EU, thereby stimulating the modernisation of 
Ukraine’s economy. The Strategy envisages the harmonisation of 
technical regulations with EU law (the list of EU norms appears in the 
                                                        
82 See http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/844-2015-%D1%80.  
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Action Plan accompanying the TBT Strategy), a development of 
institutions and infrastructure and a preparation for signing the ACAA. 
The export of Ukrainian products to the EU market without additional 
testing and conformity assessment procedures is one of the expected 
results following implementation of the Strategy. 
Horizontal legislation. By now, Ukraine’s national legislation 
has largely aligned with the relevant EU horizontal legislation, 
explained above, but is still awaiting the official evaluation by the 
European Commission. There are six key laws in the sphere:  
 Law No. 2735-VI on State Market Surveillance and Control over 
Non-food Products83 (2010, last amended 2015) 
 Law No. 2736-VI on General Safety of Non-food Products84 
(2010, last amended 2015) 
 Law No. 3390-VI on Liability for Damage Caused by Defected 
Product85 (2011) 
 Law 1315-VII on Standardisation86 (2014, last amended 2015) 
 Law No. 1314-VII on Metrology and Metrological Activity87 
(2014, last amended 2015) 
 Law No. 124-VIII on Technical Regulations and Conformity 
Assessment88 (2015) 
The Strategy foresees the development of a secondary legislation 
for laws on metrology and metrological activity and on technical 
regulations and conformity assessment to ensure that the horizontal 
laws are properly implemented. In addition, the laws on technical 
regulations and conformity assessment and on market surveillance 
require further modification, in particular to remove a duplication of 
functions of various public bodies, simplify procedures and increase 
responsibility of involved parties.  
Sectoral legislation. Ukraine has intensified reforms in the 
sphere of technical regulations since the country joined the WTO in 
2008; over 40 technical regulations have been passed, using the EU 
directives as a basis. By the end of 2014, technical regulation for 24 out 
                                                        
83 See http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2735-17.  
84 See http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2736-17.  
85 See http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3390-17.  
86 See http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1315-18.  
87 See http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1314-18.  
88 See http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/124-19.  
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of 27 sectors envisaged in the DCFTA were adopted, and 17 
implemented.89  
These technical regulations were not identical to the EU 
directives, however, which is a precondition for the conclusion of an 
ACAA. The government of Ukraine is therefore currently working on 
the completion of sectoral legislation alignment with the support of the 
EU technical assistance projects. By the end of 2015, eight technical 
regulations had been closely aligned with the corresponding EU 
directives,90 including most of the sectors earmarked for the first round 
of the ACAA like electromagnetic compatibility, electrical equipment 
and machinery. Alongside the alignment of sectoral legislation with the 
EU directives, the government has to cancel other legal norms like 
sanitary and labour safety norms that contain additional mandatory 
requirements regarding product characteristics, production methods 
and processes, and hence duplicate technical regulations. In January 
2016, the government made an important step forward in this sphere 
by cancelling numerous sanitary, epidemiologic and hygienic norms 
adopted before 1991. This decision will enter into force on 1 January 
2017.91 
Ukraine’s plan for harmonisation of technical regulations with 
the EU norms does not focus exclusively on the 27 sectors foreseen in 
the DCFTA. Technical regulations in other sectors are also set for 
alignment with the EU legislation, e.g. with REACH. 
Adoption of standards. As of 1 January 2016, there were 17,889 
national standards in Ukraine, including 10,964 aligned with the 
international and European standards.92 Compared to previous years, 
two major changes occurred. First, the total number of standards was 
reduced by 40% from 29.6 thousand documents in 2014. Second, the 
                                                        
89 “Report on Implementation of the Association Agreement between the 
European Union and Ukraine (September 2014 – January 2015)” 
(www.kmu.gov.ua/kmu/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=248115804&cat_
id=247749488). 
90 “Report on Implementation of the Association Agenda and the Association 
Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine (2015)” 
(www.kmu.gov.ua/kmu/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=248115804&cat_
id=247749488) 
91 See www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/cardnpd?docid=248850007.  
92 “Report on the Implementation of the Association Agenda and the 
Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine (2015)” 
(www.kmu.gov.ua/kmu/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=248115804&cat_
id=247749488 ). 
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number of national standards harmonised with international ones 
increased by 24% compared to 2013 a year before and their share 
doubled from 30% to 60% in total. 
The changes were mostly due to the abolition of obsolete GOST 
standards from before 1992, as required by the DCFTA (see above). In 
2015, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade annulled 14.1 
thousand GOSTs, a great acceleration compared to 122 standards 
withdrawn in 2014 and 3.8 thousand in 2006-13.   
In parallel, Ukraine intensified alignment with international and 
European standards: 4,792 standards, almost half of all international 
standards adopted over the years of independence, were adopted in 
2014-15.      
Importantly, access to national standards has improved 
significantly. Most standards can be bought and downloaded online at 
http://shop.ukrndnc.org.ua/ua/about, supported by the national 
standardisation authority.  
Standardisation: institutional setup. In accordance with the 
new law on standardisation enacted in 2015, standardisation was 
passed from the public body to an independent non-governmental 
national standardisation authority, namely to the state-owned 
enterprise ‘Ukrainian Scientific Research and Training Centre for 
Standardisation, Certification and Quality’ (UkrNDNC). This 
institution has become responsible for the organisation and 
coordination of standardisation activities, including setting up 
technical committees for the standardisation, adoption and 
abolishment of standards, and to represent Ukraine in international 
bodies.  
Over 170 technical standardisation committees embracing 
representatives of all stakeholders, have been registered under the 
auspices of the UkrNDNC, and to ensure a proper balance of interests 
among stakeholders, the Management Board, as an advisory and 
supervisory body of the national authority on standardisation, and the 
Appeals Commission were established.  
The UkrNDNC has already received confirmation of its 
membership in the International Standardization Organization (ISO) 
and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), an 
international counterpart of the CENELEC.  
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Ukraine’s State Service of Technical Regulation, a predecessor of 
the UkrNDNC, had been an affiliate member of the CEN93 and the 
CENELEC.94  
Metrology. The law on metrology adopted in 2014 completely 
changed the principles and institutional structure of metrological 
activity in the country and aligned it with European and international 
norms. The new national metrology system has been developed based 
on norms and practices of the International Organization of Legal 
Metrology (OIML),95 in particular the OIML international document 
“Elements for a Law on Metrology,”96 the EU, the WTO and  other 
international organisations.  
Accreditation. The National Accreditation Agency of Ukraine 
(NAAU), an independent authority in the sphere of accreditation, was 
established in 2002 by the Ministry for Economic Development and 
Trade. Together with the NAAU, the Accreditation Council, the 
Technical Committee on Accreditation and the Appeals Commission 
were set up. To ensure a balance of interests, the Accreditation Council 
consists of representatives of three groups of stakeholders, namely 
central public authorities, accredited conformity assessment bodies and 
other stakeholders (i.e. representatives of business, expert community, 
academia and civil society organisations). The impartiality of NAAU is 
guaranteed by law. 
The NAAU is an associate member of the European Cooperation 
for Accreditation (EA) and signed several bilateral agreements with the 
EA, which recognises and accepts the equivalence of the operated 
accreditation systems,97 as well as the reliability of the conformity-
assessment results provided by conformity assessment bodies.98  
                                                        
93 See https://standards.cen.eu/dyn/www/f?p=CENWEB:9:::NO:::. 
94 See www.cenelec.eu/dyn/www/f?p=web:9. 
95 Ukraine is a member of the International Organization of Legal Metrology 
(OIML), 
www.oiml.org/en/structure/members/contactmember_view?IDCountry=22
2&CountryName=UKRAINE&iso=UA&M=2. 
96 See www.fundmetrology.ru/depository/04_IntDoc_all/D_E_1.pdf. 
97 See www.european-accreditation.org/the-mla. 
98 “Report on Implementation of the Association Agenda and the Association 
Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine (2015)” 
(www.kmu.gov.ua/kmu/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=248115804&cat_
id=247749488). 
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In addition, the NAAU is a full member of the International 
Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC). In 2014, it signed several 
Mutual Recognition Agreements with the ILAC regarding assessment 
and accreditation of conformity assessment bodies according to two 
international standards: ISO/IEC 17025 and ISO/IEC 17020. The 
accreditation bodies that signed the ILAC MRA were peer-evaluated in 
line with ISO/IEC 17011 requirements to prove their competence.99 
Conformity assessment and market surveillance. The new law 
on technical regulations and conformity assessment adopted in 2015 
established unified principles of conformity assessment in line with the 
EU and WTO norms and practices and stipulates that the mandatory 
certification of products, an archaic element of the Soviet system, will 
no longer be in force by 2018.100 The register of the conformity 
assessment bodies for specific technical regulations has been available 
online at the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade website.101 
The market surveillance and control over non-food products is 
regulated by the law passed in 2010 and developed according to EU 
norms and practices. However, further changes in market surveillance 
legislation are expected to increase the efficiency of the system. 
Currently, the State Service on Food Safety and Consumer 
Protection (SPSA) is the key responsible authority in the sphere of non-
food products market surveillance. Formally established in 2015, this 
Service was launched only in 2016. It will require some time to develop 
its institutional and technical capacity and thus ensure efficient market 
surveillance. 
To sum up, Ukraine made significant progress in its 
approximation to EU legislation in the sphere of technical regulations. 
Now, major efforts are required to ensure the proper implementation 
of these changes, including capacity development of the institutions 
involved in standardisation, conformity assessment and market 
surveillance, and the creation of adequate infrastructure. EU technical 
assistance is expected to play a key role in this process.   
 
                                                        
99 See http://ilac.org/ilac-mra-and-signatories/. 
100 Compared to 2009, the list of products subject to mandatory certification 
reduced by 70%. 
101 See http://me.gov.ua/Documents/List?lang=uk-UA&tag=Otsinka-
pidtverdzhenniaVidpovidnosti. 
DEEPENING EU-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS: WHAT, WHY AND HOW?  69 
 
Technical standards for industrial goods at a glance 
The adoption of European technical standards for industrial products is 
vital for the modernisation and competitiveness of the Ukrainian industry. 
Ukraine has adopted a Strategy for Development of Technical Regulation 
System until 2020 to eliminate technical barriers in trade with the EU.    
Ukraine is making good progress in first approximating the limited EU 
relevant directives, and second in adopting the huge number of European 
standards. 
Ukraine’s national accreditation system achieved recognition from the 
European Cooperation for Accreditation and the International Laboratory 
Accreditation Cooperation. 
Progress in establishing proper market surveillance system is proving more 
difficult. 
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8. FOOD SAFETY REGULATIONS 
The chapter officially entitled “Sanitary 
and PhytoSanitary Measures” (SPS) 
concerns the food safety standards 
required to facilitate trade in agricultural 
and food commodities and plants 
covered by SPS regulations, and to 
safeguard human, animal and plant life 
or health (Art. 59). The key mechanism is 
for the law of Ukraine to approximate its 
SPS law to that of the EU, with 
procedures to establish their effective 
equivalence. The Agreement also aims to reach a ‘common 
understanding’ on animal welfare standards.   
Provisions of the Agreement 
Approximation. The Agreement did not itself define the list of laws to 
be approximated, but instead required Ukraine to submit a 
Comprehensive Strategy for the implementation of EU SPS standards 
within three months of its entry into force. In February 2016 agreement 
was reached between Ukraine and the European Commission on the 
contents of the Comprehensive Strategy, which is a list of roughly 255 
EU regulations and directives. This sets out the implementation 
schedule for each regulation or directive (see below and Figure 8.1 in 
particular). 
Equivalence. Rules are established for recognising the 
equivalence of measures taken by Ukraine with those of the EU, or for 
groups of measures, for sectors or sub-sectors, and commodities or 
groups of commodities (Art. 66). The process should be launched by 
the exporting party based on the “objective demonstration of 
equivalence” and the “objective assessment of this demonstration” by 
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the importing party. This should be an interactive process. It is then for 
the importing party to determine equivalence or not, or to withdraw or 
suspend equivalence, based on internationally recognised standards or 
proper scientific evidence. Verifications may be made by the importing 
party, for which there are detailed rules. Where equivalence is 
recognised there will be a reduction of physical checks at frontiers and 
simplified procedures.  
Audits are conducted by the EU to verify that SPS conditions are 
being met. For example an audit conducted in 2015 on cereal seeds was 
positive: “Overall, the national authorities responsible for 
implementation of seed certification in Ukraine are competent and 
operate appropriately. Once the abovementioned minor shortcomings 
have been addressed, seed produced in Ukraine can be considered 
equivalent to seed produced in the EU”.102 
Trade conditions. When the approximation has been fully 
undertaken the import conditions for the products or sectors in 
question shall apply to the whole territory of Ukraine as exporting 
country (Art. 69). However, this still requires that enterprises wishing 
to export to the EU obtain certification from the ‘competent authority’ 
of Ukraine, which has to guarantee that the establishment meets the 
relevant health requirements of the EU and has the power to suspend 
the establishment’s listing in the case of non-compliance (Art. 4 of 
Annex VIII). 
Pests, animal and plant diseases. There are detailed provisions 
for handling problems of animal or plant diseases and of pests. The 
diseases and pests in question are listed (Annex VI). Procedures are 
established to recognise the pest-free status of given regions for the 
purpose of trade and for the notification of risks to public, animal or 
plant health through diseases.  
Safeguard measures. Where the importing country needs to take 
measures to control a serious health hazard or risk it may take 
provisional restrictive measures affecting imports, but these have to be 
suitable or proportional in order to minimise the disruption to trade.  
SPS Sub-Committee of the Association Council.  This sub-
committee has the task of reviewing the implementation of the SPS 
chapter and may inter alia decide upon modifications to the annexes. 
Decisions shall be taken on the basis of consensus of the parties.  
                                                        
102 Ukraine, audit number 2015-7641, “Cereal seed and their equivalence with 
EU requirements” (http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/audit_reports/ 
details.cfm?rep_id=3499). 
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Pre-existing import arrangements. The EU maintains a 
comprehensive system for the regulation of imports of agri-food 
products from third countries world-wide to assure their compliance 
with its SPS requirements, notably under Regulation 854/2004/EC on 
rules for the organisation of controls of products of animal origin.   
This Regulation first of all sets the rules for the approval within 
the EU itself of ‘establishments’ (i.e. slaughterhouses, or food 
processing factories) and requires that officially designated ‘competent 
authorities’ carry out or organise controls to verify compliance with 
SPS requirements. However, this Regulation goes on to establish 
comparable rules for approving establishments in third countries for 
the purpose of exporting to the EU market. These arrangements are 
currently being used by Ukraine and will remain in force while the 
provisions of the Agreement are implemented. The most active 
categories of recognised establishments and the number of enterprises 
recognised are as follows: 
 Meat from poultry, rabbits - 4 
 Fishery products - 16 
 Dairy plants - 34 
 Facilities handling animal by-products - 34 
 Processing plants  - 22 
 Pet food plants  - 23 
 Fertiliser and soil improvers - 7 
These lists show that a considerable number of Ukrainian agri-
food enterprises producing commodities of animal origin are already 
recognised for exporting to the EU in compliance with its SPS 
requirements.  
This mechanism can effectively continue to be used and 
expanded alongside entry into force of the Agreement, since its 
requirements are the same as those in Art. 69.2-5, described above. The 
enterprises in question have to comply with the same relevant SPS 
regulations as set out in the SPS strategy. Others may lag behind, but 
this does not hold back the more progressive export-oriented 
enterprises.  
In conclusion, total SPS compliance for the whole of the territory 
of Ukraine is an ambitious long-term objective, and the system will take 
a number of years to become effectively applied throughout the agri-
food sector. In the meantime, procedures exist for those enterprises 
willing and able to comply with export certification for the EU. This is 
an important element of effective flexibility in the Agreement and can 
help avoid excessive costs of compliance.  
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In addition, there are provisions within the EU to exempt small-
scale production from various SPS requirements (Regulation 
853/2004/EC on hygiene rules). For example, hygiene rules do not 
apply to production for private domestic consumption, or small 
quantities supplied to local retail establishments and markets. Ukraine 
remains free to apply similar exemptions for local markets.   
Implementation perspectives 
Early legislation. Development of the national SPS system in Ukraine 
started in 1991, when the first legislation was passed. Since then, 
Ukraine developed relevant legislation and infrastructure aimed at the 
protection of human health and safety of plant and animal products.     
WTO accession. Reforming the SPS system was an integral part 
of Ukraine’s accession to the WTO. As a result, all SPS regulations in 
Ukraine are already consistent with the provisions of WTO Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement). Harmonisation occurred without transition periods.  
Ukraine is also a member of Codex Alimentarius, the Office 
International des Epizooties (ОІЕ) and the International Plant 
Protection Convention (IPPC).  
Types of control. According to the Customs Code of Ukraine, the 
current SPS system requires three types of border control: sanitary and 
epidemiological, veterinary and sanitary, and phytosanitary control.  
Sanitary and epidemiological control aims to protect the territory 
of Ukraine from the spread of infectious diseases and to test the 
compliance of goods with the sanitary standards. This type of control 
is obligatory, mainly for imported food products, some consumer 
products and for the export of sunflower oils. Transit of farm produce, 
however, is not subject to sanitary and epidemiological control.   
Veterinary and sanitary control aims to prevent the spread of 
animal diseases. It is applied for exports, imports and transit of animals, 
animal products (including meat products, eggs, milk, fish and honey), 
reproductive material, biological products, pathological material, 
veterinary preparations, animal-care products, feed additives, 
premixes and feeds.  
The purpose of phytosanitary control is to prevent the spread of 
pests and supervise quarantine regimes. This type of control is applied 
for exports, imports and the transit of plants and plant products 
(including food products), packaging, means of transportation, soil and 
other products that spread regulated pests.  
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Institutional infrastructure. Development and implementation 
of policies on SPS is directed and coordinated by the Cabinet of 
Ministers of Ukraine through the Ministry of Agriculture and Food of 
Ukraine, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade and the 
Ministry of Healthcare of Ukraine. Before 2016, the main operational 
authorities were the State Sanitary and Phytosanitary Service of 
Ukraine, the State Inspection for Consumer Protection of Ukraine and 
the State Sanitary and Epidemiological Service of Ukraine.  
The State Sanitary and Phytosanitary Service of Ukraine103 
conducted veterinary and sanitary control, supervised animal health, 
the safety and quality of all food products and feeds, and protected 
Ukraine from pathogens of dangerous diseases. The State Sanitary and 
Epidemiological Service of Ukraine,104 among other functions, 
performed sanitary measures to protect the country against the entry 
and spread of dangerous (including quarantine) infectious diseases, 
conducted sanitary and epidemiological supervision and control at 
checkpoints across the state border, and supervised compliance with 
sanitary standards. The State Inspection for Consumer Protection of 
Ukraine105 was an authorised consumer rights protection body. It 
conducted state control for compliance with the legislation on 
consumer protection and carried out market surveillance for 
compliance with technical regulations.  
As part of the administrative reform, the system of main 
operational bodies in the SPS sphere was revised. The single State 
Service on Food Safety and Consumer Protection of Ukraine (SPSA) 106 
was established by reorganising the State Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Service and merging it with the State Inspection for Consumer 
Protection and the State Sanitary and Epidemiological Service. The new 
State Service was launched in spring 2016. 
Legislation. In order to implement its SPS-related obligations 
under the Association Agreement, in February 2016 Ukraine adopted a 
Comprehensive Strategy for Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. 
This entails adopting 255 EU directives and regulations. Most of the 
legislation should be passed in 2015-19 with major implementation to 
occur in 2016-20 (see Figure 8.1), aimed at closing the gap between 
Ukrainian and EU SPS-related legislation and infrastructure.  
                                                        
103 See www.vet.gov.ua/. 
104 See www.dsesu.gov.ua/ua/. 
105 See www.dsiu.gov.ua/. 
106 Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 442 of 10 September 2014. 
DEEPENING EU-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS: WHAT, WHY AND HOW?  75 
 
Figure 8.1 Schedule for approximating SPS legislation of the EU  
 
These legislative changes will cover the following ground:  
 Principles and requirements for food and feeds safety - on official 
controls, rapid alert system, traceability and veterinary checks. 
 Labelling and information on foodstuff – on health and nutrition 
claims for foods, vitamins and minerals. 
 Hygiene rules – approximation of hygiene rules for food of animal 
products, temperatures in transport and storage, etc.  
 Food additives – regulations on additives, enzymes and 
flavourings.  
 Packaging materials – best EU practices on manufacturing of 
materials and articles intended to come into contact with food. 
 Animal health – on health protection of bovine and porcine 
animals, poultry, live fish, crustaceans, molluscs, bees and other 
mammals, etc.  
 Animal diseases – legislation on swine vesicular disease, African 
horse sickness, bluetongue, infectious salmon anaemia (ISA), etc. 
 Identification and registration of animals – of equidae, bovines, 
ovine and caprine animals as well as swine.  
 Animal welfare standards – EU standards of stunning and 
slaughter of animals, as well as farming animals should be 
implemented.  
 Plant health –on plant health checks, standardisation of plant 
passports, control of certain plant diseases, phytosanitary 
certificates, etc.  
 Protection of plant variety – Ukraine should apply the EU approach 
to plant protection rights.    
 Registration of plant protection products – labelling requirements, 
maximum residue levels of pesticides, etc. 
 Fertilisers – a number of regulations and directives should be 
adopted. 
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 Seeds – regulations on marketing of different seeds, minimum 
conditions for seeds and related field inspections. 
 Regionalisation/zoning and compartmentalisation – requirements for 
regions, buffer and quarantine zones.   
 Genetically modified organisms (GMO) – traceability of the 
products containing GMO, labelling requirements and 
provisions on inspections.  
 
Box 8.1 Technical assistance projects 
The EU implements significant technical assistance projects to support 
the work of the State Veterinary and Phytosanitary Service of Ukraine to 
get in line with European standards. One important project, costing €3.9 
million, aims to improve the food safety control system ‘from farm to 
fork’. Another project costing €2.6 million will supply laboratory 
equipment and software to increase the range of tests undertaken by 
state food laboratories and strengthen database collection and 
processing.  
 
Likely impact of SPS reforms. Proper implementation of 
Ukraine’s SPS-related obligations under DCFTA will contribute 
dramatically to the development of its agriculture and food industry, 
improvement of consumer protection rights and protection of human, 
animal and plant health. Given the huge potential of Ukraine’s 
agriculture to export to European and world markets the task of getting 
Ukrainian SPS standards fully in line with best EU and international 
practice is of the highest importance. The most promising markets for 
export expansion may well be in Asia rather than Europe, but 
approximation of EU standards becomes a brand asset and a sufficient 
technical qualification for accessing many world markets.   
Continuing improvement of food safety will allow Ukrainian 
companies to gain greater access to the EU market. For example, in 2014 
a number of meat and egg producers were recognised for exporting to 
the EU, and in 2015 some dairy enterprises and producers of fertilisers 
were recognised similarly.   
After approximation of Ukrainian legislation to EU standards, 
animal and plant products will face lower non-tariff barriers to enter 
the EU market. In addition, obtaining access to the EU market will have 
a positive externality in facilitating access to the markets of the third 
countries. Costs will be lowered through easier trade procedures, 
including fewer import permits and inspections. With the introduction 
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of risk management by the state authorities, less suspicious products 
will be subject to less onerous physical inspections.   
Consumers will benefit from better quality of products and 
better protection of consumer rights. Yet Ukrainian producers will face 
higher costs in order to comply with higher quality standards. 
Producers of high-quality goods will benefit from higher legislative 
pressure on low-quality producers.  
Some small producers will be hit by higher costs, but under EU 
regulations the authorities retain considerable flexibility in defining 
how local markets and traditional regional specialities may be 
exempted from full compliance with SPS standards. Moreover, in the 
next few years before the new SPS regime is fully established in 
Ukraine, there remains the possibility for individual export-oriented 
enterprises to be recognised by the EU as SPS-compliant. Ukraine’s 
2020 agriculture strategy prioritises the expansion of the number of 
enterprises individually recognised in this way.  
Government policy on SPS is expected to be more transparent. 
Also, Ukraine will be able to apply best European experience in the 
application of early warning systems on SPS-related emergencies. The 
system of government bodies will be better structured and coordinated.  
 
Food safety regulations at a glance 
Ukraine adopts a comprehensive strategy for applying EU SPS regulations 
in its agri-food sectors, which is programmed to take approximately 6 years 
to implement. 
This will assure high health and safety standards for Ukraine consumers, as 
well as position Ukrainian enterprises to export in EU and other 
international markets.  
For the time being individual enterprises can still be certified by the 
Ukrainian authorities for exporting to the EU, ahead of the SPS standards 
being applied across the entire territory of Ukraine.  
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9. SERVICES 
Development of a dynamic and 
competitive service sector is of huge 
importance for the modernisation of the 
Ukrainian economy. In this regard the 
DCFTA provides for a comprehensive 
and extremely detailed liberalisation of 
establishment and trade in services, 
subject still to reservations - more by the 
EU than Ukraine. For several services 
sectors, the agreement envisages the 
integration of Ukraine into the EU 
Internal Market. However, this far-reaching integration is conditional 
upon Ukraine’s approximation to the relevant EU legislation.  
Provisions of the Agreement 
 The provisions of the agreement are organised under three headings i) 
establishment, ii) cross-border supply of services and iii) temporary 
presence of natural persons for business purposes. 
Establishment. This entails the right of either enterprises (‘legal 
persons’), or individuals (‘natural persons’) to pursue business in the 
country of the other party. Enterprises may create or acquire branches 
or representative offices. Individuals may pursue their business as self-
employed persons or set up undertakings that they control.  
The Agreement provides for national treatment and MFN 
treatment for establishment. This means that the EU and Ukraine must 
grant the ‘established’ enterprises treatment no less favourable than 
that accorded to its own enterprises, or those of any third-country, 
whichever is better. 
However, for several service sectors both the EU and Ukraine 
have reservations that restrict this national treatment or MFN 
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treatment. These reservations are laid down in the annexes to the 
agreement (Annex XVI-A and D) and essentially replicate the parties’ 
reservations under the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), which entered into force in 1995.107 Ukraine has fewer 
reservations than the EU and its member states (see Table 9.1). 
Ukraine’s liberal approach mainly reflects the fact that it has only a few 
reservations at the level of the WTO (i.e. in its Schedule of Specific 
Commitments on Trade in Services).108 It is important to note that these 
reservations in the DCFTA are listed in a negative list. This means that 
the EU and Ukraine will, by default, open up all services sectors, except 
those sectors listed in which reservations apply (as detailed in the 
annexes). This approach guarantees automatic coverage for new 
services not listed as exceptions.  
Ukraine has for example some important reservations with 
regard to land ownership (i.e. foreign citizens and persons without 
citizenship have no right to the acquisition of agricultural land). In 
several other areas, Ukraine requires that the service provider must 
have Ukrainian nationality (e.g. notary services, ownership of forests 
or directing educational institutions), or must obtain a licence (e.g. 
several postal activities), or must meet professional qualification 
requirements according with Ukrainian legislation (e.g. medical and 
dental services; health-related and social services). Ukraine has also no 
national treatment or MFN obligations for air transport services and 
national cabotage transport.  
The list of EU reservations is complicated by a distinction 
between horizontal and sectoral reservations and includes both EU-
wide and member state-specific reservations. With regard to horizontal 
reservations (i.e. reservations applying to all sectors or sub-sectors), 
important EU-wide reservations concern, for example, economic 
activities that are considered as public utilities or may be subject to 
public monopolies.  Several member state-specific reservations exist, 
for example, for real estate purchase. Numerous EU-wide or member 
state-specific reservations remain in the area of agriculture and 
                                                        
107 For on overview of the parties’ reservations under the GATS, see 
http://i-tip.wto.org/services/Search.aspx. 
108https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=((
%20@Symbol=%20wt/acc/ukr/*%20or%20wt/l/718%20or%20wt/l/718/*%2
0)%20or%20(%20@Symbol=%20wt/min*%20and%20@Title=%20(accession%2
0and%20working%20and%20party%20and%20ukraine)))&Language=ENGLI
SH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true# 
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hunting, fishing, energy mining, professional services, financial 
services, transport services, etc.  
The agreement also includes a standstill clause that forbids, 
subject to the reservations in the Annex, the EU and Ukraine to adopt 
new discriminatory regulations as regards the establishment of legal 
persons of the other Party by comparison with their own legal persons. 
A soft commitment is included to further negotiate investment 
protection provisions and an investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanism. 
Table 9.1 National treatment or MFN reservations to establishment 
 EU party reservations Ukraine 
reservations 
 EU-wide 
reservations 
Member state-
specific reservations* 
 
Horizontal reservations 3 22 0 
Sectoral reservations 21 59 21 
Total 105 21 
* The number of member state-specific reservations stands for the number of reservations 
that are being applied by different EU member states. 
Cross-border supply of services. The DCFTA section on cross-
border supply of services covers both: 
 Cross-border supply, from the territory of a party into the 
territory of the other party without the supplier’s presence in 
the importing country (GATS Mode 1), and  
Consumption abroad, where a service consumer (e.g. a 
tourist or patient) moves to another country’s territory to 
obtain a service (GATS Mode 2).  
However, it does not apply to audio-visual services, national 
maritime cabotage and domestic and international air transport 
services.109 The EU and Ukraine have to accord services and service 
suppliers of the other Party market access and national treatment. 
However, contrary the section on establishment, the section on cross-
border supply of services works with a positive list. This means that the 
EU and Ukraine only make market access and national treatment 
commitments in those service sectors listed in the annex.  
                                                        
109 The conditions of mutual market access in air transport are covered by the 
bilateral Common Aviation Area Agreement (explained in the transport 
chapter). 
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In the sectors where market access commitments are undertaken, 
the EU and Ukraine may not limit: 
(i) the number of service suppliers (e.g. by quotas, monopolies, 
exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an economic 
needs test); 
(ii) the total value of service transactions or assets in the form of 
quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test; or 
(iii) the total number of service operations, the total quantity of 
service output by quota or the requirement for an economic 
needs test. 
The sectors or subsectors liberalised, including the applicable 
market access and national treatment reservations, are listed in great 
detail in Annex XVI-B (EU and its member states) and XVI-E (Ukraine). 
However, the liberalisation is – similar to establishment – rather 
asymmetrical: whereas Ukraine only has a limited number of 
reservations or unbound service sectors in its list, the EU has numerous 
reservations (Table 9.2). Again, this is mainly due to Ukraine’s liberal 
approach in the GATS. 
Table 9.2 Market access and national treatment reservations for cross-border 
services 
 EU  Ukraine 
 Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 1 Mode 2 
Business services 79 23 4 0 
Communication services 2 2 1 1 
Construction and related engineering  0 0 0 0 
Distribution services 13 4 0 0 
Educational services 11 8 0 0 
Environmental services 1 0 0 0 
Financial services 33 13 5 0 
Health services and social services 3 1 2 0 
Tourism and travel related services 4 0 0 0 
Recreational, cultural, sporting services 5 7 4 0 
Transport services  25 11 8 0 
Other services 2 2 3 0 
Energy services 12 1 0 0 
Total 190 72 27 1 
Notes: EU reservations above are both EU-wide and individual member state 
reservations. EU-wide and member state-specific reservations are grouped together. The 
number of member state-specific reservations stands for the number of reservations that 
are being applied by different EU member states. 
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Temporary presence of natural persons for business purposes. 
This section covers measures of the parties concerning the entry into 
and temporary stay in their territory of categories of natural persons 
providing services such as “key personnel” (i.e. senior personnel 
responsible for the setting-up or operation of an establishment), or as 
an “independent professional” (i.e. persons engaged in the supply of a 
service and established as self-employed for such purposes). 
With regard to key personnel, a legal person of the EU party or 
of Ukraine is entitled to employ employees who are nationals of the 
other party respectively. The residence and work permits of such 
employees only cover the period of such employment and the entry and 
temporary stay of such employees shall be for a period of up to three 
years. The entry and temporary presence of business visitors will be for 
a period up to 90 days in any 12-month period.  
Legal persons of the EU or Ukraine are also entitled to employ 
graduate trainees who are nationals of the other party for a period of 
up to one year. The EU and Ukraine will also allow the temporary entry 
and stay of sellers of business services for a period of up to 90 days in 
any 12-month period. 
The DCFTA also partly liberalises services provided by 
contractual services suppliers in 18 sectors. However, this liberalisation 
is subject to several conditions and reservations. Important conditions 
are, for example, that the natural persons must be engaged in the 
supply of a service on a temporary basis as employees of a juridical 
person, which has obtained a service contract not exceeding twelve 
months. Moreover, they must possess at least three years professional 
experience in the relevant sector and must have a university degree or 
a qualification demonstrating knowledge of an equivalent level and 
relevant professional qualifications. The reservations are listed in two 
Annexes (EU reservations in Annex XVI-C and Ukraine’s reservation 
in Annex XVI-F). The EU party has again more reservations than 
Ukraine.110 Whereas Ukraine only imposes limited reservations in the 
area of research and development services and entertainment services, 
several or most of the EU member states have specific reservations in 
each of the 18 listed sectors, such as the requirement of an economic 
needs tests (i.e. a test that conditions market access upon the fulfilment 
                                                        
110 Whereas the EU party has in total 82 reservations (member state reservations 
or EU-wide reservations), Ukraine has only 2 reservations (the number of 
member state-specific reservations stands for the number of reservations that 
are being applied by different EU member states). 
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of certain economic criteria). Similar or identical conditions and 
reservations also apply for the six sectors for which the parties liberalise 
the supply of services by independent professionals.111 
Regulatory framework and Internal Market treatment. The EU 
and Ukraine also aim to tackle regulatory barriers to trade in those 
services sections where they have made specific commitments. For 
example, the DCFTA defines some basic rules for licensing (i.e. the 
process through which a service supplier or investor is required to 
obtain a license from a competent authority before being allowed to 
supply a service). The DCFTA requires that licensing and licensing 
procedures proceed in clear, transparent and pre-established manner, 
and that it is proportionate to a legitimate public policy objective and 
made public. The agreement also envisages the mutual recognition of 
necessary qualifications and/or professional experience that natural 
persons must possess to provide a specific service. The EU and Ukraine 
shall encourage their relevant professional bodies to make 
recommendations to the Trade Committee on mutual recognition of 
requirements, qualifications, licenses and other regulations.  
In four services sectors, i.e. i) postal and courier services, ii) 
electronic communications, iii) financial services and iv) international 
maritime transport, the DCFTA includes specific rules and procedures 
on regulatory cooperation and even envisages a far-reaching 
integration into the EU internal market on the basis of legislative 
approximation. Ukraine has committed itself to approximate to the 
EU’s key legislation in these four services sections (included in Annex 
XVII). After the EU has determined, after a strict monitoring procedure, 
that Ukraine has effectively implemented these EU rules, the Trade 
Committee may grant reciprocal “internal market treatment” with 
respect to the services concerned. This internal market treatment means 
that there shall be no restrictions on the freedom of establishment of 
juridical persons of the EU or Ukraine in the territory of either of them 
and that juridical persons of one Party shall be treated in the same way 
as juridical persons of the other Party. This shall also apply to the 
freedom to provide services in the territory of the other Party.112 In 
practice, this means that for these four specific sections, the reservations 
of the EU and Ukraine to market access and national treatment, listed 
                                                        
111 These six sectors are i) legal services, ii) architectural services, iii) 
engineering services, iv) computer services, v) management consulting services 
and vi) translation services. 
112 Art. 4 Annex XVII. 
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in the corresponding annexes, will be lifted.113 The Agreement defines 
detailed rules on how Ukraine has to implement and enforce this 
legislation in its domestic legal order and how the EU shall monitor this 
implementation.114 
These sectors are discussed in further detail in the chapters 
concerned.  
 
Box 9.1 Summary of commitments and reservations of the EU and Ukraine 
for service sectors 
EU 
Reservations on establishment: substantial horizontal and sectoral national 
treatment reservations 
Commitments on liberalisation of cross-border supply of services:  large 
liberalisation, but with extensive reservations  
Commitments on contractual services and independent professionals:  
extensive reservations 
Ukraine 
Reservations on establishment:  substantial national treatment reservations 
Commitments on liberalisation of cross-border supply of services: large 
liberalisation with few reservations 
Commitments on contractual services and independent professionals:  
almost no reservations 
Ukrainian perspectives 
Ukraine’s service industry is one of the most important sectors of 
Ukrainian economy. It employs around 63% of the country’s workforce 
and is the major contributor to its GDP (66%).115 65% of Ukrainian 
enterprises (state and private) and 91% of private entrepreneurs work 
in services. The sector was steadily growing by 10-12% per year until 
                                                        
113 Annex XVI-A, point 1(3) and Annex XVI-B point 7. 
114 Annex XVII. 
115 Services include trade, repair and maintenance, transportation, postal and 
courier services, accommodation and food services, information and 
telecommunications, finance and insurance, real estate, professional, scientific 
and technical services, administration, state governance and defence, 
education, healthcare, culture, sports and recreation, and other services. 
DEEPENING EU-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS: WHAT, WHY AND HOW?  85 
 
2014 when its volumes dropped by 2% due to the unstable political and 
economic situation in Ukraine. In 2015, the service industry volumes 
increased by 38% to UAH 1301 bn. 
The biggest number of companies and entrepreneurs works in 
trade and automobile maintenance (60%), professional, scientific and 
technical activities (7%) and information and telecommunications (7%). 
At the same time, the biggest employers are trade and automobile 
maintenance (35%), education (14%) and healthcare (10%) sectors. This 
shows, first, that trade attracts most entrepreneurs and, second, that 
there is a vast public sector in education and healthcare. 
One of the fastest growing service sectors is the IT service and 
software R&D sector. Ukrainian developers often work on mobile, 
software, enterprise and web projects solving complex engineering 
tasks. Ukraine also has the largest and fastest-growing number of IT 
professionals in Europe (90,000 of IT professionals in 2015, the highest 
number in Europe). The main destination of Ukrainian IT firms is the 
US market (around 80% of exported IT services). The export volume of 
Ukraine’s software development industry reached around $2.5 billion 
in 2015 (third largest export sector), showing double digit growth year 
after year.116 Moreover, Ukraine is home to over 100 R&D subsidiaries 
of global companies from a variety of industries, including telecoms, 
software, gaming and e-commerce.  
The Association Agreement will impact the IT sphere mainly via 
legislative regulation of the rights of both suppliers and consumers of 
IT services. The key issue here is protection of intellectual property 
rights according to the EU’s E-commerce Directive 2000/31/EC, whose 
key provisions are enshrined in the DCFTA IPR Chapter (see chapter 
11 of this handbook). Stronger intellectual property rights legislation in 
Ukraine will mean for the business higher protection of investments 
into new technologies and innovations thus increasing investment 
attractiveness of the country. 
The Ukrainian financial sector was hard hit by the events of the 
beginning of 2014 and its banking system has structural weaknesses: 
“high rates of related-party lending, the short open currency position 
of many banks, the high ratio of non-performing loans to total banks 
                                                        
116 Ukraine Digital News (http://itonews.eu/report-ukraine-powerhouse/). 
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assets”117 in addition to hryvnia depreciation. To stabilise the system, 
the National Bank of Ukraine closed around a third of all banks in 
Ukraine (54 out of 180) and stress-tested 35.118 During 2013 – first half 
of 2015, credit volumes decreased by 15% year over year, lending to 
enterprises decreased by 9% while lending to households fell by 57%. 
Ukraine experienced also a significant outflow of foreign capital from 
the system: the share of foreign investment decreased from 34% on 
January 1, 2014 to 24.8% on June 1, 2015. The DCFTA requirements 
related to the banking industry mean the introduction of new macro-
prudential supervision tools aimed at strengthening financial stability, 
implementation of Basel II principles, progressive introduction of free 
movement of capital, improvement of monetary and financial statistics. 
The insurance sector of Ukraine despite being treated with 
caution due to low consumer confidence and thus low demand for 
insurance products, nevertheless, holds “definite long-term 
potential”.119 Many segments, in particular life and health insurance, 
are underdeveloped with low penetration rate. The DCFTA requires 
measures of prudential supervision on the insurance market to protect 
investors, policyholders and beneficiaries. 
The healthcare system in Ukraine is highly inefficient with 
oversized and fragmented infrastructure. The government health 
expenditures account for about 4.2% of GDP, the rest in patients’ out-
of-pocket expenditures. Ukraine has 2,400 hospitals and 300,000 beds 
which is twice the number of Spain, a country with a similar 
population. Yet crude adult death rates in Ukraine are higher than in 
its neighbours, Moldova and Belarus, and for its men among one of the 
highest in the world. For the healthcare, the DCFTA is important 
mainly in the light of the intellectual property rights protection which 
includes medicinal products and protection of exclusive data of 
medicinal testing.120 In the sphere of protection of biotechnological 
inventions Ukraine protects the inventions according to its national 
                                                        
117 World Bank Group, “Ukraine Partnership: Country Program Snapshot”, 
April 2015 (www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/ 
Ukraine-Snapshot.pdf). 
118 Ukraine: banking sector overview (www.ey.com/Publication/ 
vwLUAssets/ey-ukraine-banking-sector-overview/$FILE/ey-ukraine-
banking-sector-overview.pdf). 
119 BMI, “Ukraine Insurance Report”, 1 January 2016. 
120 Arts 219-223. 
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patent laws. Ukraine also has to harmonise its technical regulations for 
medicinal products with that of the EU.121 
For the labour market, the mutual opening of markets for 
natural persons for business purposes (e.g. independent professionals 
and key personnel) can lead to increased competition on the Ukrainian 
market and, accordingly, to higher qualification levels in certain 
spheres. Moreover, Ukrainian contractual service suppliers and 
independent professionals will have access to the EU market. For 
example, the employer will obtain rights for the computer programs 
created by a hired professional under the labour contract (now both the 
employer and the employee have the rights). This will induce the 
employers looking for IT professionals in Ukraine to formalise their 
relations via labour contracts and thus ‘de-shadow’ the IT market in 
Ukraine. However, as illustrated above, the EU has imposed numerous 
reservations in this area. The Agreement doesn’t make it easier for 
Ukrainian professionals to find job in the EU. On the contrary, it 
stimulates EU employers to establish companies in Ukraine and 
Ukrainian companies to provide services to the Europeans.122  
In telecommunications, the Agreement envisages new rules for 
setting tariffs, mutual access to networks, new regulation methods, 
market liberalisation, strengthening the regulator. “All in all, the level 
of trade liberalisation and the parties’ concessions in trade in 
telecommunications services do not go far beyond the commitments 
under the GATS. The value-added of this agreement seems to lie 
elsewhere, namely in its detailed provisions on domestic regulation.”123 
Thus, as before, EU companies cannot provide telecom services directly 
to customers in Ukraine on a cross-border basis since, according to 
Ukrainian laws, only a locally incorporated company may provide 
these services in Ukraine. A foreign company also cannot apply for any 
telecom or frequency license. It can operate in Ukraine only through a 
local subsidiary (whether wholly or partially owned). 
                                                        
121 Annex III to the TBT Chapter states that Ukraine will approximate to the EU 
sectoral (New Approach) Directives in the area of medical devices, active 
implantable medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices.  
122 See http://europa-torgivlia.org.ua/it-business/. 
123 Olga Batura and Olga Kretova, “Opportunities of Trade in Services between 
the EU and Ukraine: the Case of Telecommunications Services under the GATS 
and the Association Agreement”, ZERP-Working Paper No. 1/2015. 
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For audio-visual services, Ukrainian legislation has to follow 
major European principles in this sphere: 124 everyone (not just 
institutions licensed under the laws of Ukraine) has the right to 
freedom of expression and freedom to receive and impart information 
without interference by public authorities. According to the audio-
visual media services Directive, which Ukraine should implement 
within two years of the entry into force of the DCFTA (Annex XXXVII), 
“governments may not restrict which broadcasts people can receive or 
what programmes foreign broadcasters can retransmit in their 
country” if the broadcasts comply with the Directive.125 European 
standards do not require legislative authorities of Ukraine to encourage 
full public disclosure of information on ownership and control in the 
media sector (although Ukraine has every right to go beyond the 
requirements of European standards, introducing stricter requirements 
for media). However, audio-visual services are exempted from the 
DCFTA both for establishment and cross-border supply. 
Reforms in services sector are under way. As a step to implement 
international monitoring standards in financial services, the National 
Bank of Ukraine approved the “Methodology of comprehensive 
assessment of systemically important payment systems” that complies 
with the key principles of oversight standards: management of the 
payment organisation; risk management; finality of settlements in the 
payment system; requirements on access, participation and 
participation structure in the payment system; efficiency and 
effectiveness of the system; information disclosure. The Ministry of 
Finance is currently working on “Risk criteria for legalisation (money 
laundering) of crime proceeds, terrorist financing and financing of 
weapons of mass destruction” which sets the requirement for 
mandatory risk assessment for all clients receiving financial or other 
services. 
In the IT and electronic commerce sector, the Parliament adopted 
a Law on electronic commerce which harmonises Ukrainian legislation 
to that of the EU in the sphere of innovative technologies and electronic 
trade. The Government also prepared a draft Law on electronic trust 
services, which develops a unified system of electronic trust services 
and introduces mutual recognition of Ukrainian and foreign public key 
certificates and electronic signatures and seals. 
 
                                                        
124 According to European Convention on Transfrontier Television of 1989. 
125 See https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/general-principles. 
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Services sector at a glance 
A competitive and diversified services sector is of huge importance for the 
Ukrainian economy. 
The Agreement is detailed and comprehensive in both commitments to 
liberalisation and reservations. The text is asymmetric, with more 
liberalisation and fewer reservations on the Ukrainian side, which however 
is consistent with the urgent need for the Ukrainian economy to be 
modernised.  
The Agreement makes provisions for a few services sectors to attain ‘full 
internal market treatment’ by the EU as a long-term objective.  
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10. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
Public procurement is of great economic 
importance to both the EU and Ukraine; 
it accounts for around 18% of GDP in the 
EU and offers enormous potential 
market for Ukrainian companies. The 
DCFTA provides for the gradual and 
reciprocal liberalisation of the parties’ 
public procurement markets under the 
strict condition that Ukraine implements 
the EU’s key public procurement rules. 
Ukraine has to ensure that the public purchase of goods, works and 
services are transparent and fair, guarantee sound competition, tackle 
corruption and get the best value for taxpayers’ money.  
Provisions of the Agreement 
In the DCFTA chapter on public procurement the EU and Ukraine 
envisage mutual access to their respective public procurement markets, 
based on the principle of national treatment at national, regional and 
local level for public contracts and concessions in traditional sectors 
and for utilities. It covers any state, regional or local authority, 
including public undertakings in the field of utilities, such as state-
owned enterprises and private undertakings operating on the basis of 
special and exclusive rights. Defence procurement is not covered.  
The DCFTA procurement rules only apply to contracts above 
certain value thresholds listed in Annex XXI-P (Table 10.1). The 
agreement states that these thresholds should be adapted at the 
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moment of entry into force of this agreement to reflect the thresholds in 
place under the EU directives.126  
Table 10.1 Thresholds for application of public procurement rules 
 Threshold 
a. Public supply and service contracts awarded by 
central government authorities 
€133,000 
b. Public supply and public service contracts not 
covered by point a. 
€206,000 
c. Public works contracts and concessions €5,150,000 
d. Works contracts in the utilities sector €5,150,000 
e. Supply and service contracts in the utilities sector €412,000 
 
The DCFTA includes provisions relating to i) institutional 
reforms and the award of procurement contracts, ii) Ukraine’s 
approximation to the EU’s public procurement laws and iii) market 
access.  
Institutional reforms. Ukraine has to establish and maintain an 
appropriate institutional framework for the proper functioning of its 
public procurement system. In particular, Ukraine has to designate a 
central executive body that guarantees coherent economic policy in all 
areas related to public procurement, which will also be responsible for 
the implementation of this chapter. Ukraine also has to establish a 
separate, impartial and independent body that will review decisions 
taken by contracting authorities or entities during the award of 
contracts.  
Award of contracts. The DCFTA also defines “basic standards 
regulating the award of contracts”, which are derived directly from EU 
public procurement law and include the principles of non-
discrimination, equal treatment, transparency and proportionality. 
Ukraine has to comply with these basic standards no later than six 
months after the entry into force of the Agreement. Ukraine has to 
ensure that all its intended procurements are properly published to 
enable the market to be opened up to competition and to allow any 
interested economic operator to have access to information regarding 
the intended procurement prior to the award of the contract. 
                                                        
126 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1336/2013 of 13 December 2013 amending 
Directives 2004/17/EC, 2004/18/EC and 2009/81/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council in respect of the application thresholds for the 
procedures for the awards of contract. 
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Concerning the award of contracts, these basic standards state that all 
contracts have to be awarded through transparent and impartial award 
procedures that prevent corrupt practices. This impartiality has to be 
ensured, especially through a non-discriminatory description of the 
subject matter of the contract, equal access for all economic operators 
and appropriate time limits. Contracting entities may not impose 
conditions that directly or indirectly discriminate against the economic 
operators of the other party, such as the requirement that economic 
operators interested in the contract must be established in the same 
country, region or territory as the contracting entity. The final decisions 
are to be communicated to all applicants, and upon the request of an 
unsuccessful applicant, reasons must be given in sufficient detail to 
allow a review of the decision.  
Legislative approximation. This DCFTA chapter includes 
detailed rules on Ukraine’s approximation to the EU public 
procurement law. Ukraine is obliged to approximate to Directive 
2004/18 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public 
works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, 
and Directive 2004/17 on coordinating the procurement procedures of 
entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services 
sectors (i.e. utilities). However, these two Directives do not have to be 
implemented in their entirety and at once. Annex XXI divides these two 
Directives into mandatory elements and elements that fall outside the 
scope of legislative approximation. 
Directive 2004/18 covers most public contracts other than for 
utilities, telecommunications and service concessions. It obliges the 
contracting authorities to treat economic operators equally, non-
discriminatorily and in a transparent way. It provides for four types of 
contract procedures: i) open (i.e. any party may submit a bid), ii) 
restricted (i.e. any party may ask to participate and the contracting 
authority decides which parties to invite to submit a bid), iii) negotiated 
(i.e. the contracting authorities negotiate directly the terms of a 
contract) and iv) competitive dialogue (i.e. for very complex contracts 
the contracting authority may discuss requirements and solutions with 
candidates admitted to a procedure, before the candidates submit their 
final tender). With regard to transparency, this directive requires the 
publication of all public contract notices in the EU’s Official Journal and 
in the TED database, which is the public procurement database of the 
EU.127 All publications must contain identical information, such as the 
deadlines for the bids, language(s), award criteria and their relative 
                                                        
127 See http://ted.europa.eu/TED/main/HomePage.do. 
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weighting so as not to favour any bidder. Most of this Directive’s 
provisions are labelled in Annex XXI as ‘mandatory’ and therefore need 
to be implemented by Ukraine.  
Directive 2004/17 applies to supply, works and services 
contracts in the energy, water, transport and postal services sectors. 
Like Directive 2004/18, this one provides rules, most of which are 
mandatory, on the procedures for the awarding of public procurement 
contracts (i.e. an open, restricted and negotiated procedure), rules on 
publication and transparency, contract award criteria and conditions 
for participation. Finally, Ukraine also has to approximate to the EU’s 
remedies Directives (covering the utilities and public sector), which 
require that decisions taken by contracting authorities or contracting 
entities may be reviewed effectively and as quickly as possible where 
such decisions have infringed EU public procurement law.128 
Market access. This DCFTA chapter clearly links market access 
to Ukraine’s progress in approximating to the annexed EU public 
procurement rules and institutional reforms. Annex XXI includes an 
“indicative time schedule for institutional reform, legislative 
approximation and market access” (hereinafter “the indicative time 
schedule”). This time schedule sets out five phases indicating the 
provisions of the EU public procurement Directives that Ukraine has to 
implement and the specific market access that Ukraine and the EU will 
grant to each other (Table 10.2). The market access granted in each 
phase implies that the EU shall grant access to contract award 
procedures to Ukrainian companies – whether established or not in the 
EU – that is no less favourable than that accorded to EU companies and 
vice versa. This schedule also indicates that the EU and Ukraine will 
open their respective procurement markets gradually and 
simultaneously. Unlike other DCFTA chapters such as trade in goods, 
the EU will not grant access to a section of its procurement market until 
Ukraine offers the same market access to the EU. Moreover, each phase 
shall be evaluated by the Trade Committee and the reciprocal granting 
of market access will only take place following positive assessment by 
this Committee, which will take into account the quality of Ukraine’s 
legislation, as well as its practical implementation. The Trade 
Committee shall only proceed to the evaluation of the next phase once 
the measures to implement the previous phase have been carried out 
and approved. 
                                                        
128 Directive 89/665/EEC and Directive 92/13/EEC as amended by Directive 
2007/66/EC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures 
concerning the award of public contracts. 
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Table 10.2 Indicative time schedule for approximation of public procurement 
rules 
Phase Action Indicative 
time 
schedule 
(period after 
the entry into 
force of the 
DCFTA) 
Market 
access 
granted to 
EU by 
Ukraine 
Market access 
granted to 
Ukraine by 
EU 
1 Implementation of 
the basic standards, 
the institutional 
reforms and the 
public procurement 
roadmap 
6 months  Supplies for 
central 
government 
authorities  
Supplies for 
central 
government 
authorities 
2 Implementation of 
the basic elements of 
Directive 2004/18 
EC and of Directive 
89/665/EEC  
3 years Supplies for 
state, 
regional & 
local 
authorities & 
bodies 
governed by 
public law 
Supplies for 
state, regional 
and local 
authorities & 
bodies 
governed by 
public law  
3 Implementation of 
basic elements of 
Directive 2004/17 
EC and of Directive 
92/13/EEC 
4 years Supplies for 
all 
contracting 
entities in the 
utilities 
sector 
Supplies for 
all contracting 
entities 
4 Implementation of 
other elements of 
Directive 2004/18 
EC 
6 years Service & 
works 
contracts & 
concessions 
for all 
contracting 
authorities 
Service & 
works 
contracts  & 
concessions 
for all 
contracting 
authorities 
5 Implementation of 
“other elements” of 
Directive 
2004/17/EC 
8 years Service & 
works 
contracts for 
all 
contracting 
entities in the 
utilities 
sector 
Service & 
works 
contracts for 
all contracting 
entities in the 
utilities sector 
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Prior to the beginning of legislative approximation, Ukraine has 
to submit a comprehensive roadmap to the Trade Committee for the 
implementation of this procurement chapter (hereinafter: the public 
procurement roadmap), covering all reforms in terms of legislative 
approximation and institutional capacity building. This roadmap has 
to comply with the five phases of the indicative schedule of Annex XXI 
(Table 10.2). Following a favourable opinion by the Trade Committee, 
this roadmap will be considered as the reference document for the 
implementation of this chapter. 
It is important to note that the EU public procurement Directives 
included in the DCFTA have since been replaced by a new legislative 
package. In 2011 the Commission proposed the revision of Directives 
2004/17 and 18 and the adoption of a Directive on concession contracts. 
This legislative package was adopted in February 2014 and member 
states have until April 2016 to transpose the new rules into their 
national law.129 These new public procurement rules aim to simplify the 
EU procurement regime, introduce more flexibility, establish better 
access to EU procurement markets for SMEs and ensure that greater 
consideration is given to social and environmental criteria. Once the 
DCFTA enters into force, it will be crucial that Annex XXI be updated 
to take into account these new EU procurement Directives. Moreover, 
these new public procurement rules should also be covered in 
Ukraine’s public procurement roadmap. While these new directives 
did not change the basic framework of the EU’s public procurement 
system, which is mainly covered in phase 1 of the DCFTA’s indicative 
time schedule, the numerous novelties need to be transposed in the 
DCFTA. At a technical level the Commission and the Ukrainian 
authorities already agreed on the elements of the new directives to be 
transposed to the agreement. The public procurement roadmap, 
drafted by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, already 
takes account of these new directives (see below). 
Implementation perspectives 
Public procurement policy reform has been a government priority for 
several years and remains so, given the general government deficit and 
                                                        
129 Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement and repealing Directive 
2004/18/EC; Directive 2014/25/EU on procurement by entities operating in 
the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 
2004/17/EC; Directive 2014/23/EU on the award of concession contracts. 
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the need for fiscal consolidation and greater efficiency in public 
spending. 
Ukraine started legislating on public procurement when 
negotiating membership of the WTO. The basis for this was the WTO 
Government Procurement Agreement (signed by WTO members in 
1994). The Cabinet of Ministers approved several resolutions in 1997-
98130 with a view to introducing WTO principles on procurement. In 
particular, it approved the principles for procurements by central and 
local government entities, enterprises and organisations, if they are 
subject to budget financing or credits guaranteed by the government. 
These provisions were defined for the procurement of works, services 
and goods above UAH 10, 000. Special procurement procedures were 
allowed for construction works. Overall, these regulations were 
evaluated to be in compliance with international practice and WTO 
provisions, and in 2000 they were consolidated into the single law.131 
While a welcome step, the law had several drawbacks: it set low 
thresholds for the purchase of services and goods (UAH 20, 000 and 
UAH 50, 000, respectively); it also made the Tender Chamber of 
Ukraine (a non-government entity) a platform for state procurement, 
which became known for corruption, non-transparent procedures and 
expensive services. SMEs were de facto excluded from participating in 
public procurements. There were many delays in organising and 
conducting tenders – all factors that led to the abolition of this law in 
2008.132  
A long-debated public procurement reform finally occurred in 
2010, when the state procurement Law became effective.133 The law was 
positively evaluated by the expert community in Ukraine and 
international organisations, including the European Commission. The 
law envisaged more transparent rules for state procurements, even 
though it did not fully comply with the EU law. However, almost 
immediately the Parliament amended it and extended the number of 
exceptions for which procurements should be conducted according to 
special procedures (e.g. the purchase of energy, housing and utility 
services were taken out of the scope of the Law). As a result, the 
                                                        
130 No. 694 from 28 June, 1997; No.1058 from 24 September, 1997; No.1369 from 
1 September, 1998. 
131 Law No. 1490-III from 22 February, 2000. 
132 This Law was abolished according to the Law No.150-VI from 20 March, 
2008.  
133 The Law No. 2289-VI from 1 June, 2010 (became effective on July 30, 2010). 
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European Commission suspended its budget support programmes in 
Ukraine and only resumed them after the amendments to the Law on 
public procurement were introduced in order to make the procedures 
more transparent. In July 2011, the President signed the amendments 
to the state procurement Law,134 the key novelties of which included 
changes to the rules of state procurement with a single bid procedure 
and a reduction in the number of goods and services whose purchase 
had been excluded from the Law. The inclusion of procurement of 
housing and utility services under the Law can be considered as a 
positive step. However, state and municipal enterprises, which did not 
receive budget support and perform procurement on account of their 
own working capital, were removed from the scope of the Law. The 
decision whether to conduct a tender or not was to be made at the 
discretion of such enterprises. Besides, it was claimed that a lack of 
control over the procurement procedures involving a single participant 
led to more corruption, as the Ministry of Economic Development and 
Trade was not responsible for authorising such a procurement 
procedure. Overall, in four years the State Procurement Law of 2010 
was amended more than 20 times, mainly to increase the list of 
exemptions, which did not bring it closer to EU standards. 
In April 2014, the Parliament approved a new State Procurement 
Law,135 whose key provisions were harmonised with EU rules.136 The 
law was drawn up by the Ministry of Economic Development and 
Trade with the aim to increase transparency and openness in the area 
of procurements, to simplify procedures, reduce corruption and 
approximate legislation to the EU norms. The law extended the list of 
procuring entities to be covered, reduced the list of exemptions and 
narrowed the grounds for non-competitive procedures. Changes were 
introduced for conducting procurements in utilities (e.g. notion of 
“special or exclusive rights” was introduced in compliance with EU 
norms). The openness of state procurements was ensured by 
publication of information on all tenders on the special web-portal 
(www.tender.me.gov.ua).  
                                                        
134 The Law No. 3681-17 from 8 July 2011.  
135 The Law No. 1197-VII from 10 April 2014.  
136 For detailed analysis of the compliance of the Law with the EU rules, see S. 
Yaremenko and O. Shatkovskiy, “Commentary on Ukrainian Public 
Procurement Legislation”, Harmonisation of Public Procurement System in 
Ukraine with EU Standards, 5 November 2014 
(http://eupublicprocurement.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/ 
Commentary-to-Ukrainian-PP-legislation-ENG-031220141.pdf). 
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The Ministry was defined as the authorised government entity 
in public procurements, while the Antimonopoly Committee was an 
appeal entity. Such institutional arrangements complied with the EU 
Directive 2004/18. The only provision of this Directive that was not in 
the law, but should have been implemented within six months of the 
Association Agreement becoming effective, related to the provision 
that entitled the entity that did not win the tender to receive clear 
explanations for rejection. Overall, according to the plan approved by 
the Ministry, the harmonisation of Ukrainian legislation with the EU 
directives was to be implemented according to the ‘roadmap’ for public 
procurement reform.137 
Still, according to estimates of the Ministry, losses from 
corruption and low competitiveness in public procurements accounted 
for nearly 20% of procurement spending in 2014.138 As procurements 
were paper-based, they often resulted in the non-transparent selection 
of the winner, with possible changes of documents and difficulties of 
control by stakeholders. To increase the efficiency of budget spending 
and reduce corruption the government promised to introduce e-
procurement in compliance with EU standards, which is envisaged in 
the DCFTA. As a result, the Ministry has initiated a pilot scheme for e-
procurements through a system called ProZorro.139 On 12 February 
2015, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defence, the State 
Management of Affairs and the state-owned company Energoatom 
conducted pilot e-procurements140 through ProZorro, which became 
possible thanks to amendments to the State Procurement Law in 
January. Six e-trading markets were connected to ProZorro (Prom.ua, 
SmartTender.biz, Е-tender.biz, NEWTEND, NEtCast and PublicBid). 
Other central executive bodies joined e-procurement in 2015. 
The system allows for small-scale e-procurements of goods and 
services up to UAH 200, 000 and up to UAH 1.5 million, respectively, 
(before October 1, it was UAH 100, 000 and up to UAH 1 million, 
respectively), which are not subject to the general Law on Public 
                                                        
137 The Plan of Implementation of the Directive 2004/18/EC, approved by the 
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, 15 November, 2015 
(http://new.me.gov.ua/news/7460.html). 
138 See http://reforms.in.ua/sites/default/files/upload/docs/ 
7.1_20150514_nrc_public_procurement_presentation_v9_a4_dr_0.pdf.  
139 See http://prozorro.org/. Currently the system belongs to the Transparency 
International. After the completion of pilot stage of its work the System will be 
provided to the Government. The pilot was prolonged to the end of 2015.  
140 See www.president.gov.ua/news/32246.html. 
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Procurement. During the pilot phase, the ProZorro was administered 
by Transparency International, and its creation and operation was 
financed by international donors and user fees. Overall, during the first 
year of work 73.5 thousand tenders were conducted through ProZorro 
at a total amount of UAH 15.3 billion. The savings are officially 
estimated to be 14% of allocated financing. 
At the end of December 2015, the Parliament approved the 
Public Procurement Law drawn up by the government. The law mostly 
complies with the norms of the Directives 2014/24/EC and 
2014/25/EC. The exception relates to the compulsory e-auctions 
regulation envisaged in the Law (according to the EU directives such 
auctions are not compulsory). In Ukraine the requirement of 
compulsory e-auctions is officially explained by traditionally high 
corruption in public procurements. Still, according to the Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade this provision was already agreed 
with the European Commission. All central executive bodies and state-
owned natural monopolies have had to conduct procurement through 
ProZorro since 1 April 2016, and other public entities will have to 
switch to ProZorro starting 1 August 2016. In particular, ProZorro 
should be used for purchases of goods and services above UAH 
200, 000 and for works above UAH 1.5 million (these thresholds are 
raised for procurement of natural monopolies to UAH 1.0 million and 
UAH 5.0 million, respectively). The system is also used for 
procurement for much smaller purchases to ensure a better price. 
Besides, the law stipulates that the entity that conducts procurement 
should make the contract public if the tender is not conducted through 
ProZorro but its amount is between UAH 50, 000 and the threshold 
defined for the full tender. The law envisages the electronic appeal 
procedure and introduces centralised procurement organisations. In 
addition, it provides for procedures of auction at a minimum price, 
auctions with the MEAT criteria,141 competitive dialogue and 
negotiations. E-tenders through the ProZorro have built-in 
mechanisms to reduce corruption. Moreover, to increase the 
transparency and public control over procurement, the business 
intelligence module of the platform is public (bi.prozorro.org). 
                                                        
141 The MEAT criterion means that contracting authorities must base the award 
of public contracts on the Most Economically Advantageous Tender, which 
aims to ensure the best value for money (rather than the lowest price). The 
quality as well as the price or life-cycle costs of the work, good or service in 
questions have to be taken into account.  
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The ProZorro platform was transferred to the state company 
Zovnishtorgvydav in the beginning of April 2016. Eight e-trading 
markets received accreditation. The participation in e-procurement is 
on a cost recovery basis (it also helps to filter spurious bids). This is 
expected to allow ProZorro to be self-financing, ensure higher 
competition between e-trading markets for new suppliers and increase 
quality of services provided by e-trading markets.142 In May 2016, the 
Ukrainian e-procurement system Prozorro became the winner in the 
category of Public sector award in the World Procurement Awards 
2016.143  
The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade is generally 
responsible for the implementation of public procurement reform and 
the implementation of DCFTA provisions. The Ministry elaborated the 
public procurement roadmap, which was approved by the Cabinet of 
Ministers in February 2016.144 The roadmap complies with the different 
phases of the indicative time schedule of the DCFTA’s public 
procurement chapter, explained above (Table 10.2). It already takes into 
account new EU Directives (i.e. 2014/25/EC and 2014/24/EC). The 
Ministry further plans to harmonise rules of concluding agreements, 
usage of framework of agreements, etc.  
Moreover, in November 2015, the WTO’s Committee on 
Government Procurement took a decision to invite Ukraine to join the 
WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA).145 In March 2016, 
the Verkhovna Rada ratified the WTO GPA, which means that Ukrainian 
companies had an opportunity to access public procurement in? 48 
countries (estimated at total amount of USD 1,700 billion). This is a step 
forward in public procurement reform, which became possible thanks 
to the changes in the state procurement legislation aimed at 
deregulation and reduction of corruption.146 
Overall, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade is 
very active in implementing public procurement reform according to 
the indicative time schedule on public procurement. The full-scale 
                                                        
142 In April and May 2016, more than 25,000 tenders were announced in the 
ProZorro. The savings were estimated at 15.8%. Overall, since the introduction 
of the ProZorro in 2015, the number of tenders announced in the ProZorro by 
5,000 entities exceeded already 100,000.    
143 See www.procurementleaders.com/world-procurement-awards/winners. 
144 See http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/175-2016-%D1%80. 
145 See www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/gpro_11nov15_e.htm. 
146 Law No. 679-VIII from 15 September 2015. 
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implementation of new Public Procurement Law is expected to result 
in lower corruption in public procurements, greater efficiency in 
government consumption, greater transparency and openness of 
procurement and higher competition.  
 
Public procurement at a glance 
The Association Agreement calls for Ukraine to approximate its public 
procurement legislation to the respective EU directives to increase 
transparency and competition. 
The government moved towards the introduction of compulsory e-
procurement in the public sector on the basis of the ProZorro system, which 
proves to be effective in enhancing efficiency and reducing corruption.  
Overall, current government policies comply with the schedule of public 
procurement reform envisaged in the Association Agreement. A new Law 
on public procurement was approved in 2015 and the roadmap for reform 
was adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers in February 2016. 
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11. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
In our knowledge-based economies, the 
protection of intellectual property is 
important, not only for promoting 
innovation and creativity, but also for 
developing employment and improving 
competitiveness. The DCFTA requires 
Ukraine to modernise its IPR 
(Intellectual Property Rights) system. 
These reforms will contribute to a stable 
legal environment in Ukraine for the 
protection of IPR, which is crucial for 
attracting foreign investment.  
Provisions of the Agreement 
The DCFTA chapter on IPRs aims to facilitate the production and 
commercialisation of innovative products while guaranteeing an 
adequate level of protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights. It complements and further defines Ukraine’s obligations under 
the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS). This WTO agreement establishes minimum 
levels of protection that each government has to provide to the 
intellectual property of fellow WTO members. The DCFTA confirms 
these WTO rules and even goes beyond them in several areas. This has 
important implications for Ukraine as in principle it has to extend these 
‘TRIPS-plus provisions’ to all WTO members in line with TRIPS’ MFN 
clause (Art. 4 TRIPS). In addition to the TRIPS Agreement and the 
DCFTA, Ukraine is also under pressure from the USA to reform its IPR 
system. Ukraine is on the ‘301 Priority Watch List’ due to widespread 
(and admitted) use of illegal software by Ukrainian government 
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agencies and its failure to effectively combat the widespread online 
infringement of copyrights (see below).  
Unlike other DCFTA chapters, the IPR section does not oblige 
Ukraine to approximate to a selection of the EU’s IPR legislation 
annexed to the agreement. However, the main text of the DCFTA is 
very detailed, and its provisions reflect – or sometimes even copy – 
several principles and procedures of the EU’s IPR legislation. The 
DCFTA lays down rules on copyright, trademark, geographical 
indications (GIs) and designs, including detailed enforcement 
provisions.  
Copyright. The parties must comply with several international 
conventions and agreements (e.g. the Rome Convention for the 
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organisations, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works and the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
Copyright Treaty). With regard to the duration of authors’ rights, the 
DCFTA states that the rights of an author of a literary or artistic work 
have to be protected for 70 years after his/her death and critical and 
scientific publications may be protected for a maximum of 30 years 
after publication. The agreement also covers broadcasting and 
communication to the public; protection of technological measures; 
computer programs; rights of management information and release 
rights. The provision on cooperation on collective management of 
rights, which goes beyond the TRIPS agreement, envisages that the 
parties’ collecting societies147 conclude agreements with each other in 
order to ensure easier mutual access to and delivery of content between 
the EU and Ukraine, as well as to ensure the mutual transfer of royalties 
for the use of parties’ works.  
Trademarks.  Ukraine must establish a fair and transparent 
system for the registration of trademarks in which any refusal by the 
relevant trademark administration is duly reasoned, including the 
possibility to appeal a final refusal before judicial authorities. Ukraine 
has to provide a publicly available electronic database of trademark 
applications and registrations. A trademark may be revoked if, within 
a period of five years, it has not been put to genuine use in the relevant 
territory in connection with the goods or services in respect of which it 
is registered. 
                                                        
147 For example, authorities established under national IPR law that represent 
the holders of a certain IPR and who have the responsibility to administer the 
IPR rights of its members, such as collecting societies responsible for collection 
of copyrights royalties for musicians. 
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Geographical Indications (GIs). The text of the Agreement 
recognises that Ukraine’s IPR legislation (e.g. the Law of Ukraine on the 
Protection of Rights to Indications of Origin of Goods of 16 June 1999 
and its implementing rules) already meets the required conditions with 
regard to registration and control of GIs (Annex XXII), and therefore it 
does not require further legislative approximation to EU law. The 
annexes contain an elaborate list of geographical indications of 
agricultural products, foodstuffs and types of wines and spirits of both 
parties, which will be protected against commercial use or misuse of a 
protected name for comparable products, going beyond the TRIPS 
requirements. This list can be expanded after an objection procedure. 
Because numerous Ukrainian producers of foodstuffs and types of 
spirit drinks are still using protected EU GIs, the agreement provides 
for several transition procedures. Products that were produced and 
labelled before the DCFTA entered into force, but which do not comply 
with its GI requirements, may continue to be sold until stocks run out. 
Moreover, a transitional period of seven or ten years is provided during 
which Ukrainian producers may still use a selection of EU GIs for their 
comparable products, such as Champagne, Cognac, Porto, Calvados, 
Parmigiano Reggiano and Feta. A specific sub-committee on GIs shall 
monitor the implementation of these provisions and report to the Trade 
Committee. Moreover, this Committee is responsible for amending the 
annexes to this chapter, including the list of protected GIs.  
Designs and patents. Ukraine also has to protect independently 
created designs that are new and have individual character. The 
protection shall be provided by registration and shall confer exclusive 
rights upon the holder to at least have the exclusive right to use the 
design and to prevent third parties from using it without consent, in 
particular to make, offer, put on the market, import or export it. The 
duration of protection following registration shall amount to at least 
five years, but the holder may have the term of protection renewed for 
one or more periods of five years each, up to a total term of 25 years 
from the date of filing. Specific rules are provided for patents for 
medicinal and plant products. For example, the provisions on 
pharmaceutical data protection, which go beyond the TRIPS 
agreement, require that Ukraine shall implement a comprehensive 
system to guarantee the confidentiality, non-disclosure and non-
reliance of data submitted for the purpose of obtaining an authorisation 
to put a medicinal product on the market. 
Enforcement of IPRs. The Agreement has a strong section on the 
enforcement of IPRs. These commitments go beyond the TRIPS 
Agreement. However, the complementary measures and remedies in 
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the DCFTA have to be fair and equitable and may not result in 
additional barriers to trade. The section on civil measures and 
procedures, which is largely based on the EU’s IPR enforcement 
Directive,148 includes detailed procedural provisions on the judicial 
enforcement of IPR (e.g. on transparency, procedural fairness, right to 
information, measures for preserving evidence and publication of 
judicial decisions). Judicial authorities must have the competence to 
recall products from the market that are found to infringe an 
intellectual property right or to order the destruction of those goods. 
Moreover, judicial authorities must be able to issue an injunction and 
penalty payments or pecuniary compensation payments against the 
infringer with the aim to prohibit the continuation of the infringement. 
In addition, provisions on the liability of intermediary service 
providers (e.g. online service providers) are foreseen. These are copied 
from the EU’s E-commerce Directive149 and provide for a ‘safe haven’ 
regime, under which three types of intermediary service providers are 
exempted from liability for IPR infringements, under certain 
conditions. Ukraine only has to comply with these obligations within 
18 months of the entry into force of this agreement.  
Implementation perspectives 
Overview of intellectual property system. The development of the 
national system of intellectual property in Ukraine started in 1992 with 
the creation of the State Patent Office of the Committee for Scientific 
and Technological Progress under the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. 
It was reorganised several times: in 1999 the State Committee of Science 
and Intellectual Property was established, which was replaced in 2000 
by the State Department of Intellectual Property and in 2011 by the 
State Intellectual Property Service of Ukraine (SIPRU). In 2013 the 
SIPRU changed subordination from the Ministry of Education and 
Science to the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. 
Currently, the SIPSU is a central government body, which implements 
policy on intellectual property and develops proposals for the MEDT 
on the further development of this policy.150 The SIPSU also supervises 
                                                        
148 Directive 2004/48 EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
149 Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society 
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on 
electronic commerce). 
150 See http://sips.gov.ua/ua/polozhennia.  
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a number of special bodies dealing with the evaluation of applications 
for industrial property (Ukrainian Institute of Industrial Property), the 
management of copyright (Ukrainian Agency of Copyright and Related 
Rights) and issuing checkmarks (Intelzakhyst). 
In December 1993, the Verkhovna Rada passed the first set of laws 
on IPRs: the Laws on the Protection of Rights to Inventions and Utility 
Models;151 Protection of Rights to Industrial Designs;152 Protection of 
Rights to Marks for Goods and Services;153 and Copyrights and Related 
Rights.154 The standards system in the field of industrial property in 
Ukraine entered into force in 1998.155  
In 1998-2000 another four laws were passed, including the Laws 
on the Protection of Rights to Topographies of Integrated Circuits156 
(1998); on the Protection of Rights to Indication of Origin of Goods 
(1999);157 on the Distribution of Audio-visual Works, Phonograms, 
Computer Programs, Databases (2000);158 and on state regulation of 
business entities associated with the Production, Export and Import of 
Disks for Laser-reading Systems (2000).159 In 2007 the Ukrainian 
                                                        
151 See http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3687-12/ 
print1445587447179522.  
152 See http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3688-12/ 
print1445587447179522.  
153 See http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3689-12/ 
print1445587447179522.  
154 See http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3792-12/ 
print1445587447179522.  
155 These standards include the “Patent Card, Basic Provisions, Drawing up and 
Execution Procedure” and “Patent Research, Basic Provisions and Conducting 
Procedure”.  
156 See http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/621/97-%D0%B2%D1%80/ 
print1445587447179522  
157 See http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/752-14/ 
print1445587447179522.  
158 See http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1587-14/ 
print1445587447179522.  
159 See http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2953-14/ 
print1445587447179522.  
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parliament passed the Law on Basic Principles of State Supervision 
(Control) in Economic Activity.160 
Another important development in intellectual property rights 
protection was Ukraine’s accession to the WTO in 2008, when it also 
joined the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS). 
State of intellectual rights protection. Despite this substantial 
legislation and infrastructure, IPR protection in Ukraine is quite poor, 
as shown in the evaluations by the US and the EU. 
Ukraine has been included in the ‘Special 301 Report’ of the 
United States Trade Representative since 1998., but its status has not 
been constant (see Table 11.1). Starting with the most moderate status 
in the Watch List in 1998, Ukraine was then downgraded by 2001 as a 
‘Priority Foreign Country’, which means the worst protection of IPR. In 
2008-11 Ukraine’s status was again updated to the Watch List, and later 
in 2013-14 the situation worsened again. As of 2016, Ukraine remained 
on the Priority Watch List.161 Ukraine did not solve the problems but 
some efforts to improve the situation were noted.  
Table 11.1 Evolution of Ukraine’s status under Report 301 
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160 See http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/877-16/ 
print1444899710805737.  
161 US Trade Representative, 301 Report 2015 
(https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2015-Special-301-Report-FINAL.pdf). 
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According to the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR), the three major IPR problems in Ukraine are:  
 unfair and non-transparent administration of the system for 
collecting societies; 
 widespread use of illegal software by the government agencies; 
 failure to combat the widespread online infringement of 
copyright and related.162 
Legislative reform regarding collective societies has not 
proceeded and not all collecting societies actually represent rights 
holders. In 2015 one collecting society was de-credited, two more were 
under investigation, and 15 continue to operate without paying 
royalties to the rights owners. No institutionalised mechanism of 
transition to the use of authorised software was established; there were 
only occasional transitions. As a result, the piracy rate in the 
government remains high, at 60-80%. Regarding online infringement, 
Ukrainian officials were involved in some training and enforcement 
activities, and drafted relevant legislation. The process has stalled, 
however. 
In its recent report on the protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights in third countries the European 
Commission also states that, despite some minor improvements, the 
situation regarding the protection of IPR in Ukraine has not changed 
significantly and remains unsatisfactory.163 Ukraine is included on the 
Priority 3 list of countries (Priority 1 is defined as the most detrimental 
for the EU). 
Among the major IPR-related problems, the European 
Commission’s list reiterated massive infringements (both online and in 
physical markets), non-payment of royalties by state broadcasters and 
a general lack of clear rules in the area of collective management 
organisations. IPR laws are not relevant for enforcement in the digital 
environment, as criminal sanctions do not represent sufficient 
deterrence, legal proceedings are lengthy, and the number of IPR-
trained judges is insufficient. According to the European Commission, 
the main reasons for this situation are weak institutions, corruption, 
                                                        
162 See https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR-2016-Special-301-
Report.pdf. 
163 See https://oami.europa.eu/ohimportal/documents/11370/0/ 
Report+on+the+protection+and+enforcement+of+intellectual+property+right
s+in+third+countries.  
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poor capacity and lack of resources on the part of the enforcement 
authorities.  
The gap between the DCFTA and reality and reforms underway. 
The provisions of Ukraine’s legislation on intellectual property rights 
are mainly in compliance with the relevant EU legislation.  
However, some gaps remain. According to Ukraine’s Plan of 
Implementation of the Association Agreement in the sphere of 
intellectual property,164 it intends to adopt 19 EU legislative acts (12 
directives and 7 regulations) in 2015-17. The major improvements will 
focus on mechanisms for strengthening the protection and enforcement 
of industrial property rights; institutional and organisational changes 
for protecting Geographic Indications; mechanisms to increase the 
protection of rights and interests of copyright holders; a unified 
procedure of property rights realisation by copyrights by means of 
collective management organisation; and civil and administrative 
enforcement procedures and additional measures.165 The drafts of these 
laws had to be submitted by July 2015. The drafts were submitted in 
time but this process has also stalled: three draft laws were withdrawn 
for the Parliament, while two drafts are still under public consultation. 
These draft laws would bring the following amendments to the current 
legislation on IPR: 
Ukraine’s copyright system mainly complies with the DCFTA 
provisions. The amendments proposed include regulations on resale 
rights for the benefit of the author of an original artwork, the legal 
protection of computer programmes and databases, lease, loan and 
related rights in the field of intellectual property, and the 
harmonisation of issues regarding satellite broadcasting and cable 
retransmission. New legislation should also eliminate conflict between 
the provisions of legislation regarding property rights on office 
computer programs; provide for exemptions from copyrights (freedom 
of panorama); introduce the concept of public licence agreement in 
order to legalise end-user licence agreements, free software and free 
content. 
                                                        
164 Cabinet of Ministers Resolution №164, 4 March 2015. This implementation 
plan was prepared by the State Intellectual Property Service of Ukraine (SIPSU) 
with the assistance of an EU Twinning project “Strengthening the protection 
and enforcement of intellectual property rights in Ukraine,” 
http://sips.gov.ua/en/twinning_eng. 
165 See http://new.me.gov.ua/en/content/plani-implementacii-aktiv-
zakonodavstva-es-shvaleni-rozporyadzhennyam-kabinetu-ministriv-ukraini-
vid-4-bereznya-2015-roku--164.html?PrintVersion.  
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Ukraine should develop separate legislation on collecting societies 
in order to implement the relevant provisions of EU legislation. The 
proposed amendments include detailed provisions on the collection 
and distribution of royalties, including those obtained from home use 
and cable retransmission.   
Ukraine should improve the system of electronic application for 
the protection of trademarks, industrial designs, geographical 
indications, regulation of appeals regarding industrial rights and the 
renewal of industrial property rights. Immediate online access to this 
information should be granted. 
Opportunities and challenges for implementation. Proper 
implementation of the DCFTA provisions would bring Ukrainian 
legislation on intellectual property rights close to the best EU practices. 
This would contribute significantly to Ukraine’s economic 
development and international economic relations and would resolve 
most of the current concerns of the EU and US.  
The implementation of the DCFTA provisions on GIs will be 
challenging as numerous Ukrainian producers of foodstuffs and types 
of spirit drinks are still using protected EU GIs. Both the Ukrainian 
government and businesses should take a number of steps to fulfil 
Ukrainian obligations regarding the protection of the EU GI’s. The 
government should assure the protection of GI’s at its borders and 
maintain a database of GI’s. Businesses producing goods affected by 
these changes would face some losses. The DCFTA gives these 
producers a long transition period to adjust (up to 10 years for some 
products), however. As Ukraine is mainly an importer of intellectual 
property, stricter regulations could also impose additional costs on 
Ukrainian consumers.  
Another important change would be the improvement of 
legislation on the collective management of copyright and related 
rights, which is one of the major IPR-related problems in Ukraine. The 
proposed amendments would increase the transparency of collecting 
societies and improve the system of collecting and distribution of 
royalties.  
Online access to the information on trademarks will improve the 
protection of IPRs for both domestic and foreign producers. This would 
allow producers to monitor applications for trademark registration and 
make appeals in case their intellectual property rights are violated.   
Better regulation of IPR protection on the internet would 
significantly contribute to the overall better protection of IPR in 
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Ukraine, as well as eliminate Ukraine from the list of the major ‘pirate’ 
countries, which is one of the main concerns regarding IPR in Ukraine.  
An EU-funded twinning project, “Strengthening the protection 
and enforcement of intellectual property rights in Ukraine”, will 
support legislative changes, and organise training courses and study 
tours for relevant officials and judges working in the field of intellectual 
property.166  
Since Ukraine started its implementation of DCFTA a number of 
positive changes have occurred. For example, the State Intellectual 
Property Rights Service of Ukraine launched online access to data on 
applications for the registration of trademarks on August 21, 2015, and 
updates it daily.  
During the first nine months of 2015, the State Fiscal Service of 
Ukraine reported 2,210 cases of customs clearance suspensions due to 
suspected violation of intellectual property rights. The customs services 
also initiated 19 investigations into instances of imported goods 
violating IPRs.  
 
Intellection property rights at a glance 
Ukraine’s IPR system has some gaps in relation to the best European and 
international practices, which raises many concerns for the US and the EU. 
These gaps will be addressed by forthcoming legislation. 
Ukraine is a member of the main IPR- related international organisations 
(WIPO) and international treaties (TRIPS). 
The main problems are: non-transparent work of collecting societies; use of 
illegal software by public authorities; and online and offline infringement of 
copyright. 
Major changes will deal with copyright and related rights, trademarks, 
patents and designs, geographical indications and enforcement. 
                                                        
166 See http://sips.gov.ua/en/twinning_eng.  
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12. COMPETITION POLICY 
An effective competition policy that 
controls monopolistic behaviour by 
companies and trade-distorting 
subsidies by the government is essential 
for the sound functioning of a modern 
economy. It assures a level playing field 
for economic operators, lower prices for 
consumers with better quality and wider 
choice, and reduces the scope for 
corruption. However, the starting point 
for today’s Ukraine shows there is much 
to be done.  
 
Provisions of the Agreement  
Antitrust and mergers. The DCFTA prohibits and sanctions anti-
competitive practices and transactions, with the following practices 
deemed illegal: 
(a) agreements, concerted practices and decisions by associations of 
undertakings, which have the object or effect of impeding, 
restricting, distorting or substantially lessening competition in 
the territory of either party; 
(b) the abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position in 
the territory of either party; or; 
(c) concentration between undertakings, which results in 
monopolisation or a substantial restriction of competition in the 
market in the territory of either party. 
These principles are clearly derived from EU competition law 
(i.e. Arts 101 and 102 TFEU). The above practices are only prohibited 
“insofar as they may affect trade between the Parties”. However, the 
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Commission interprets very widely what may affect trade between EU 
countries, and sets the bar quite low for what is not considered to affect 
such trade, notably if (a) the aggregate market share of the parties on 
any relevant market does not exceed 5% and, (b) the aggregate annual 
turnover of the undertakings does not exceed €40 million. Implicitly, a 
similar interpretation may apply to the DCFTA.  
The DCFTA gives Ukraine considerable discretion in how to 
implement and enforce these antitrust and mergers principles. The 
agreement only requires that Ukraine maintains i) competition laws 
that effectively address these anti-competitive practices, and ii) 
authorities responsible for the effective enforcement of these 
competition laws. These competition laws and enforcement authorities 
have to be transparent and non-discriminatory, respecting the 
principles of procedural fairness and rights of defence. While Ukraine 
is not obliged to approximate to the entire body of EU antitrust and 
merger law, it has to implement specific provisions of important EU 
competition regulations within three years of the entry into force of the 
DCFTA.  For example, Ukraine has to approximate to the concentration 
thresholds of the EU merger Regulation (No 139/2004), which define 
when a merger has an ‘EU dimension’ and therefore needs to be 
notified to the Commission and subjected to the publication 
requirements of Directive 1/2003. The latter implies that the Ukrainian 
competition authority has to properly publish its decisions while taking 
into account the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of 
their business secrets. 
State aids. The provisions here apply to all goods and services, 
except agriculture and fisheries. Again, the DCFTA provisions are 
largely inspired by the key principles of EU competition law. Reflecting 
Art. 107(1) TFEU, the DCFTA states that:  
any aid granted by Ukraine or the [EU member states] 
through state resources which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods is incompatible with the proper 
functioning of this Agreement insofar as it may affect trade 
between the Parties.  
Here too, the DCFTA only prohibits state aid when trade 
between Ukraine and the EU “may be affected”. In the EU, state aid 
granted by a member state to a single undertaking that does not exceed 
€200,000 over a period of three fiscal years falls outside the scope of EU 
state aid control. The agreement also takes over from the Treaty (TFEU) 
the types of state that “shall” or “may be considered to be” compatible 
with the agreement: for example, various social aids and disaster relief 
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“shall” be considered compatible, and various regional economic 
development aids “may” be compatible, including state aid to achieve 
the objectives allowed under the EU horizontal block exemption 
regulations (e.g. aid for environmental protection and for research and 
development). Ukraine and the EU will notify each other of the total 
amount annually, types and sectoral distribution of state aids that may 
affect trade between them, although any aid below €200,000 does not 
need to be notified. 
Institutional aspects. The Agreement is largely silent on how 
Ukraine’s competition policy should be administered. Only in the area 
of state aid does the DCFTA explicitly oblige Ukraine to establish an 
independent authority with powers to authorise state aid schemes, as 
well as to order the recovery of state aid that has been unlawfully 
granted. There is a crucial political issue here that goes beyond the 
question of formal institutional organisation; namely, how the system 
works in practice.  
The EU’s own experience in this regard has some strong 
messages. To take just three examples from EU member states, 
Belgium, France and Germany, the general rules are that the 
government and/or parliament make the top-level appointments for 
fixed terms for medium-term periods (five or six years), but the 
appointees cannot be dismissed at the discretion of the government or 
parliament. Most important, individual case decisions of these 
competition policy bodies are sovereign, and not subject to approval by 
the government. These member state examples are perhaps more 
relevant than the EU’s own institutional structure, where the 
competition authority (Directorate-General) works as part of the 
European Commission. However, even in this case, there is a strongly 
established convention that competition policy decisions are taken 
according to a strict interpretation of EU law and minimum 
politicisation. For example, at the present time when the Commissioner 
is handling cases concerning companies of global significance, such as 
Google and Gazprom, the Commissioner declares that strict respect for 
the law is the only safeguard against politicisation of such cases. Such 
considerations are of high importance in Ukraine, given the endemic 
corruption and the political leverage of leading entrepreneurs 
(‘oligarchs’).  
The overall conclusions for Ukraine are that top-level 
appointments to the Anti-Monopoly Committee should be for fixed 
periods of several years and should be protected from politically 
motivated dismissal by transparent and strict procedures that 
guarantee the right of defence, and that the case decisions of the Anti-
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Monopoly Commission should be made independently of the 
government or parliament.  
Implementation perspectives 
Competition policy and institutions in Ukraine. The first set of 
competition-related laws were adopted in 1992-96, in the initial period 
of state formation. The Law on Limitation of Monopolism and Prevention of 
Unfair Competition in Entrepreneurial Activities, dated February 1992, 
focused on abuses of dominance, anti-competitive concerted actions 
and discrimination of enterprise by public authorities, and on unfair 
competition among business entities.167 This law also established the 
Anti-Monopoly Committee of Ukraine (AMCU) as the public authority 
responsible for protection of businesses against unfair competition and 
monopoly power abuses and for state control over the implementation 
of the anti-monopoly legislation. In July 2000, important changes were 
introduced to the organisational structure of the AMCU,168 reducing its 
independence. Since then, the Chairman of the AMCU has been 
appointed and dismissed by the President of Ukraine after the Rada’s 
consent. Similarly, the Commissioners have been appointed and 
dismissed the President based on submissions of the Prime Minister 
following the proposals of the Chairman of the AMCU. The AMCU 
Law169 stipulates several clear reasons for the AMCU Chairman and 
Commissioners’ dismissal, namely health, their personal decision, a 
crime and a major violation of duties (for Commissioners), thereby 
shielding the Commissioners from politically motivated dismissals.  
A new Law on Protection of Economic Competition,170 passed in 
January 2001, followed the patterns of EU competition rules, bringing 
Ukrainian legislation closer to international standards.171 It provided a 
clearer definition of monopolistic activity, especially the description of 
                                                        
167 See http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2132-12/ed19920218. 
168 See http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1907-14/ed20000901. 
169 See http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3659-12/ 
print1447338779961228. 
170 See http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2210-14/ed20010111. 
171 M. Jakubiak (2005), “Analysis of factors contributing to the adoption of 
competition law in Ukraine. Implications for other developing countries”, 
Project on Competition Policy Foundations for Trade Reform, Regulatory 
Reform and Sustainable Development (www.iwh-halle.de/projects/ 
competition_policy/Ukraine_Country_Study.pdf). 
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a dominant position on the market and concerted practices and also 
expanded the role of the AMCU. Since 2010, the AMCU’s 
responsibilities have been further widened as it became an appeals 
body for public procurement and a monitoring and control authority 
for state aid.  
Until recently, there had been no unified rules on oversight of 
the state aids, which were regulated by the Commercial, Budget and 
Tax Codes, the Law on Protection of Economic Competition, the Law 
on Stimulating Regional Development and numerous sectoral 
development programmes.172 However, in 2014, the framework Law on 
State Aid to Commercial Entities173 was passed, bringing the system of 
state aid provision in line with European norms. The law designated 
the AMCU as a public authority responsible for monitoring and 
authorising state aids, and assessing their impact on competition and 
thus their legality, and also empowered the AMCU to recover the 
unlawfully granted state aid. This was, as explained above, a key 
DCFTA requirement. Although selected provisions of the law have 
become effective since 2014, its key provisions will only be 
implemented in 2017.  
A peer review of Ukraine’s competition law and policy 
conducted by UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development) in 2012 concluded that Ukraine has developed a rather 
comprehensive body of competition law largely aligned with 
international best practices, and thus did not require drastic changes.174 
At the same time, the UNCTAD experts advised that more effort was 
needed on law enforcement, and to strengthen the AMCU as the 
independent and powerful competition authority.  
While Ukraine’s anti-monopoly legislation is relatively well 
developed, enforcement has remained very poor. Also, sectoral 
legislation has occasionally restricted competition. For instance, in 
October 2014, new rules regarding airline route allocation were passed, 
envisaging inter alia that only airlines operating regular domestic 
                                                        
172 O. Betliy and V. Kravchuk (2012), “Reforming state aid in Ukraine,” Policy 
Paper for the Project on Economic aspects of Ukraine’s European integration in 
the light of Association Agenda priorities: Expert analysis, recommendations 
and public discussion.  
173 See http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1555-18/paran205#n205. 
174 UNCTAD, “Voluntary Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy: 
Ukraine”, 2013. 
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flights for at least a year are entitled to serve international routes.175 This 
legislation effectively ruled out international competitors. In May 2016, 
the new version of the rules was passed removing this dubious 
standard, although the implementation of the rules may be delayed by 
litigation initiated by the main Ukrainian airline.   
Poor competition law enforcement resulted in the growing 
monopolisation of Ukraine’s economy. According to AMCU 
assessments, from the beginning of 2015, only 43% of markets were 
competitive, while in 2005 their share was 60%.176 The share of 
oligopolistic markets grew from 12% to 17% over last decade, the share 
of markets dominated by one company – from 24% to 31%, and the 
share of monopolies – from 7% to 10%. The highest level of market 
concentration is registered in utility services, energy, and transport.  
According to the Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015,177 
Ukraine’s “intensity of local competition” is ranked 101 out of the 144 
states surveyed, the “extent of market dominance” is ranked 129 and 
the “effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy” has the disconcertingly low 
ranking of 136.  
Reforms in legislative and institutional set-up. Reforms for the 
protection of competition and antitrust laws have been identified 
among 62 key reforms of the Presidential Strategy 2020, although it was 
not placed among the top eight reform priorities. At the same time, 
reforms of the juridical and law enforcement system are among the 
country’s priorities, and their successful accomplishment would be 
beneficial, also for the competition policy enforcement.   
In September 2014, the government approved the Action Plan for 
the Association Agreement, including the competition chapter.178 
Several important steps have been already taken.  
As required by the DCFTA, in September 2015, the AMCU issued 
an official clarification on the methods of setting penalties for anti-
                                                        
175 See http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z1440-14/ed20141024. 
176 See 
www.amc.gov.ua/amku/doccatalog/document?id=122547&schema=main.  
177 See 
www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2014-15.pdf. 
178 See www.kmu.gov.ua/kmu/control/en/publish/article?art_id= 
248402403&cat_id=248402399.  
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competitive practices,179 based on the European Commission 
guidelines.180  Experts assessed these clarifications as a positive step, 
although they might require further improvement after its 
implementation starts.181  
Since July 2015, the AMCU has started publishing its decisions. 
In November 2015, Law No. 782-VIII was also passed, improving the 
transparency of the AMCU by requiring timely and full publication of 
all Committee’s decisions on the official website. The law was reviewed 
and generally supported by the European Commission.182  
Law No. 935-VIII aiming to increase efficiency of control over 
economic concentration envisaging simplification of concentration 
practices and their harmonisation with the EU norms was passed in 
January 2016.183 The main novelties include higher thresholds for 
controlled concentrations, removal of the 30% market-share criterion 
for notification of concentration, improvement of the procedure for 
considering the application and introduction of simplified procedure 
for certain types of concentrations.  
The draft Law No. 2431 amending the Law on the Protection of 
Economic Competition regarding penalties imposed by the AMCU for 
anti-competitive practices awaits its second reading.184 Its adoption has 
been delayed by debates on the role of courts in appeal procedures 
regarding penalties imposed by the AMCU.  
A new Chairman and set of Commissioners of the AMCU were 
appointed in 2015. The appointment ended a period of weak 
operational capacity of the AMCU, as in 2014 the institution lacked a 
Chairman and four out of nine Commissioners, causing delays in its 
work and making the process more burdensome for all participants. 
According to the AMCU report, in 2015 the authority considered 5,000 
complaints regarding competition violations, 12% more than the year 
before, while penalties increased by 3.4 times to UAH 339 million.185 
                                                        
179 AMCU, Clarifications No. 16-pp, 15 September 2015 
(http://search.ligazakon.ua/l_doc2.nsf/link1/FN013589.html). 
180 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex: 
52006XC0901%2801%29. 
181 See www.epravda.com.ua/columns/2015/09/22/560649/. 
182 See http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/782-viii/. 
183 See http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/935-viii/. 
184 See http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=54479/. 
185 See 
www.amc.gov.ua/amku/doccatalog/document?id=122547&schema=main. 
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Competition policy at a glance 
The provisions in the DCFTA for competition policy are substantial and 
strong in terms of legal commitments, requiring Ukraine to reform control 
of monopolistic behaviour and state subsidies in line with established EU 
practices. 
Ukraine has already largely aligned its competition legislation on EU and 
international standards and further legislative and institutional reforms are 
envisaged. The adoption of the Law on State Aid marks an important 
achievement in the implementation of the DCFTA competition chapter.  
However, the effective implementation and enforcement of these and other 
envisaged competition laws will be the key challenge for Ukraine. This 
requires a competent and independent AMCU, which is still too dependent 
on the executive branch. 
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13. STATISTICS  
A modern and internationally 
comparable statistical system is 
indispensable for informed policy-
making and for the work of the business 
sector and civil society. All the post-
Soviet states have had to face the same 
challenges of radical reform to their 
statistical systems, notably the move 
from systems that essentially served the 
needs of the state to systems that serve 
the private sector and society as a whole 
and, more technically, to a greater use of sampling methods rather than 
exhaustive data collection.  
Provisions of the Agreement 
The EU has engaged all six Eastern Partnership states and the Central 
Asian states in extensive cooperation programmes to assist this long 
and complex process. Many of the projects listed below are ‘group 
activities’ for the whole Eastern Partnership and, in some cases, also 
with the Central Asian states.  
For Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia this is enhanced by 
collaboration and by the explicit commitments made in the Association 
Agreements to align their statistical systems to that of the EU: Eurostat, 
which sets out a huge number of legal regulations in the Statistical 
Requirements Compendium. This is a highly ambitious programme. 
The time horizon for compliance with EU regulations is not specified, 
however, but experience from the accession of the new member states 
of the EU would indicate that this is a long-term process. For a realistic 
perspective, it took around 15 years for other new EU members to 
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complete the transition, with much more support from the EU than 
Ukraine, Moldova or Georgia will be receiving.  
Cooperation between Eurostat and the partner states is 
structured as follows: 
- Seminars on statistical strategies, once a year for three days 
- Training courses on current issues and recent developments in 
statistical systems, about five to six times over a two-year cycle 
- Collection of selected data series, about 300 in number (i.e. a 
selection of key series, but less than what the EU member states 
comply with), in which the partner states submit data in 
accordance with Eurostat questionnaires, allowing Eurostat to 
publish comparable data series 
- In-depth assessment of the statistical systems of Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia (called Global Assessments), on which see 
further below  
- Activity of the Eastern Partnership multilateral platform and 
panel on statistical systems. This consists of conferences held in 
EaP capitals at a rate of about two per year, each taking up a 
particular theme in depth (such as labour market, migration, 
etc.). 
Developments in Ukraine’s statistical services 
Ukraine has a relatively well-developed statistical agency, Ukrstat. 
During the 2000s, Ukrstat received a lot of help from international 
donors to upgrade data collection processes, data quality and 
methodology, including a major $45 million loan from the World 
Bank.186 An ongoing twinning project with the Danish statistical agency 
also seems to be moving at a good pace.187 
In part thanks to international funding, Ukrstat introduced a 
number of new statistical products and revamped existing ones. For 
example, the consumer prices index was reformed in 2007-08. National 
accounts are now produced based on standardised models (SNA-2008 
and NACE 2.0). The methodology for the industrial output index was 
revised several times in recent years. Most publications by Ukrstat are 
now published online and generally on time. The output compares 
                                                        
186 See www.worldbank.org/projects/P076338/development-state-statistics-
system-monitoring-social-economic-transformation-project?lang=en. 
187 See www.dst.dk/en/consulting/projects/ukraine. 
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favourably with most post-Soviet states, and with Eurostat on some 
points.188 
However, the many revisions in methodology have caused 
breaks in data series, including four such breaks for the industrial 
output index. Back-cast data were provided with a significant delay. 
Ukrstat is currently adjusting for important discontinuities resulting 
from the loss of Crimea and the conflict over the eastern Donbas (see 
Box 13.1).  
 
Box 13.1 Impact of Crimea and eastern Donbas on Ukrainian statistics 
The loss of control over Crimea in March 2014, led to relatively 
straightforward consequences for Ukrainian statistics. Most statistics are 
aggregated from data gathered by regional/oblast statistical offices. 
After reports from Crimea and Sevastopol stopped, Ukrstat started to 
provide data aggregated from reports by the 25 remaining regional 
offices, and Ukrstat is now providing adjusted retrospective data in most 
cases from 2010. The loss of Crimea causes a break in most data series, 
but adjustments are relatively small as Crimea and Sevastopol 
accounted for less than 4% of GDP in Ukraine. 
In the case of eastern Donbas, the situation is more complex. Some 
economic establishments were destroyed and others continued to 
operate but ceased reporting. Others nevertheless continued to report to 
Ukrstat, despite operating on uncontrolled territory. Ukrstat stated that 
2015 statistics and some of 2014 statistics excludes “part of the zone of 
the antiterrorist operation” but did not provide guidance on what this 
means. In practice part of oblast-level statistics and thus national 
aggregates clearly include reported economic activity in the eastern 
Donbas.189 This may result in an overstating of the reported reduction in 
economic activity in 2014 and 2015. The IER has estimated that GDP in 
Ukraine, excluding eastern Donbas (and Crimea), fell by less than 10% 
in the first half of 2015, compared to the 16% drop reported by Ukrstat. 
In 2016, reports from companies in eastern Donbas continued to be 
included at minimum levels of industrial output, and construction and 
services activity. Survey-based statistics have by necessity been 
calculated without the eastern Donbas. 
                                                        
188 According to personal experience with cross-country data. 
189 For example in first quarter of 2016, Donetsk city accounted for 25% of 
reported construction work in the Donetsk oblast and steel production in the 
Lugansk oblast (with no large mills in controlled part of oblast) contributed 
29% of sales by industrial companies in the oblast. 
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However, it is not completely clear how the displaced population, 
estimated at over 1 million,190 was accounted for in recent household 
surveys.191  
The main challenges on data gathering are the coverage of 
individual entrepreneurs and households, and delays in censuses of 
households and agricultural undertakings. Individual entrepreneurs 
are not subject to mandatory statistical reporting, although they 
account for large market shares in a number of service sectors, 
including hotels and restaurants, IT services, real estate services, 
professional and business services, etc. So far Ukrstat has resorted to 
extrapolation, based on data reported to tax authorities, but did not 
make much progress in voluntary surveys. 
The household survey has a relatively high response rate (77%) 
but the response rate for urban households was lower, at 70% for large 
cities and only 49% for Kyiv. This probably means that a large share of 
middle-income households and most high-income households are 
excluded from the sample. This is reflected in an improbably low Gini 
index of 0.246192 for distribution of income by Ukrainian households, 
which is the lowest recorded by the World Bank.193 
A census of households was initially planned for 2011, i.e. ten 
years after the previous census in 2001. But this has been pushed back 
repeatedly, most recently to 2016, because of the budget crisis. This 
means that the Ukrstat’s population estimates are based on 2001 data, 
adjusted for administratively registered births, deaths and migration. 
For example, Ukrstat’s 2016 population estimate for Kyiv city is 2.9 
million, while the unregistered population is estimated at 0.4 million.194 
A delayed agricultural census is also critical for accurate agricultural 
                                                        
190 About 1.6 million were registered as displaced by social services (required 
for regular welfare payments), and 1 million received assistance from the 
emergency services.  
191 In 2015, the reported number of households in 23 regions not affected by 
conflict increased by 0.3 million from the 2013 level, despite mortality 
exceeding the birthrate. It is difficult to judge whether this reflects displaced 
persons and whether they were represented in the survey sample. 
192 See www.ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/publicat/kat_u/2016/bl/05/ 
bl_vrdu15_pdf.zip, p. 144. 
193 See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?order=wbapi_ 
data_value_2011+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-first&sort=asc. 
194 See 
www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2016/ds/kn/kn_u/kn0316_u.html. 
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statistics, since 45% of agricultural production is estimated to be 
produced by households.  
Current progress and plans for the implementation of EU 
standards cover an extensive range of statistical series, including 
business sentiment, structural statistics, a labour force survey, 
household survey, education statistics, gas and electricity prices, 
agricultural holdings, fisheries, livestock and meat statistics, and 
pesticide statistics. For these series implementation is at various stages 
of completion. Overall Ukrstat is likely to be able to implement EU rules 
on statistics as scheduled, as no major increase in scale or complexity of 
data gathering is required.  
There remain several serious technical challenges:  
- The website of Ukrstat is antiquated and navigation can be 
difficult for new users.  
- Ukrstat.gov.ua is not searchable, either internally or through 
search engines (except through unofficial sources). 
- There is no interface to download data series.  
 
Ukrainian statistics at a glance 
Ukraine has a relatively well-developed statistical agency, although its 
website is still rather antiquated. 
Programmes for harmonisation with European methodologies are extensive 
and broadly proceed as planned. 
However, shortage of resources hold back some important census and survey 
operations.  
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14. MACROECONOMIC CONTEXT 
AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
The macroeconomic context 
In the first decade of the post-Soviet 
period, Ukraine suffered a more 
dramatic recession than many of the 
other transition economies. Real GDP 
decreased by 59% between 1990 and 
1999, and labour market adjustment 
mainly took the form of a drastic fall in 
real wages. Despite progress in 
privatisation and price liberalisation, 
many structural reforms were postponed.  
Figure 14.1 Economic trends in Ukraine since independence 
 
Note: Since 2010, data do not include AR Crimea and Sevastopol; the 2015 
data also do not include the occupied territory in eastern Ukraine. 
Source: Ukrstat. 
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Economic recovery started in 2000, led by a global commodity 
price boom and later by increased domestic demand. Real GDP grew 
by 6.9% on average between 2000 and 2008.   
The Ukrainian authorities did not use these years of easy growth 
to implement reforms, however. Tax and regulatory burdens remained 
high and pension, social welfare, health care and education reforms 
were incomplete. Substantial universal energy subsidies were provided 
in the form of discounted gas, heating and electricity tariffs. The 
government did succeed in a degree of international trade 
liberalisation, which allowed the country to become a member of the 
WTO in May 2008.  
Ukraine’s economy entered into recession in 2008 as the world 
financial crisis aggravated its inherent weaknesses. The hryvnia 
depreciated sharply, resulting in high inflation. In 2008 and 2009, the 
economy’s external payments were supported by an IMF loan 
programme, but the drop in external and domestic demand caused a 
severe contraction of real GDP in 2009 by 15.2%.  
Table 14.1 Ukraine: Main economic indicators 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014* 2015** 
GDP growth (%) -15.2 7.5* 5.5* 0.2* 0.0* -6.6* -9.9** 
CPI (% aop) 15.9 9.4 8.0 0.6 -0.3 12.1 48.7 
Budget balance 
(% GDP)*** 
-6.3 -5.8 -2.8 -4.5 -4.8 -4.9 -2.3 
External debt 
(% GDP) 
88.3 83.1 74.6 73.7 75.4 93.9 131.3 
Current account 
(% GDP) 
-1.7 -2.1 -6.1 -7.8 -8.7 -3.4 -0.2 
*Without Crimea. **Without Crimea and part of eastern Donbas. ***IMF 
methodology, excluding Naftogaz. 
Source: Ukrstat, NBU, Ministry of Finance. 
The economy began to bounce back in 2010. Nevertheless, 
serious budgetary problems obliged the government to ask for another 
IMF programme, which was approved after the Ukrainian authorities 
accepted budgetary conditions, raised gas tariffs for the population and 
increased the independence of the central bank. The tax code and a new 
version of the budget code were approved, although high tax levels and 
unfair tax administration remained in place. Fiscal decentralisation was 
not introduced. 
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In 2011, Ukraine’s economy continued its recovery, but then the 
external environment for Ukraine took a turn for the worse in both the 
EU (with recession and then stagnation in 2012-13) and Russia (with 
decelerating growth in 2012, leading to recession in 2014), and with 
metal commodity prices falling continuously from 2011 onwards. 
External demand for Ukrainian products remained weak and unstable. 
In 2012, real GDP growth almost stopped, and in 2013 a new phase of 
recession started. The budget deficit increased sharply, with acute 
pressure also on the foreign exchange market. The economic situation 
again signalled the need for long-delayed structural reforms. 
But in 2014 and 2015, Ukraine faced tougher challenges still, with 
the annexation of Crimea by Russia, military conflict in the Eastern 
Donbas and an extreme financial and economic crisis. Real GDP 
dropped by 6.6% in 2014 and by 9.9% in 2015. Industrial output 
plummeted, partly due to the destruction and closure of some 
companies in the occupied territory, broken supply links and trade 
tensions with Russia. The decline in exports and higher demand for 
foreign currency led to a sharp depreciation of the hryvnia. Average 
consumer price inflation reached 48.7% in 2015. A fragile 
macroeconomic stabilisation was reached towards the end of 2015.  
Nonetheless, during 2014 and 2015, there was intense 
cooperation with the IMF, with a two-year Stand-By Agreement for a 
$17 billion package agreed in April 2014, which was replaced in March 
2015 by a four-year Extended Fund Facility for the same amount, to 
which the EU added complementary funds (see below). The Ukrainian 
authorities intensified reforms efforts only in 2015. Deregulation and 
public procurement reform were among the largest successes. The 
central bank moved to a more flexible exchange-rate policy. The 
banking sector became sounder, as problem banks were taken out of 
the market. The fiscal situation improved as high inflation and 
somewhat better tax administration resulted in additional revenues, 
while energy subsidies were reduced after the hikes in gas tariffs. In 
autumn 2015, the Ministry of Finance agreed on sovereign debt 
restructuring with debt holders, which reduced financing needs for the 
next three years by $15.2 billion.195 However, implementation of anti-
corruption measures was slow and ineffective. Comprehensive tax 
reform and pension, healthcare and social welfare reforms were not 
                                                        
195 At the same time, the government imposed the moratorium on the 
repayment of $3 billion Eurobond held by Russia (maturing on 31 December 
2015), which is expected to lead to a legal challenge by Russia against Ukraine 
in a British court. 
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implemented. Judicial reform was delayed hampering further 
investment climate. Slow reforms, delays in approval of the State 
Budget for 2016, as well as the political crisis in the beginning of 2016 
resulted in the suspension of disbursements under the IMF 
programme. Now that the newly appointed government confirmed its 
intention to continue the promised reforms, cooperation with the IMF 
is likely to resume in the second half of 2016. 
Real GDP is expected to grow by 1.6% in 2016. However, 
economic development is subject to many risks, including a possible 
escalation of war and higher political uncertainty. 
Provisions of the Agreement and financial assistance 
from the EU 
The text of the Association Agreement on macroeconomic cooperation 
(chapter 2) is short and simple. It foresees regular dialogue on 
macroeconomic policy and forecasts. Ukraine shall aim at “gradual 
approximation of its policies to those of the EU”, but there is no legally 
precise backing to this aspiration in the Agreement. 
The actual macroeconomic cooperation and financial assistance 
to Ukraine is substantial, however, with the EU normally topping up 
aid from the IMF, largely subject to the same conditions. For the period 
2014-20, the EU announced a package of possible financial measures 
totalling €11 billion, including grants from the EU budget and 
investments by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), as detailed in Table 
14.2.  
After signature of the Association Agreement in June 2014 the 
EU extended fresh macroeconomic loans to Ukraine, alongside the 
main macroeconomic assistance programme led by the IMF with its $17 
billion stand-by arrangement agreed in April 2014. In January 2015, the 
EU Commission proposed €1.8 billion of loan operation, which was 
agreed by the EU authorities in April 2015, following €1.6 billion of 
loans in the preceding years. The new loan operation is subject to a 
memorandum of understanding rapidly agreed with the Ukraine 
authorities in May, outlining the policy programme attached to the 
loans. The programme largely builds on the reform agenda pursued by 
the Ukrainian authorities and covers a broad range of areas, including 
public finance management, governance and transparency, the energy 
sector, social safety nets, the business environment and financial sector. 
A first tranche of €600 million was disbursed in July 2015. These loans 
will carry a low interest rate with a maturity of 15 years.  
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Table 14.2 EU support for Ukraine, indicative package for 2014-20 
Source Indicative amounts/ 
ranges (€ mn) 
1. European Commission 3,175 
1.1 Development assistance (grants) 1,565 
- Annual Action Plan for 2014 140-200 
- Annual Action Plans for 2015-20 780 
- Umbrella Programme ‘more for more’, 2015-20 240-300 
- Neighbourhood Investment Facility 200-250 
- Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace ((IcSP) 20 
- Common Foreign and Security Policy 15 
1.2 Macro financial assistance (loans) 1,610 
2. European Financial Institutions up to 8,000 
2.1 European Investment bank Up to 3,000 
2.2 European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development  
5,000 
Grand total Up to 11,175 
Source: European Commission. 
The EU is executing a number of grant programmes provided for 
in the indicative package for 2014 to 2020. This includes €355 million of 
grants for a State-Building Contract and a share for Ukraine (with 
Georgia and Moldova also profiting) of a €200 million programme for 
supporting small- and medium-sized enterprises to be executed over 
the next 10 years. This programme is expected to leverage total 
investment of up to €2 billion. Further initiatives to support 
decentralisation and local government reform with over €100 million 
was announced in December 2015.  
Humanitarian aid from the EU and its member states was 
supplied in 2014 and 2015 to support the basic needs of the population 
hit by the conflict in eastern Ukraine: €28 million from the EU and €47 
million bilaterally from member states in 2014, with the Commission 
pledging €15 million for 2015. 
Ukraine is also a leading recipient of grants from the 
Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), which supplies grant 
funding in support of investment operations led by European financial 
institutions, notably the EIB and the EBRD, and the national investment 
institutions of Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Austria. From its 
inception in 2008 to 2014, the NIF supplied €1 billion of grants 
alongside €12 billion of investments by the financial institutions, with 
a leveraging of total investments of €25 billion. For the period after the 
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signing of the Association Agreement, Ukraine is expected to receive 
an increased level of NIF funding, with €200-250 million up to 2020.  
The EIB expects to increase its investments in Ukraine in the 
period until 2020 to €3 billion, up from the €2.4 billion invested between 
2010 and 2014. New commitments made in 2015 amounted to €857 
million, devoted to the energy, transport and environmental sectors.  
The EBRD is also stepping up its activity in Ukraine, planning up 
to €5 billion of investments up to 2020. It will concentrate on energy 
efficiency and energy security, industry, quality infrastructure and the 
financial sector. The EBRD has already invested €5 billion on projects 
in Ukraine. Projects approved in 2015 include several in agri-business 
and municipal environment and infrastructure.  
 
Macroeconomics and funding for the EU at a glance 
In the years since independence, Ukraine made slow progress in economic 
policy reforms and consequentially saw a slow recovery of output, except for 
a period of very favourable commodity prices.  
In 2014-15, Ukraine suffered a very severe recession and losses of 
infrastructure as a result of the war with Russia over the eastern Donbas, 
on top of the effects of the global recession.  
The EU is supplying significant financial assistance to help economic 
recovery through multiple channels, including macroeconomic loans 
alongside the IMF, budget grants and investments from the EIB and EBRD.  
These financial instruments are supporting concrete operations under the 
sectoral policy chapters of the Association Agreement, notably in the 
energy, environmental, agri-business, SME and financial sectors.  
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15. FINANCIAL SERVICES 
The Agreement envisages the 
comprehensive adoption by Ukraine of 
the European system for regulating 
banks, insurance and securities markets 
with adoption, at least in the end, of the 
entire EU legislative complex of laws. 
After a series of major financial crises, 
the priority now is for the financial 
markets to be safe and efficient for 
consumers, systemically sound for the 
economy and for industry to have open 
access to European markets and to secure its competitiveness and 
modernisation.  
Provisions of the Agreement 
General provisions. The Agreement commits Ukraine to reform its 
financial market regulations to ensure that they are “gradually made 
compatible” with those of the EU for banking, insurance, securities and 
asset management. A large number of EU laws, 51 in total (listed in 
Annex XVII-2), will be approximated with implementation delays of 
mostly four years. In addition, however, there is a smaller number of 
core regulations of systemic importance and many other technical 
implementing provisions for the core regulations.  
While the ‘gradual’ language in the main text of the Agreement 
(Art. 133) appears to be quite soft, the Annexes list the legal acts to be 
transposed into Ukrainian legislation with their timetables (Annex XVII 
on Regulatory Approximation in general, and particular Annex XVII-2 
on approximation for financial services). Art. 2 of Annex XVII states 
that compliance with the laws listed within the stipulated time delays 
“shall be binding”, although Ukraine may request delays in the event 
of difficulties.   
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National treatment. In general, the Agreement provides for 
national treatment for establishment and the cross-border supply of 
services, meaning that each party shall grant to the other party’s 
operators treatment no less favourable than for its own. This is in line 
with standard WTO/GATS principles, where however national 
treatment only applies once a service provider has legally entered the 
market (i.e. this national treatment does not in itself grant market 
access, which is a separate matter – see further below). In addition, 
there are detailed provisions facilitating the “temporary presence” of 
key personnel and suppliers of services (i.e. implicitly assuring the 
granting of visas). However, there are still numerous specific 
reservations by individual EU member states (listed in Annex XVI-B), 
many of which may be of small significance, but nonetheless 
complicate and limit the openness of the market. In the case of Ukraine, 
its commitments replicate its very liberal GATS schedule. 
Market access. Annex XVII goes on in Art. 3 to specify the 
specific conditions for “full internal market treatment” to be granted. Full 
internal market treatment is defined as meaning: 
- No restrictions on the freedom of establishment, including 
agencies, branches or subsidiaries, where the two parties treat 
each other’s juridical persons in the same way as their own; and 
- No restrictions similarly on freedom to provide services. 
For this purpose, Ukraine “shall transpose and continuously 
implement the existing EU legislation”. This covers “all new or 
amended” legislation, so this part of the Agreement is to be 
automatically updated. Actually, the legislation listed (in Annex XVII-
2) predates major revisions to EU law and international norms that had 
already been undertaken in the wake of the financial crisis that began 
in 2008-09. For full internal market treatment to be granted, the EU 
must carry out an assessment that the conditions are fulfilled and then 
the Trade Committee of the two parties may decide on the granting of 
full internal market treatment. The updating of the list of EU laws for 
approximation is thus to be a normal process for the two parties to 
arrange together, with periodic formal announcements on which items 
of law are to be added and/or repealed in relation to those in the 
Annex.  
It will surely take a considerable number of years before Ukraine 
achieves full internal market access. In the meantime, conditions close 
to GATS commitments prevail. Under the Association Agreement, 
however, GATS provisions will be subject to accelerated dispute 
settlement. The EU and Ukraine may agree in principle to reduce trade 
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barriers under Annex XVI independently of the full internal market 
treatment process.  
International standards. At the same time, the Agreement calls 
in Art. 127 for Ukraine “to make its best endeavours” to apply 
internationally agreed standards, inter alia: 
- Core Principle for Banking Supervision under the Basel rules 
- Insurance Core Principles of the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisor (IAIS) 
- Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation of the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSC) 
- OECD’s Agreement on exchange of information on tax matters 
- G20 Statement on transparency and exchange of information for 
tax purposes 
- Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering and Nine 
Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, issued by the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
Ukraine has included the implementation of international best 
practices for financial-sector supervision in its action plan to implement 
the Association Agreement as well as its 2020 Financial Development 
Programme. In practice, Ukraine has been making efforts to implement 
Basel principles since the 2000s, and its IMF programme should also 
lead to better compliance. FATF rules have been implemented as part 
of Ukraine’s compliance efforts after the country was called out by 
FATF. Ukraine’s regulators are also members of IOSCO and IAIS. 
While some provisions in these documents are included in EU 
legislation, others are best practices, which are implemented on an 
operational level.  
Banks 
Capital requirements. The global financial crisis of 2008-09, with the 
collapse or near-collapse of major banks of systemic importance, has 
led to a radical strengthening of the capital reserve requirements of 
banking systems. When the Association Agreement was negotiated, 
Ukraine was adhering to core Basel I rules.196 Meanwhile the EU was 
                                                        
196 Basel I was the first internationally agreed set of banking regulations 
negotiated and produced by the Committee on Banking Supervision at the 
Bank for International Settlements (located in Basel), while Basel III is the most 
recent version that takes into account of the need for changes in light of the 2009 
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implementing the newer Basel II capital adequacy requirements, and 
the Association Agreement binds Ukraine to harmonise with these 
rules. Since then, however, the EU has moved on to the latest 
international standard, i.e. the Basel III rules, and repealed older legal 
instruments. Accordingly, among the key EU laws to be implemented 
are the following: 
- The 2006 Directive on capital adequacy of investment firms and 
credit institutions (2006/49/EC), replaced in 2013 by a 
Regulation on prudential requirements for credit institutions 
and investment firms (575/2013/EU – CRR) 
- Another related Directive of 2006 on the business of credit 
institutions (2006/48/EC), replaced now by a Directive of 2013 
on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions and investment firms 
(2013/36/EU - CRD IV)  
These key prudential requirements are now set in the above EU 
regulations, which are directly applicable to banks.197 While the basic 
minimum capital requirement of 8% of equity capital is unchanged (as 
in Basel I and the Basel II), the definition of capital is tightened and 
additional categories of reserve requirements are introduced, giving 
essentially the following regime (under Basel III and the new 2013 
laws): 
- Minimum capital reserve requirement of 8%, plus… 
- Capital conservation buffer of 2.5% 
- Countercyclical capital buffer of 0 to 2.5% 
- Capital buffer of 0 to 3.5% for systemically important institutions 
- Systemic risk buffer of 0 to 3 to 5% (usually not cumulative with 
systemic institution buffer) 
As a result, capital adequacy requirements can range from 10.5% 
to 16.5% of risk-adjusted assets (exposure), depending on the systemic 
status of banks (based on size or specialisation). Small- to medium-
sized banks can be largely exempt from the additional requirements. 
These capital reserve requirements are subject to extremely complex 
methodologies of definition and calculation, which take up the bulk of 
the texts in question. There are also new requirements with respect to 
                                                        
financial crisis. While these norms are international, the EU legislates to make 
them strictly operational and binding.  
197 For a detailed analysis of the new laws, see Karel Lannoo (ed.), The Great 
Financial Plumbing: From Northern Rock to Banking Union, Brussels and London: 
CEPS and Rowman and Littlefield, 2015. 
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liquidity to cover stress conditions. The timeline for implementation of 
the new rules will be decided in accordance with the procedure in Art. 
3 in Annex XVII. The Trade Committee will have to add new EU 
legislation to Annex XVII-2 and agree on ‘indicative deadlines’.  
Accounting rules. Five accounting directives, cited in Annex 
XVII-2, set requirements for annual accounts by banks and other 
financial institutions. 
Insurance. The key law for regulating the insurance industry is a 
Directive on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of insurance and 
reinsurance also known as Solvency II (2009/138/EC), which is a 
fundamental text detailing the rules for the conduct of the industry, its 
supervision and solvency. Ukraine should comply within four years. It 
is understood that implementation of Solvency II will pose a big 
challenge for Ukraine and will take considerable time to be realised. 
Ukraine also promised to implement EU rules on insurance 
intermediaries (2002/92/EC – IMD II) and the motor insurance 
Directive (2009/103/EC). So far, the Ukrainian insurance regulator has 
focused its efforts on implementing the last two directives referred to 
above. 
Securities (MiFID). The EU has established a comprehensive 
regulatory regime for investor transactions by stock markets, other 
trading systems and investment firms, with a single authorisation for 
investment firms to do business anywhere in the EU. The key law is the 
2004 Directive for markets in financial instruments (2004/39/EC – 
MiFID), supplemented by an implementing Directive in 2006 
(2006/73/EC). Two other key Directives concern rules for the 
prospectus for issuance of securities (2003/71/EC) and for controlling 
insider dealing (2003/6/EC). The remaining directives presented in 
this section are mostly intended to provide detailed amendments or 
implementing details of the three main directives cited above. 
Investment funds (UCITS). The basic law of the EU for 
investment funds was revised in 2009 in the wake of the Madoff scandal 
of 2008, and this text on the Regulation of collective investment in 
transferable securities (2009/65/EC – UCITS) is cited in Annex XVII-2. 
The market in question has grown to a substantial size of over €5 billion 
in the EU. Moreover, this text has undergone a further important 
revision in 2014 (2014/91/EU). There was also in 2011 a significant 
addition to this domain of regulation with a Directive to govern 
alternative investment fund managers (2011/61/EU – AIFMD), aimed 
at hedge funds and other highly leveraged institutions, but it is not 
listed in Annex XVII-B. 
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Financial derivatives. The EU has introduced complex rules to 
regulate financial derivatives in a Regulation on over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives, central Counterparties and trade repositories, also 
called EMIR (648/2012/EU). This was a major development, enabling 
the European Union to deliver the G20 commitments on OTC 
derivatives agreed at the Pittsburgh summit in September 2009. The 
Regulation ensures that information on all European derivative 
transactions will be reported to trade repositories and made accessible 
to supervisory authorities.  
Implementation perspectives 
Present structure and state of Ukrainian financial markets. Ukrainian 
financial markets have developed practically from zero since 
independence in 1990. The banking and insurance sector started with 
Ukrainian branches of Soviet state banks and insurance companies, 
while securities markets, investment funds and others started literally 
from scratch. The development of the financial sector has not been a 
smooth process, however, having witnessed no less than three financial 
and economic crises (1998-99, 2008-09 and 2014-15). 
The decade between first two crises, i.e. from late 1999 to 
September 2008, was marked by rapid expansion of all segments of 
financial markets from the banking sector to credit unions, insurance 
companies and stock markets. Between 2003 and 2008, bank loans 
outstanding increased from 20% of GDP to 59% of GDP and bank 
deposits from 18% of GDP to 33% of GDP. This reflected a lending 
boom in 2006-08, when loan stock grew at over 100% year on year. 
Before 2008, the financial sector also attracted large amounts of foreign 
investment. By 2008, FDI in the financial services sector reached about 
$12.7 billion or about 30% of the total FDI stock, with about half of the 
assets of the banking system being held by foreign owned banks.  
Structurally the Ukrainian banking sector was diffused. On the 
eve of the 2008 crisis, over 180 banks operated in Ukraine. The top 10 
banks held only 49% of total assets of the banking sector with 113 small 
banks contributing 8.4% to the total. Quite a few small and medium 
banks operated as ‘pocket’ banks, performing treasury, funding and 
tax-optimising functions for the owners.  
In late 2008 and in 2009, the financial services sector went 
through a ‘perfect storm’. Spillovers from the global economic and 
financial crisis were compounded by domestic structural problems, 
high dollarisation and overheating from the lending boom. 
Depreciation of the hryvnia from 5 to 8 per USD instantly reduced the 
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quality of loan portfolios. The crash of the real estate market reduced 
the value of collateral assets. Most market participants were able to pull 
through the crisis due to regulatory forbearance and generous 
stabilisation loans from the National Bank. Parent companies of 
foreign-owned banks injected additional funds to help keep their 
recently acquired subsidiaries afloat. In all, less than 20 banks failed in 
2009 and 2010, and eight new banks were created. By 2013, number of 
active banks was back to 180.  
Nevertheless, the 2008 crisis inflicted lasting damage on the 
banking sector despite (or because of) the few bankruptcies. The banks 
that survived were left holding large portfolios of problem loans that 
were not adequately provided for. The capitalisation of banks appeared 
sound on paper, with average ratios of capital to risk-weighted assets 
of over 20% in 2010, but this reflected under-provisioning, 
opportunistic risk-weighting of assets and over-capitalisation of state-
owned banks. In reality, many banks were weakened by the 2008 crisis 
and were still struggling by the time the next crisis started. 
The 2014-15 crisis presented a mix of new and old challenges to 
the banks. A sharp depreciation of the hryvnia, lower cash flows of 
borrowers due to the economic downturn and difficulties in selling 
collateral in a buyer’s market were present in 2009. But, in addition, the 
armed conflict in the Donbas region and the annexation of Crimea 
presented new problems to deal with. Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts in 
2013 produced 31% of output of extractive industries and over 23% of 
manufacturing output, and were thus major borrowers. Banks with 
larger exposure to Donbas and Crimea were disproportionally affected, 
and several regional banks simply ceased to function, as their offices 
and documentation were located outside the effective control of the 
Ukrainian authorities.  
The result of these accumulated challenges was a large number 
of bank failures. In 2014 and 2015, 66 banks failed and over five months 
of 2016 another nine banks withdrew from the market. Together they 
represented over 28% of banking sector assets, including three out of 
top15 banks and 13 out of next 20 banks. So far, no banks have been 
bailed out by the government, and the National Bank of Ukraine has 
been more selective in granting emergency loans.  
As foreign owners were more conservative in granting loans and 
had less difficulty in recapitalising banks, the ownership structure of 
the banking system changed significantly (see Figure 15.1). Between 
2009 and 2012, some foreign owners sold their Ukrainian banks to 
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Ukrainian owners and expanded their assets at a slower pace than 
Ukrainian-owned banks.  
Figure 15.1 Ownership structure of Ukrainian banks (by assets*) 
 
* Not adjusted for minority stakes. 
Source: Own calculations and Raiffeisen Bank Aval based on NBU data. The 
figure extends the data found in “The economic implications of the Eurozone 
crisis on Ukraine” Policy Brief 03/2013 by German Advisory Group and 
Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting.  
During the crisis, most of the private banks that failed had 
Ukrainian owners. By March 2016, the asset share of private domestic-
owned banks decreased to 35%, including 21.6% attributed to 
Privatbank, the largest bank in the country. The share of state-owned 
banks in total bank assets swelled to 30.3%, as they picked up business 
from failed banks and continued lending to public-sector entities. The 
share of foreign-owned banks increased slightly to 34.7%, including a 
9.7% share by Russian-owned banks.198  
                                                        
198 Russian-owned banks exclude Alfabank, which is majority-owned by 
Russian emigres (with UK and Israeli citizenship).  
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Present state of regulatory system before the Agreement 
The requirements of Basel I were broadly in force in Ukraine since at 
least 1995,199 with the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) applying the 
minimum ratio required by Basel I, i.e. 8% for the overall capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR) and 4% for Tier 1 CAR. In 2004, the CAR was 
raised to 8%, and in the middle of 2008, the Tier 1 ratio was replaced by 
a leverage ratio defined as the regulatory capital to total assets (gross 
assets net of provisions). It was set at 9%. In 2014, the NBU added a 
modified leverage ratio defined as the ratio of regulatory capital to 
liabilities set at 10%.  
After Basel II was approved, there were plans to transition to 
new rules200 at the NBU, but they were delayed during the lending 
boom and abandoned during the 2008 crisis. 
While key ratios did not change much over the last 20 years, the 
NBU made numerous revisions to what could be included in regulatory 
capital, risk-weighting, deductions and exceptions. It also introduced 
changes to rules about other regulatory ratios, such as minimum 
capital, liquidity and limits on the open foreign currency position. The 
NBU’s Instructions on bank regulation of 2001201 was amended 60 times 
over the next 15 years. Besides, the NBU made several cycles of 
revisions to accounting standards by banks to align them to IFRS/IAS 
standards. In 2010, in principle, banks were required to provide annual 
financial reports in accordance with IFRS, and in 2016 quarterly reports 
will also be subject to IFRS. This corresponds to reporting requirements 
adopted by the EU for listed companies.202 
After the 2009 crisis, the banking authorities learned some 
lessons. For example, to limit dollarisation, the NBU implemented 
tougher requirements for foreign currency loans, and new consumer 
foreign exchange loans were prohibited altogether. Reserve 
requirements on foreign currency deposits were increased. In an effort 
                                                        
199 Rulemaking by the NBU in the beginning of the 1990s was informal. Thus, 
it is difficult to establish when CARs were established. In any case, 
hyperinflation made CARs meaningless before 1995.  
200 See http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v3749500-04.  
201 See http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z0841-01. 
202 Ukrainian law requires all banks to be incorporated as public joint-stock 
companies and to apply the same IAS/IFRS accounting standards that are 
mandatory for listed companies in the EU. At the same time the form of 
presentation of annual/quarterly accounts does not correspond fully to that in 
Council Directive 86/335/EEC on annual accounts of financial institutions. 
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to make provisioning for non-perming loans more effective, new rules 
for loan loss provisions were implemented. Problems with loan fraud 
and loan enforcement prompted the Parliament to make significant 
changes in the laws on contracts, mortgage, enforcement of court orders 
and bankruptcy. At the same time, consumer-protection provisions for 
lending to individuals were strengthened. Some loopholes remained, 
however, allowing some borrowers to invalidate loan 
agreement/sureties. Institutional weaknesses of the court system also 
remained, allowing some corporate borrowers to prolong litigation 
excessively and to syphon assets from the debtor entity and move them 
to other companies. Enforcement of court orders remained long and 
often unfruitful. 
In 2015, the NBU took a first step towards implementing Basel III 
by inserting some elements, e.g. concerning core capital ratio and 
capital buffers, for their gradual introduction between 2019 and 2023 
(i.e. after an IMF loan programme is scheduled to end). For example, 
the Tier 1 capital ratio at 7% will become effective in 2019 and the 
capital conservation buffer will be phased in during 2020-30, increasing 
each year to 2.5% in 2023. The NBU will also be able to apply a 
countercyclical buffer of up to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets in case of 
debt overheating. Systemic banks will be subject to a systemic bank 
buffer of 1-2%. However, this is only a framework decision. In the next 
three to four years, the NBU will have to implement detailed rules on 
capital buffers to be effective. 
Reform and approximation prospects and priorities. From the 
above, it is evident that there will be many issues of timing of 
approximation and implementation of individual EU laws and on how 
and when to update the list of laws for approximation in the financial 
area. The government of Ukraine has drawn up a very detailed action 
plan, its Comprehensive Programme of Financial Market Development 
of Ukraine until 2020,203 which integrates commitments under the 
Agreement with the EU with those made with other international 
partners and of course the domestic context. The 2015 EU-Ukraine 
Association agenda recommends implementation of EU legislation on 
financial services based on an updating of the list in Annex XVI-2.204 
The programme seems to follow this approach as it contains an 
                                                        
203 For the programme approved by NBU resolution 315 from 18.06.2015, see 
http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v0391500-15.  
204 Ukraine Association Agenda to prepare and facilitate the implementation of 
the Association Agreement as endorsed by EU-Ukraine Association Council on 
16 March 2015 (http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/docs/st06978_15_en.pdf).  
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implementation schedule for both EU legislation in financial services 
listed in Annex XVI-2 to the agreement as well as new legislation such 
as Directive 2013/36/EU. All key new directives are mentioned there. 
More burdensome large-scale directives that will require market 
participants to significantly change their business practices are planned 
for implementation in 2018. A significant number of directives are 
planned for earlier implementation, including those related to deposit 
guarantees, e-money, payment services, etc. A more detailed listing of 
the deadlines is given below in Table 15.1.  
Table 15.1 Deadlines for implementation of EU legislation in the 2020 
Programme  
2015-16 2018 
2009/110/EC (new E-money 
Directive) 
2014/49/EC (DGS Directive) 
2014/59/EU (BRRD) 
2001/24/EC (bank resolution 
Directive) 
2007/64/EC (payment services 
Directive) 
1781/2006 (wire transfer 
Regulation) 
2004/39/EC as amended by 
2006/31/EC (MiFID) 
2006/73/EC (MiFID implementing 
Directive) 
97/9/EC (investor compensation 
Directive) 
2014/57/EU (market abuse 
Directive) 
596/2014 (market abuse Regulation) 
2004/72/EC, 2003/124/EC, 
2003/125/EC, 2273/2003 
(implementing 
Directives/Regulations)  
1060/2009 (CRA Regulation) 
2002/47/EC (collateral Directive) 
2008/48/EC (consumer credit 
Directive) 
2007/14/EC (transparency 
Directive) 
2005/60/EC (3rd AML Directive, 
2017)  
2013/36/EC (CRD IV) 
2007/44/EC (acquisitions Directive) 
2014/65/EU (MiFID 2) 
575/2013 (CRR IV) 
2002/87/EC (FICOD) 
86/635/EEC (bank reporting 
Directive) 
2001/65/EC (fair value Directive) 
2013/34/EU (EU accounting 
Directive) 
2006/43/EC (statutory audits 
Directive) 
2003/51/EC (accounts 
modernisation) 
537/2014 (statutory audit 
Regulation) 
2006/46/EC (company reporting 
Direct.) 
2014/56/EU (amending audit 
Directive) 
98/26/EC (settlement finality 
Directive) 
2007/60/EC (PEP Directive) 
1287/2006 (MiFID implementation 
Regulation) 
2009/65/EC (UCITS IV) 
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2001/34/EC (prospectus and 
listing) 
2003/71/EC (prospectus Directive) 
2008/10/EC, 809/2004,1787/2006, 
1289/2008 (prospectus Regulations) 
2004/109/EC (listed companies 
Directive) 
2010/43/EC, 583/2010, 584/2010 
(UCITS implementing legislation) 
2007/16/EC (eligible assets 
Directive) 
1606/2002 (IAS Regulation) 
2009/138/EC (Solvency II) 
2009/103/EC (motor insurance 
Directive) 
91/674/EEC (insurance accounts 
Directive) 
2002/92/EC (IMD II) 
2003/41/EC (IORP Directive) 
1569/2007/EC (accounting 
standards) 
 
Overall, it seems that the NBU plans to prepare all the legislative 
changes necessary for internal market treatment by the end of 2018. 
However, the legislation may be implemented with transition periods, 
as in the case of Basel III. Besides, other regulators may be slower in 
implementing EU legislation. For example, it is planned to divide the 
Financial Services Commission between the NBU and the Securities 
Commission in the course of 2016. This may reduce incentives to be 
proactive in implementing EU legislation and means that it may be 
difficult to keep to the deadlines. Still, eventual access to the EU market 
is likely to be beneficial by increasing competition in the Ukrainian 
market and easing access to the EU financial market for Ukrainian 
corporates. 
 
Financial markets at a glance 
At the starting point of the Agreement, Ukraine’s financial sector was in 
the midst of extreme tensions regarding the stability of the banking system 
and the servicing of external debt, following a major financial crisis.    
Nevertheless, the government is proceeding with a comprehensive, long-
term programme for regulatory modernisation, anchoring on EU 
legislation, which is a crucial part of the general economic modernisation 
process.  
A large portion of EU legislation is complex and will demand a long and 
sustained effort to implement, but there are sound reasons to embark upon 
adopting this international best practice immediately. 
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16. TRANSPORT 
Transport has been a key sector for the 
EU’s internal market since the early days 
of the European integration process. As a 
result, the EU has a well-established 
body of law and policies on transport. 
The DCFTA aims to expand and 
strengthen Ukraine’s cooperation with 
the EU in the field of transport and 
thereby to promote efficient, safe and 
secure systems with greater 
interoperability. This will be 
fundamental to integrating Ukraine’s industries into the European 
supply chain and to boosting contact between people, especially when 
visa-free travel becomes possible. 
Provisions of the Agreement 
Overall, the DCFTA provides for a progressive liberalisation of 
transport in road, rail and inland waterways, with approximation to 
many EU standards and, in some instances, conclusion of further 
special agreements. Before the conclusion of such agreements, the EU 
and Ukraine may not restrict the conditions of mutual market access. 
Mutual market access for shipping services will only materialise when 
Ukraine transposes and implements a designated list of EU regulatory 
measures. Air transport is mentioned but does not fall under the 
Association Agreement. The conditions of mutual market access in this 
sector are dealt with in a bilateral Common Aviation Agreement, which 
waits full ratification. 
Road transport. At the present time road freight services 
operated between the EU and Ukraine are regulated by bilateral 
intergovernmental agreements between EU member states and 
Ukraine. These agreements impose quota and licence arrangements on 
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hauliers from both sides.205 A recent study has shown that abolition of 
these restrictions would give a significant boost to trade, output and 
employment for both parties.206 However, because EU member states 
fear that their markets could be overrun by lower-paid Ukrainian 
truckers they have not so far been willing to adopt a mandate for the 
Commission to negotiate an EU-Ukraine road transport agreement. 
While the DCFTA does not allow foreign investors to provide road 
passenger transport services within a member state (cabotage), it does 
offer an exception for the rental of non-scheduled services of buses with 
operators (Annex XVI-A).  
Under the terms of the DCFTA, goods and passenger road 
transport companies, operators and drivers from Ukraine have to fully 
comply with the EU regulatory standards within three to five years of 
the entry into force of the Agreement.207 This puts the onus on Ukraine’s 
legislature to approximate domestic rules and standards to those of the 
EU and to introduce the necessary monitoring, inspection and 
enforcement mechanisms to assure the proper implementation of the 
EU directives and regulations. In view of the need to create more 
transparency in the licensing system and to level the playing field for 
road transport operators, priority should be given to the approximation 
of legislation on a single state electronic register for road transport 
operators208 and the confirmation of the professional qualifications of 
drivers.209  
                                                        
205 According to the case law of the European Court of Justice, these bilateral 
agreements have to conform to existing EU transport law. See Judgments in 
Cases C-466-9/98, C-471-2/98, C-475-6/98, Commission v United Kingdom, 
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria and Germany, 5 
November 2002. 
206 See “Study on the economic impact of an agreement between the EU and 
Ukraine”, 14 October 2014 (http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/road/ 
studies/doc/2015-07-24-icf-eu_ukraine-roadfl-finalreport.pdf), which 
concludes that an EU agreement that abolished these requirements “would 
deliver a modest but positive boost to trade, output and employment for both 
parties. The largest gains come from removal of bilateral permitting 
arrangements; removal of transit permits has a smaller effect. Full liberalisation 
could boost total trade by more than €0.5 billion per year. Liberalisation 
increases the EU’s road-freighted exports to Ukraine more than it does imports 
from Ukraine under all scenarios.” 
207 See Annex XXXII. 
208 Regulation (EC) No. 1071/2009. 
209 Directive 2003/59/EC. 
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Air transport. The DCFTA refers to the Common Aviation Area 
Agreement (CAA) between Ukraine and the EU, which was negotiated 
separately and initialled in 2013. When the CAA enters into force,210 
Ukraine will be committed to approximate its legislation to more than 
60 legal acts of the EU (Annex I of the CAA) concerning flight safety 
and certification regulations; the strengthening of the administrative 
capacity of the aviation authorities to implement EU aviation 
standards; and further cooperation with the European Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA), including convergence of the airworthiness 
certification system with that of the EU. 
The transition of Ukraine towards the full implementation of the 
CAA will happen in stages, as it is subject to assessments and 
standardisation inspections by the European Commission and the 
EASA, as well as a decision of the Joint Committee. The CAA does not 
immediately confer complete internal market access to Ukrainian 
carriers: at first they only obtain the right to fly between Ukraine and 
an EU destination, either directly or via an intermediate point in the 
neighbourhood, in the European Common Aviation Area or in Iceland, 
Liechtenstein or Switzerland (Art. 16 and Annex II). That precludes 
Ukrainian carriers from operating flights within EU member states 
(cabotage) and flights between two EU member states unconnected to 
a flight to or from Ukraine. Such rights would come at a second stage 
(cf. Art. 33 and Annex III). 
The legal regime applicable to air transport services is 
convoluted. In general terms, the DCFTA defers to the CAA, once it 
enters into force. In the meantime, the DCFTA excludes national and 
MFN treatment for domestic and international air transport services, 
whether scheduled or non-scheduled, and services directly related to 
the exercise of traffic rights. There are, however, exceptions to this rule, 
with respect to: i) aircraft repair and maintenance services during 
which an aircraft is withdrawn from service; ii) the selling and 
marketing of air transport services; iii) computer reservation system 
(CRS) services; iv) ground-handling services; v) airport operation 
services” (Arts 87-88 of the DCFTA). However, the reservations 
mentioned in the DCFTA have to be regularly reviewed by the 
Association Council’s sub-committee dealing with transport in order to 
                                                        
210 The CAA was initialled on 28 November 2013 in Vilnius but its signature 
has been postponed by the EU because Spain and the UK have not yet agreed 
to the Agreement’s territorial application to Gibraltar. 
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progressively liberalise the establishment conditions and resolve the 
legal inconsistencies between the CAA and the DCFTA.211  
Railway transport. The DCFTA aims to reform the rail transport 
sector in Ukraine and gradually liberalise the freight and passenger rail 
market over a period of 8 years. As with other modes of transport, this 
requires equal access to infrastructures and improvement of technical 
and technological quality standards. 
One of the difficulties of achieving interoperability with the rail 
networks in the EU is that the three Eastern Partnership countries still 
operate on the Russian gauge, which at 1,520 mm is wider than the 
European standard of 1,435 mm. Finland is currently offering technical 
expertise to the Support Group on Ukraine to help organise rail 
connections in a cost-efficient way, in particular through the use of 
equipment to change the undercarriages at border crossings. 
Inland waterway transport. The Agreement does not foresee 
any national and MFN treatment obligations with respect to national 
cabotage (either in the EU or Ukraine), but respects the traffic rights 
reserved under existing or future agreements (e.g. following the Rhine-
Main-Danube link). Still, Ukraine is expected to gradually approximate 
its legislation (within 5 years of entry into force of the Agreement) 
concerning the conditions for access to the domestic market, i.e. 
qualifications for operators, a central register, harmonised information 
services, safety standards for vessels and the establishment of a 
network of logistics centres. 
International maritime transport. The Agreement grants 
“unrestricted access to the international maritime markets and trades 
on a commercial and non-discriminatory basis” and MFN treatment to 
                                                        
211 This should forego any problems of hierarchy of legal regimes when the 
CAA enters into force. In the same vein, Arts 87-88 relate to the freedom of 
establishment and not to the cross-border provision of services. As these 
services are typically provided through establishment, one could argue that the 
DCFTA regime will prevail in practice. In some cases, however, services are 
provided without establishment (e.g. self-handling), which will mean that the 
applicable rules will have to be derived from the CAA. Similarly, the DCFTA 
lists two EU-wide reservations on establishment in the area of air transport 
services, one relating to the rental of aircraft with crew, the other with respect 
to CRS (Annex XVI-A). The relevant provision on CRS in the CAA (Art. 13) 
refers to access to the market, without detailing whether this is through or 
without establishment; this may indeed create a conflict, in which case one 
could either argue that the specialised (i.e. the CAA) or the later agreement 
(DCFTA) takes precedence. 
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vessels with regard to, inter alia, access to ports, the use of 
infrastructure and services of ports, and the use of maritime auxiliary 
services, as well as related fees and charges, customs facilities and 
facilities for loading and unloading (cf. Art. 135, paras. 4 and 5).212 Yet, 
EU-wide and member state-specific reservations on national treatment 
and MFN limit that access until Ukraine has approximated its 
legislation to 19 measures relating to the qualification of seafarers, 
safety standards for passenger and cargo ships, the liability of carriers 
of passengers by sea in the event of accidents, port state control, etc. (cf. 
Annex XVII) within prescribed timetables of 3-7 years of the entry into 
force of the Agreement.213 
In other areas of international maritime transport, a formal 
procedure (also regulated in Annex XVII) prescribes that it is for the 
European Commission to formally assess if revised/new Ukrainian 
legislation conforms to the EU’s acquis, and, if so, for the Association 
Committee (in trade configuration) to decide whether Ukraine has 
indeed fulfilled its commitments and that markets can be opened. In 
practice, it will take years before internal market treatment is extended 
to Ukraine. Ukraine has developed a roadmap for the approximation 
of Ukrainian legislation to EU norms in the international maritime 
transport and passed it to the EU for comments. 
Implementation perspectives 
The transport sector accounts for 7% of Ukraine’s GDP and 6% of total 
employment. The government’s reform priorities in this area are: to 
conform to European standards, to reduce the state’s role in the 
activities of monopolies, to decentralise the functions of the Ministry of 
Infrastructure and to privatise revenue-generating operating units of 
state enterprises. 
To harmonise Ukrainian transport legislation with that of the EU, 
the Ministry of Infrastructure has introduced changes to the rules of 
transportation of dangerous goods and standards for licence plates, 
and has simplified the business environment in seaports. Currently, the 
main goal is to sign the Common Aviation Area Agreement with the 
EU.  
                                                        
212 The Agreement does not apply to domestic maritime transport, with the 
exception of the movement of equipment (e.g. empty containers not being 
carried as cargo against payment between ports). 
213 See Art. 3 of Annex XVI-A and Art. 4(3) of Annex XVII.  
DEEPENING EU-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS: WHAT, WHY AND HOW?  149 
 
Road transport. This transport mode is the economically most 
vibrant in EU-Ukraine relations and is growing rapidly for both 
international road haulage and passenger traffic. Around 80% of EU 
exports to Ukraine and 30% of imports, in value terms, travel by road. 
Eurostat data suggest that 5.3 million tonnes of EU exports and 3.5 
million tonnes of EU imports are carried by road to/from Ukraine each 
year. The development of public roads in Ukraine is currently lagging 
behind the pace of motorisation in the country and the operational 
condition of roads is very poor. The average speed on roads in Ukraine 
is 2-3 times lower than in Western countries and there are barely 200 
km of highways. One of the biggest challenges facing Ukraine is the 
high death toll from road accidents. 
At the time of writing, hardly any legal acts of this kind have 
been brought before the Verkhovna Rada. However, in December 2015 
the Cabinet of Ministers approved the draft law “On bringing 
legislation of Ukraine on automobile transportation in accordance with 
the EU regulations”, which was submitted to the Verkhovna Rada on 23 
December 2015.214 Further approximation initiatives concern market 
access, working hours, speed limit devices, tachographs and technical 
inspections.215 
Air transport. Ukraine’s aviation sector has developed very 
quickly in recent years. This is partly thanks to the visa-free regime for 
EU nationals to travel to Ukraine, visa facilitation for Ukrainian citizens 
to travel to Europe and major investments in infrastructure for the Euro 
2012 football tournament. This rapid growth is expected to continue 
and to be boosted when the CAA enters into force. 
In 2015, 29 Ukrainian air companies were operating on the 
domestic market. International flights are offered by 9 Ukrainian and 
35 foreign air companies. The biggest passenger-carrying companies in 
2015 were Ukrainian International Airlines, UTair Ukraine, Windrose 
and Dniproavia. Eighteen companies offer cargo services, of which the 
biggest are; Antonov, Maximum Airlines, Ukrainian International 
Airlines, ZetAvia and Urga. Among the 20 active airports in Ukraine 
                                                        
214 See http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=57545. 
215 To liberalise the road transport market, Ukraine suggested at the Association 
Committee meeting of 13-15 July 2015 to sign a new bilateral agreement with 
the EU. At the request of the European Commission, on 15 August 2015, 
Ukraine submitted a completed questionnaire on the analysis of the Ukrainian 
market of road transportation. See www.kmu.gov.ua/document/248531076/ 
Non%20paper_Cluster%203_final_en_FOR%20WEB%20(1).pdf. 
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the biggest are Boryspil (near Kyiv), Kyiv (Zhulyany), Odesa, Lviv, 
Kharkiv and Dnipro. 
In 2015, the volume of passenger air transportation by Ukrainian 
air carriers decreased by 2.7% to 6.3 million passengers. International 
passenger air transportation decreased by 2.6% to 5.7 million 
passengers. Passenger turnover via Ukrainian airports decreased by 
1.9% to 10.7 million. This fall in demand for air travel continues from 
2014, mainly due to the unstable political and economic situation in the 
country. 
Ukraine would also like to bring its Antonov aircraft production 
into compliance with EU acquis and would like UA certification to be 
regarded as equivalent to EU standards. Ukraine retained the right to 
certify the older versions of Antonov airplanes but for the new models 
it needs to obtain EASA certificates in order to fly within the EU. 
Railway transport. The Ukrainian railway network ranks as the 
third-longest in Europe (ca. 22,000 km, half of which is electrified), but 
due to the break-of-gauge to the west and south (Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia), international rail transport is mainly directed 
towards former Soviet states. While investments were made to improve 
rail links between Euro 2012 cities, the economic weight of today’s 
passenger and freight transport via rail cannot be compared with that 
of road and air. Nevertheless, the Ministry has prepared a new draft 
law on rail transport.216 
Inland waterway transport. Ukraine has limited access to 
European inland waterways via the Danube and the Black Sea. Its 
internal navigable waterway system is limited to 2,240 km, 40% of 
which consists of the Dnieper. Whereas the Ukrainian government is 
developing plans to increase transportation of corn via Kyiv to Odesa, 
the volume is still marginal in economic terms. The Ministry has 
prepared a draft law on inland water transport. 
International maritime transport. The ports of Odesa and 
Mykolayiv are the major outlets for maritime transport. In 2015, 34% of 
all cargo was handled by the Yuzhny seaport near Odesa (48.6 million 
tons), 18% by Odesa seaport (25.6 million tons) and 15% by Mykolayiv 
seaport (22.2 million tons). The five Crimean ports (in Yevpatoriya, 
Kerch, Sevastopol, Feodosiya and Yalta) accounted only for 8% of all 
cargo handling in 2013. 
                                                        
216 Ukraine sent the draft law to the EU in July 2015 and expects to receive 
comments from DG MOVE regarding compliance of the law with the European 
railway legislation. 
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Pan-European Corridors. Ukraine occupies a pivotal position in 
the network of Pan-European Corridors, defined in 1994 as a long-term 
strategic plan for Europe’s multi-modal network of continental road, 
rail and waterway connections. This planning framework provides the 
reference for prioritising major infrastructural investments, which can 
be funded on the European side by investment from the EIB and EBRD, 
with the addition of some grant funding from the European 
Commission. These investments naturally complement regulatory 
transport policy measures, including the approximation agenda of the 
Association Agreement.  
Four of the ten Pan-European Corridors involve Ukraine, as follows: 
 Corridor IV consists of road and rail connections from 
Brussels to Kyiv, via Dresden, Krakow and Lviv.  
 Corridor V starts in Venice and goes through Slovenia and 
Hungary before entering Ukraine and Uzhgorod, and thence 
on to Lviv and Kyiv.  
 Corridor VIII is the Danube waterway, which at its mouth in 
the Black Sea gives access to Ukraine. 
 Corridor IX contains the major north-south connections, 
starting in Helsinki and St Petersburg, with one branch 
transiting Belarus and another passing through Moscow, both 
reaching Kyiv.  
All these corridors converge on Kyiv as a central crossroad point. 
The context for these corridors is now taking on the intercontinental 
dimensions of China’s ‘New Silk Road’ programme. This programme 
is likely to increase European-Chinese cooperation, which will be of 
interest to Ukraine in view of various Eurasian corridors that may pass 
through its territory.   
 
Transport at a glance 
The DCFTA sets out the EU’s detailed standards and regulations for road, 
rail, inland waterways, sea and intermodal transport, which Ukraine will 
progressively adopt. These concern the qualifications of transport operators, 
the technical safety of vehicles and vessels, and the activities of inspection 
bodies 
Air transport is referred to in the DCFTA but regulated in a separate EU-
Ukraine Civil Aviation Area Agreement, which is pending full ratification 
and will in due course open the air transport market to low cost competition. 
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In the case of road haulage transport access to the EU’s market is currently 
subject to quota provisions at the level of the member states.  
Ukraine occupies a pivotal place in the Pan-European Corridors for road 
and rail connections. The EBRD and EIB are supplying investment funding 
for improvements in these and other major transport infrastructures. 
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17. ENERGY 
The reform and modernisation of 
Ukraine’s energy sector is a challenge of 
the utmost priority, for both economic 
and geopolitical reasons. Ukraine is 
currently the most wasteful energy user 
in the industrialised world. If it 
approached average European energy 
efficiency standards it would no longer 
need to import gas. The provisions of the 
Agreement are highly relevant for the 
necessary policy reforms in the energy 
sector. 
 
Provisions of the Agreement 
The Agreement contains two separate chapters on energy: under the 
DCFTA heading one chapter concerns trade-related issues, and the 
second concerns broader energy policy cooperation. Both chapters 
include references to the Energy Community Treaty, to which Ukraine 
acceded as a full member in 2011, following Moldova in 2010. We first 
set out the content of this Treaty.  
Energy Community Treaty.  The contents of this Treaty pre-date 
the Agreement, but are carried over into it. The purpose of the Treaty 
is to provide for the application of much of the EU’s energy and 
environmental law in neighbouring non-member states. Since the 
intentions and content of the Treaty are entirely consistent and overlap 
with the Agreement, the latter includes references to the Treaty and, in 
particular, it states in Art. 278 that in the event of conflict between the 
two texts, the Treaty shall have legal precedence. The content of the two 
texts can thus be taken as parts of the same political project, even if 
there are legal distinctions between the two.  
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The blocks of EU law that feature in the Treaty cover: 
 Electricity and gas: rules for internal markets, access to networks, 
cross-border exchanges and security measures 
 Renewable energy promotion 
 Energy efficiency measures 
 Oil: provision for maintaining minimum stocks 
 Environment (see also chapter 18) 
Among these provisions, of particular importance for Ukraine 
are the rules for electricity and gas networks in the so-called 
unbundling Directives217 of the Third Energy Package. These require 
that transmission operators such as electricity transmission line and gas 
pipeline companies are separated from producers or suppliers of 
energy, and assure freedom of access to these transmission 
infrastructures for all suppliers or producers of energy. These 
unbundling provisions are significant for both the de-monopolisation 
of Ukrainian energy markets (see below) and for limiting monopolistic 
behaviour in the EU’s own markets.  
Trade-related requirements of the DCFTA. The DCFTA chapter 
on ‘trade-related’ energy applies basic free trade provisions to the 
electricity, crude oil and natural gas sectors. Customs duties and 
quantitative restrictions on the import and export of energy goods are 
generally prohibited.  Energy prices for the supply of gas and electricity 
to industrial consumers shall be determined solely by market prices. 
Related to this is the prohibition of dual pricing, where the Commission 
has imposed several anti-dumping duties on numerous energy 
intensive products from Ukraine to offset the trade-distortive effects of 
energy dual pricing.218 Over the years these measures have mainly 
concerned fertilisers and steel products, and the anti-dumping duties 
have been based on adjustments to the exporters’ gas and electricity 
                                                        
217 Directive 2009/72/EC for common rules for the internal market for 
electricity, replacing Directive 2003/54/EC; and Directive 2009/73/EC 
concerning common rules for the internal Market in natural gas, repealing 
Directive 2003/55/EC. The Agreement in its Annex XXVII actually refers to the 
two repealed directives, while (paradoxically) the Energy Community Treaty 
is more up-to-date, and in any case its provisions have legal precedence.  
218 Energy dual pricing is a two-tier pricing policy when domestic prices for 
energy are kept low compared to export or world prices. 
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costs using the so-called market price observed in a range of surrogate 
countries, including the EU.219 
This chapter also includes provisions on cooperation with regard 
to infrastructure, the establishment of an independent regulatory 
authority and the exploration for and production of hydrocarbons.  
Regarding the transit of energy goods, the DCFTA incorporates 
elements of Art. V GATT 1994 and of Art. 7 of the 1994 Energy Charter 
Treaty,220 both of which assure freedom of transit. Furthermore, under 
Art. 276 of the Agreement the EU and Ukraine shall ensure that 
transmission system operators minimise the risk of accidental 
interruption or stoppage of transit and transport. But a party shall not 
be held responsible for an interruption of supply over which it has no 
control (e.g. Ukraine shall not be held liable for an interruption caused 
by Russian actions).   
For the transport of electricity and gas, and in particular third-
party access to fixed infrastructure, Ukraine must approximate its 
legislation to the EU law referred to in Annex XXVII of the Agreement 
and in the 2005 Energy Community Treaty.  
Broader energy cooperation provisions. This Agreement 
envisages cooperation in general terms over virtually the whole 
landscape of energy policy issues, including policy strategies, crisis 
mechanisms, infrastructure modernisation, enhancement of energy 
security, energy efficiency and savings and support for renewable 
energies. Annex XXVII of the Agreement lists numerous EU laws and 
the timetables for Ukraine’s ‘gradual approximation’. These include the 
main provisions of the Energy Community Treaty, for which the 
implementation delay is zero. For other laws the implementation 
periods range from two to eight years.  
                                                        
219 Vitaliy Pogoretskyy, “The System of Energy Dual Pricing in Russia and 
Ukraine: The Consistency of the Energy Dual Pricing System with the WTO 
Agreement on Anti-Dumping”, Global Trade and Customs Journal, Vol. 4, No. 10, 
p. 313, 2009 (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2035581). 
220 The Energy Charter Treaty of 1994 is not to be confused with the Energy 
Community Treaty of 2005. The Energy Charter was an early attempt to establish 
a wider international energy legal order for the post-Soviet era, including the 
EU, Russia and all other former Soviet Union states, and a number of non-
European states. However Russia never ratified this Treaty, and the enterprise 
has had only a limited effect, although its transit provisions are legally and 
operationally significant.  
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Of strategic importance for the EU’s own long-term energy 
saving and climate policy goals are Directives for energy efficiency, 
notably that covering the energy performance of buildings221 and 
energy end-use efficiency.222 The implementation periods in the EU 
itself are quite long, in some cases extending to 2020. Both Directives 
have proved difficult to implement in many EU member states and 
have recently been replaced by updated Directives.223 This is one of 
many instances where the provisions of the Agreement already need to 
be updated with revisions of EU laws. The new Directives introduce 
the concept of ‘nearly zero-energy buildings’ – to become mandatory 
for new buildings or major renovations by 2020, albeit with a number 
of provisions allowing for flexibility.  
Box 17.1 Main provisions of EU energy efficiency Directives 
Directive on energy performance of buildings  
- Methodology for calculating energy performance of buildings 
- Minimum standards for energy performance of new buildings or 
major renovations 
- Energy performance certificates upon sale or rental of buildings 
-  ‘Nearly zero-energy’ standard for new buildings by 2020 
- Retro-fits to cover 2-3% per year of existing building stock 
Directive on energy efficiency  
- Long-term strategy required for overview of housing stock, policies 
for cost-effective renovation and expected energy savings 
- Central government to refurbish 3% of buildings per year 
- Energy-saving schemes to achieve reductions of consumption of 
1.5% per year 
- Smart meters to aid better management of energy consumption 
                                                        
221 Directive on the energy performance of buildings, 2002/91/EC, 
subsequently replaced by Directive 2010/31/EU. 
222 Directive on energy end use efficiency, 2006/32/EC, subsequently replaced 
by Directive 2012/27/EU. 
223 For an analysis of the implementation issues posed by these directives for 
the EU itself, see Tania Zgajewski, “The Energy Performance of Buildings: 
Promises Still Unfulfilled”, Egmont Paper No. 78, Academia Press, Egmont, 
Brussels, May 2015.  
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A central indicator is that buildings should emit no more than 3 
kg of CO2 emissions per square meter per year.224 This principle is 
important because if the EU itself is to achieve its own objective of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050 compared to 1990 
levels, this would require a 90% reduction of the buildings stock. 
However, the EU itself will need to invest around €62 billion per year, 
which indicates the scale of the implementation challenge for Ukraine.   
Technical requirements for energy-using products. The 
Agreement also sets out two framework Directives for energy-using 
products in Annex XXVII. The first defines eco-design requirements of 
energy-using products such as household electrical appliances to be 
implemented within three years of the entry into force of the 
Agreement.225 The second concerns the labelling of similar household 
appliances regarding their energy consumption, to be implemented in 
two years.226 These regulations specify the technical conditions for the 
CE conformity mark that allows the products to be sold on the EU 
market. These Directives have been included in the Ukrainian 
government’s implementation plan.227 After the full implementation of 
the Directives, all household appliances produced in Ukraine will bear 
the CE conformity mark and can be sold on the European market. 
Nuclear issues. Cooperation over nuclear safety is provided for 
in general terms, with reference to EU (Euratom) policies and standards 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This concerns such 
issues as nuclear fuel management and radioactive waste management. 
The most important operational programme concerns the site of the 
Chernobyl disaster (see chapter 18).  
                                                        
224 For a detailed study of NZEB, see “Principles for Nearly Zero-Energy 
Buildings – paving the way for effective implementation of policy 
requirements”, Building Performance Institute Europe (BPIE), 2011. 
225 Directive 2005/32/EC in the Agreement, but updated in Regulation 
278/2009/EC.    
226 Directive 92/75/EEC in the Agreement, but updated Directive 2010/30/EU. 
227 See http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/475-2015-%D1%80 and 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/499-2015-%D1%80. 
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Implementation perspectives 
The energy-saving landscape in Ukraine. This has recently been 
surveyed thoroughly by the Energy Charter secretariat,228 and by the 
International Energy Agency229 and the UN.230 The Ukrainian 
economy’s energy intensity (of 0.4 kg of oil equivalent per $ of GDP) is 
comparable to that of Russia, but without, of course, the latter’s natural 
resource endowment. Ukraine’s energy intensity is twice that of the 
United States (also an energy-rich economy) and three times that of 
Germany and Japan.  This gives a long-term perspective of the potential 
for energy-saving. The energy-intensity ratio may in reality be more 
favourable if the value of the shadow economy is taken into account 
(the Ministry of Economy has estimated the value creation not 
represented in official data at 34% of Ukraine’s GDP in 2012.)231 
The draft Energy Strategy of Ukraine232 explains the high energy 
intensity of the country’s economy by the high share of energy-
intensive industries in GDP, the low energy efficiency of sectors that 
transform energy (i.e. thermal energy production, energy 
transportation and distribution) and the high energy consumption by 
households for heating and hot water. The average annual energy 
consumption in the residential sector is 250-270 KWh/m2, which is 
almost twice as high as in European countries with similar climatic 
conditions. 
According to the Energy Strategy, in order to decrease energy 
intensity by 20% Ukraine will have to decrease total primary energy 
supply by 10% by 2020 (assuming that GDP growth resumes from 
2017). That would mainly be achieved by decreasing gas consumption 
by 22%. By 2035, the share of renewables in the total primary energy 
supply is expected to reach 20% due to the substitution of coal and 
                                                        
228 Energy Charter Secretariat, “In-Depth Review of Energy Efficiency Policy of 
Ukraine”, 2013.  
229 International Energy Agency, “Ukraine 2012”, Energy policies beyond IEA 
countries, series, 2012. 
230 United Nations, “Financing Energy Efficiency and Climate Change 
Mitigation: A Guide for investment in Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Russia 
and Ukraine”, 2005.  
231 Interfax Ukraine, “Economy Ministry: Level of Shadow Economy in Ukraine 
Grows by 0.4% in the first quarter of 2012”, 21 August 2012. 
232 See 
http://mpe.kmu.gov.ua/minugol/doccatalog/document?id=245032412.  
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natural gas with biomass and bioenergy. The energy intensity ratio of 
GDP is expected to fall to 0.12 kg of oil equivalent per $ of GDP.  
Energy reform policies of Ukraine. In 2014-15, Ukraine engaged 
in radical reform measures in the energy sector, driven by a 
combination of conditions set by the IMF for macroeconomic financial 
aid and the legal obligations of the Agreement with the EU and Energy 
Community Treaty.  
In its February 2015 Letter of Intent to the IMF the government 
of Ukraine pledged to raise household gas prices to parity with import 
costs, which was part of the IMF’s conditions to grant an Extended 
Fund Facility Arrangement.233 Actual prices were increased by 285% in 
early 2015 and were supposed to reach 75% of import cost levels by 
April 2016, before reaching 100% parity by April 2017. However, prices 
reached 100% parity in May 2016, ahead of schedule when the 
government unified gas prices in Ukraine to a single market price for 
both retail and industrial users. The new price-setting mechanism for 
gas prices is based on the forecast gas price at Germany’s gas hub (Net 
Connect Germany – NCG) and takes into account transportation, 
distribution, supply and other costs. This will permit the progressive 
elimination of state budget subsidies to the Naftogaz, whose deficit in 
2014 amounted to 5.7% of GDP, decreased to 0.9% of GDP in 2015,234 
and is expected to further decline to zero in 2017. At the same time, 
these huge budget savings will permit an expansion of social assistance 
to the poorest households that would be unable to afford the price rises. 
Such benefits rose from 0.4% of GDP in 2013 to 1.3% in 2014 and 2015, 
and will further increase alongside the price rises in 2016-17. However, 
these increased expenditures will be far less than the savings to the 
budget from eliminating subsidies to the Naftogaz.  
In addition, the structure of the Naftogaz and the gas sector is 
being radically changed in line with the norms of the ‘unbundling’ 
Directives. The general framework was set up by the Law of Ukraine 
‘On the natural gas market’, which came into force on 1 October 2015. 
The law separates the functions of the market operator from those of 
producers and suppliers, and it tries to minimise the influence of gas 
producers and suppliers on the operators of the gas transportation, 
                                                        
233 IMF, “Letter of Intent (by the government of Ukraine), Memorandum on 
Economic and Financial Policies & Technical Memorandum of 
Understanding”, 27 March 2015; Conference Call on Extended Fund Facility 
Arrangement with Ukraine, 12 March 2015.  
234 See http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/pubdocs/publicdoc/2016/4/ 
88201459504749749/Ukraine-Macroeconomic-Update-April-2016-ENG.pdf 
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storage and distribution systems. The gas transportation business of the 
Naftogaz therefore has to be separated out into a new independent 
operator.  
The law envisages the development of free and fair competition 
in the natural gas commodity market. To that end the law cancels the 
licences of wholesale gas traders and establishes free pricing on the 
wholesale and retail markets for natural gas, as well as the free choice 
of gas suppliers. 
Implementation of the Energy Community Treaty provisions. 
The annual implementation report of the Energy Community 
Secretariat offers a detailed account of how Ukraine is proceeding.235 
Ukraine’s progress and problems in implementing the Energy 
Community Treaty provisions have also been analysed by the Energy 
Reforms Coalition (a Ukrainian NGO),236 with continuous monitoring 
reported in DixiGroup’s monthly updates.237 Their analysis shows that 
progress is underway at the level of legislation, but the problems of 
concrete implementation remain formidable.  
The findings of these reports may be summarised as follows: 
Electricity: while the present state of affairs does not comply with 
Treaty commitments, a new Electricity Market Law will greatly 
improve this situation, but it only enters into force in 2017, which is 
considered too late. Work on developing secondary legislation has to 
be intensified. Ukraine made no real steps towards the effective 
integration of Ukrainian and European electricity systems. Other 
priorities are the unbundling of transmission and distribution 
networks, deregulation of the prices for generation and supply and 
alleviation of cross-subsidies. 
Gas: The most progress was made in the security of gas supplies 
by opening new gas routes. The law “On the natural gas market” has 
laid the grounds for further reforms and needs secondary legislation. 
Despite the improved financial transparency of the Naftogaz, the 
holding company still has no reform programme. Ukraine adopted the 
requirement to separate the functions of natural gas distribution and 
supply at the regional level. However, it was not able to introduce the 
entry/exit tariff system in the gas transportation system as this requires 
                                                        
235 Energy Community Secretariat, “Annual Implementation Report 2014-
2015”, 1 September 2015. 
236 Energy Reforms Coalition, “Ukraine and Energy Community: On the Road 
of Reforms”, Kyiv, 2015. 
237 See, for example http://ua-energy.org/post/56538. 
DEEPENING EU-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS: WHAT, WHY AND HOW?  161 
 
switching to a new payment model. Nevertheless, Ukraine made 
substantial progress and the Energy Community Secretariat notes that 
commitment so far suggests an irreversible path of reforms.  
Oil: Ukraine is required to adopt a system of minimum stocks for 
crude oil/petroleum products, including a progressive stock build-up 
schedule and its financing programme. 
Renewable energy: Ukraine has a comprehensive framework for 
the promotion of renewable energy, but this is not yet wholly compliant 
with Treaty obligations. The government eliminated the ‘local content’ 
discrimination barrier, corrected the legal definition of ‘biomass’ and 
introduced a number of incentives to develop alternative heat supply 
and bioenergy in the country. At the same time, the regulator reduced 
‘green’ tariffs, which led to a number of lawsuits from investors.  
Energy efficiency: Ukraine has made some progress in adopting 
technical regulations and supporting laws. Although a significant 
number of important legislative acts were prepared, they have not yet 
been adopted. Priorities for Ukraine are the adoption of the energy 
efficiency Law, the Law on energy performance of buildings, and the 
2020 Energy Efficiency Action Plan.  
The shortcomings in Ukraine’s performance in relation to its 
Treaty obligations have led to a number of legal infringement 
proceedings being launched by the Energy Community Secretariat. 
These concern capacity allocation for electricity connectors, non-
compliance with the Directive on sulphur in fuels, the lack of an action 
plan for renewable energies and the lack of legislation on state aids in 
the energy sector. One of the cases was closed by the Secretariat after 
the National Renewables Action Plan was submitted. The other two 
cases on failing to prohibit state aid and on Ukrainian capacity 
allocation rules remain open. 
Energy saving in households.  The reform of gas prices for 
households currently underway is indispensable for getting Ukraine 
onto a serious energy saving and efficiency track, accompanied by 
subsidies for the poorest households. However, in itself this does not 
address the problem of funding energy saving investments in low-
income households. This requires specific financing schemes with grant 
and loan funding, principally by the EU and the EBRD. 
There is already a valuable initiative in operation, administered 
by the EBRD, called the East European Energy Efficiency and 
Environment Partnership (E5P), supported by a coalition of donors led 
financially by grants from the EU and Sweden, with the EBRD also 
contributing loan funds. Until 2013, E5P had received €93 million of 
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grant pledges and had launched nine projects, mostly for the 
modernisation of the district-heating system. While this improves the 
delivery systems up to housing blocks, it does not solve the problem of 
energy waste within the buildings and individual apartments. As a 
result, a new initiative of the EBRD aims at energy saving investments 
in apartment blocks and individual households, which would mobilise 
€100 million of loan funds, with the objective of adding another 20-30% 
in grant funding from the EU and other bilateral donors. However, 
assuming an average of €5,000 of expenditure per apartment, the €100 
million would only reach 20,000 apartments.238 But if successful, it 
could lead to far bigger programmes that are necessary for a 
transformative strategy. Supposing an expansion of operations to 
increase the scale and notably the grant component, one might 
hypothesise a programme funded to the level of €500 million for both 
grants and loans, which could upgrade 200,000 apartments, thereby 
becoming more than a pilot operation.  
A necessary complement for such programmes is the 
improvement of the governance of the standard apartment block. 
Comprehensive energy-saving investment in apartment blocks 
requires collective decision-making. There is a form of legal entity 
established in Ukrainian law since 2001, namely the Law of Ukraine on 
Associations of Co-owners of Multifamily Buildings. Only about 17,000 
of the 75,000 apartment blocks have adopted this practice,239 however, 
and the numbers are not growing fast. This is at least in part because of 
the large number of poor people who could not afford to share in 
investment expenditures, and more well-off people not wanting to run 
the risk of having to bear financial responsibility for defaulting 
neighbours. A new Law on Specifics of the Right of Ownership in 
Multi-Family Apartment Buildings, adopted in 2015, is intended to 
facilitate decision-making and management in multi-family apartment 
blocks.240 This law would facilitate major investment decisions such as 
for energy efficiency by allowing them to be adopted by a 75% majority 
rather than 100% as in the past, with lesser decisions to be adopted by 
a simple 50% majority.  
                                                        
238 For detailed cost estimates see M. Emerson and V. Shimkin, “A Household 
Energy-Saving Initiative for Ukraine”, CEPS Working Document No. 408, 
CEPS, Brussels, May 2015. 
239 See www.minregion.gov.ua/osbb/dinamika-utvorennja-osbb-v-ukraini/ 
udoskonalennya-sistemi-upravlinnya--v-zhitlovomu-gospodarstvi-228731/. 
240 See http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/417-19. 
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Strategic diversification of gas supplies. Given the last decade’s 
tensions with Russia over gas supplies and now open conflict with 
Russia, Ukraine is developing gas pipeline connections with 
neighbouring EU states. The technique is not to build new pipeline 
connections, which have large capacities, but to make necessary 
engineering investments to enable gas to flow in ‘reverse’ direction 
compared to the original uses. These ‘reverse flow’ connections are via 
Slovakia and Hungary. Ukraine has built a small 400-meter pipeline 
connecting the Voyany-Uzhgorod and Soyuz pipelines, which allows 
direct gas flows from Slovakia.241 The Slovakian Eustream enterprise is 
reported to invest around €20 million to prepare Vojany for reverse-
flow mode,242 with a gas metering station and a pipeline to the 
Ukrainian border.243  
Energy policy at a glance 
The energy provisions of the Agreement are of exceptional economic and 
geopolitical importance, with a commitment to approximate much of the 
technical content of EU laws.  
Ukraine’s energy policy is now finally undergoing radical and long overdue 
reforms, centred upon the alignment of energy prices with import costs and 
the unbundling of gas distribution structures in line with IMF and EU 
requirements.   
However, the implementation of provisions of the Agreement through the 
linked Energy Community Treaty is still behind schedule. 
Gas supplies are now being diversified away from the former total 
dependence on Russian supplies, with the aid of reverse-flow pipelines 
linking to neighbouring EU states.  
Energy-savings programmes, in line with EU standards, are of vital 
importance to the independence of gas supplies.  
The major programme of building a sarcophagus to secure the destroyed 
nuclear reactor site in Chernobyl is proceeding, with major funding from 
the EU, the EBRD and other international donors. 
                                                        
241 See www.naftogaz.com/www/3/nakweb.nsf/0/ 
D8BA54BC1CAB9979C2257D33002E92. 
242 See www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-07/ukraine-europe-gas-
link-set-to-run-at-full-capacity-this-winter. 
243 See http://ukranews.com/ru/interview/2014/08/13/517. 
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18. ENVIRONMENT 
The environment chapter of the 
Agreement is a very ambitious one and 
commits Ukraine to cooperation across 
the whole landscape of environmental 
policy issues. Implementation will be a 
long and difficult process, given 
Ukraine’s starting point, but it will 
ultimately mean a radical transformation 
of environmental quality and the 
modernisation of key heavy industries in 
the country. 
Provisions of the Agreement 
Ukraine agrees to undertake a gradual approximation of its legislation 
to that of the EU within two to ten years in accordance with Annex 
XXIX of the AA, which lists 35 EU directives. This represents the main 
body of EU environmental law and policy, including environmental 
governance methods, air and water quality, waste management, 
industrial pollution and hazards, nature protection, the use of GMOs 
(genetically modified organisms) in agriculture and climate change. 
Environmental governance. The centrepiece is the environmental 
impact assessment Directive, introduced in 1985 and amended several 
times (in 1997, 2003, 2011 and 2014 – the key text is Directive 
2011/92/EC). This requires that a long list of major projects types (such 
as refineries, metallurgical smelters, major transport infrastructures, 
dams, etc.) should not receive the go-ahead before a published 
assessment of their impact on humans, fauna and flora, soil, water, air, 
climate and the landscape.  
Major pollutants and dangerous substances. The centrepiece 
here is the industrial emissions Directive (2010/75/EU), which revises 
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and modernises seven previous directives, simplifying existing 
legislation and cutting unnecessary administrative costs. The Directive 
covers all industries liable to produce harmful emissions: energy, 
metals, minerals, chemicals, pulp and paper, large-scale pork and 
poultry production, waste-management industries, etc. It sets out the 
main principles for the licensing and control of such installations, 
specifying limit values for noxious substances. It requires the 
application of best available techniques (BAT).  
To counter air pollution, the ambient air quality framework 
Directive (2008/50/EC) and four ‘daughter’ Directives lay down limits 
for specific pollutants.244 The parties are obliged to enforce standards of 
air quality within the prescribed limits. Where ambient air exceeds any 
limit or target value in a given zone or agglomeration, the authorities 
shall ensure that air quality plans are established for those zones and 
agglomerations in order to achieve the relevant limit value. Procedures 
exist for exemptions or the postponement of deadlines where limit 
values cannot be respected because of site-specific dispersion 
characteristics, adverse climatic conditions or transboundary factors.  
The large combustion plant Directive (2001/80/EC) applies to 
combustion installations, such as thermal power stations, with a rated 
thermal input equal to or greater than 50 MW. Its purpose is to limit the 
amount of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and dust emitted from 
large combustion plants. It encourages the combined production of 
heat and electricity (cogeneration). The limit values and timetables to 
be respected are graduated according to the age of installations, starting 
with ‘existing plants’ authorised before 1987, and on to later 
installations. The governments must prepare national emission 
reduction plans for existing plants by a specified date. The Directive 
allows existing plants to be exempted from compliance with the 
emission limits on condition that the operator undertakes not to operate 
the plant for more than 20,000 hours between 1 January 2008 and 31 
December 2015. The Energy Community Treaty requires that Ukraine 
comply by 2018. 
A further key law is the water framework Directive of 
(2000/60/EC, subject to several subsequent amendments), which has 
established a framework for the protection of inland surface waters, 
ground waters and coastal waters. Its objective for the EU itself has 
been to achieve a good status of all waters by 2015. The approach is 
                                                        
244 Notably 1) sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and oxides of nitrogen, and 
lead, 2) carbon monoxide and benzene, 3) ozone and 4) polyaromatic 
hydrocarbons, arsenic, nickel, cadmium and mercury. 
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based heavily on river basins, for which member states must prepare 
management plans and detailed management programmes. The parties 
should ensure that the pricing of water encourages consumers to use 
resources efficiently.  
Legislation by the EU for the prevention and control of 
catastrophic industrial accidents was triggered by the major accident at a 
chemicals factory in the Italian town of Seveso in 1976.  The resulting 
Seveso Directive (96/82/EC) was later amended in view of the lessons 
learned from later accidents such as at Bhopal, Toulouse and Enschede 
(2012/18/EU). The Directive now applies to more than 10,000 
industrial establishments in the EU where dangerous substances are 
used or stored in large quantities, mainly in the chemical, 
petrochemical, logistics and metal refining sectors. The Directive has 
contributed to reducing the number of major accidents and is widely 
considered as a benchmark for industrial accidents policy and a role 
model for legislation in many countries worldwide.  
According to the hierarchy of waste management techniques, 
landfilling is the least preferable option and should be limited to the 
necessary minimum, in accordance with the landfill Directive 
(1999/31/EC ). Where waste needs to be landfilled, it must be sent to 
landfills that comply with the requirements of the Directive. The 
objective is to prevent or reduce, as far as possible, negative effects on 
the environment, in particular on surface water, groundwater, soil, air 
and human health from the landfilling of waste, by introducing 
stringent technical requirements for waste and landfills. The Directive 
sets up a system of operating permits for landfill sites. Existing landfill 
sites may not continue to operate unless they are brought into 
compliance with the provisions of the Directive. Ukraine has a six-year 
time limit for implementation. 
Natural habitat. Nature protection is subject to two Directives 
for natural habitats and sanctuaries for wild birds (92/43/EC and 
2009/147/EC). These Directives establish principles and procedures for 
the designation of special protection zones and would be helpful 
references for the work of Ukrainian NGOs in this domain.  
Climate change. The central element of EU climate change policy 
is the emissions trading system (ETS) Directive (2003/87/EC, updated 
in 2009/29/EC); Ukraine is due to establish a compatible system within 
2 years. This requires establishing a system for registering relevant 
installations, a national development plan for the distribution of 
allowances and a system for these to be traded domestically. Ukraine 
further undertakes to fully implement the Kyoto Protocol and develop 
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a long-term action plan for the mitigation and reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions.  
Implementation perspectives 
The environmental status quo in Ukraine. In 2014, the environmental 
performance of Ukraine was ranked 95th out of 178 countries,245 while 
the majority of the EU member states are in the top 30. This gives a good 
indication of the scale of the challenges for Ukraine to approach 
European standards. According to the State Statistics Service of 
Ukraine,246 in 2013 on a per capita basis 148 kg of polluters were emitted 
into the air, 38 m3 of polluted wastewaters discarded and 9.9 tons of 
wastes discarded (including 20 kg of I-III hazard classes).  
In 2013, about 6.7 million tons of polluting substances were 
released into the air from stationary (64%) and mobile (36%) sources of 
pollution. The energy sector was the main polluter, accounting for 43% 
of emissions while manufacturing and extractive industries 
contributed to 29% and 21% of noxious emissions, respectively. The 
transport sector was responsible for 2.4 million tons of emissions, the 
majority of which came from private cars (70.1%) 
The State Emergency Service of Ukraine reports that water 
bodies are contaminated with mainly heavy metal compounds, 
nitrates, oil products, phenols and sulphates. In 2013, 1.7 billion m3 of 
polluted wastewaters were discarded; 85% of return waters (1.5 billion 
m3) were not sufficiently treated while 0.3 billion m3 were not treated 
at all, despite available water treatment capacities. 
In 2013, 448 million tons of waste were generated, including 439 
million tons from economic activities of enterprises and 9 million tons 
generated by households. Unfortunately, landfilling remains the main 
method of waste management, the share of waste disposed of or 
incinerated (without energy production) is 64.3%. As of January, 2014, 
15.2 billion tonnes of waste are accumulated at landfills.  
Implementation progress and plans. In 2015, the Cabinet of 
Ministers247 approved 21 Implementation Plans for the transposition of 
26 EU environmental directives and regulations, defining the activities 
of ministries and agencies required for the timely implementation of 
                                                        
245 See http://epi.yale.edu/epi/country-profile/ukraine. 
246 See www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2012/ns_rik/analit/arhiv.htm. 
247 Orders No. 371 as of 15 April 2015 and No. 475 as of 14 May 2015 
(www.kmu.gov.ua/kmu/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=248102785&cat_
id=247984327).  
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environmental EU legislation. The plans are also important to ensure 
transparency and enable effective monitoring of implementation by 
civil society and business representatives. Administrative planning is 
thus quite well advanced as a first step in what will be a long process. 
Environmental Impact Assessment Directive. In the last few 
years, several draft laws were registered in the Parliament aiming to 
implement this directive,248 but none of them was approved, for a 
number of reasons – mainly the resistance of the business lobby and 
government officials interested in the status quo. 
According to the Implementation Plan for the Directive on 
Environmental Impact Assessment (2011/92/EC) approved by the 
Cabinet of Ministers in 2015, all activities required for the transposition 
of this directive should be undertaken during 2015-16. In 2015, the 
Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of Ukraine established an 
interdepartmental working group on implementation of the 
directive,249 which prepared a draft law of Ukraine on Environmental 
Impact Assessment. The draft law (no. 2009a) has gone through public 
consultations and was submitted for the approval of executive bodies 
concerned.250 It was considered by parliamentarians on 26 November 
2015, and returned for revision to the main responsible Committee on 
Environmental Policy. 
Large combustion plants Directive (LCPD). According to its 
commitments under the Energy Community Treaty, Ukraine is 
expected to implement the large combustion plants Directive 
(2001/80/EC) by 1 January 2018. Similar requirements were 
established in 2008 by the Ministry of Environmental Protection.251 
However, the required modernisation has not been carried out due to 
financial constraints and limited possibilities to pass on costs to end-
users through increased electricity and heat tariffs.252 Clearly, it is not 
                                                        
248 Protocol Concerning the Accession of Ukraine to the Treaty Establishing 
Energy Community ratified by the Law No. 2787-VI (2787-17) as of 15.12.2010 
(http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/994_a27). 
249 Order Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of Ukraine No. 25-аg as of 
30.01.2015.  
250  See http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=55438. 
251 Order No. 541 “On the approval of technological standards of allowable 
emissions of thermal power plants with nominal thermal capacity exceeding 50 
MW” as of 22.10.2008 (http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z1110-08). 
252 Electricity and heat tariffs are regulated by the National Commission for 
State Regulation of Energy and Public Utilities (NCSREPU) and the investment 
component in the price structure is very restricted. 
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feasible to ensure compliance of over 140 installations with the LCPD 
Directive within the two remaining years. 
 
Box 18.1 Costs of environmental upgrading of large combustion plants 
It was estimated by the study commissioned by the Energy Community 
in 2013 that Ukraine would need between €3.8 and €5.1 billion, 
depending on the scenario for meeting the requirements of large 
combustion plants Directive and €6 billion to upgrade power plants for 
compliance with industrial emissions Directive (IED). 
Estimates prepared for NERP delivered different results. The 
total funds required for installation of modern flue gas cleaning 
equipment (to comply with IED) is €2.6 billion. Assuming capital 
investment costs at €1800/kWh, €16.4 billion is needed for the 
construction of new capacities of coal-based thermal power plants 
(TPPs). Construction of new coal-based combined heat and power plants 
(CHPPs) will require investment of €4.60 billion. Thus, the total costs of 
modernisation of thermal power sector are over €23.5 billion. The 
Cabinet of Ministers and relevant executive bodies are responsible for 
determining and approving financial mechanisms for the enforcement 
of such massive modernisation. 
Several installations subject to the Large Combustion Plants are 
located at the territories, which are currently not controlled by the 
Ukrainian government (parts of Donetska and Luhanska regions and 
Crimea), but these are still included in the NERP under the assumption 
that Ukraine will regain control over its temporarily lost territories. 
According to the NERP, emission reduction measures are planned at 
Zujivska, Muronivska and Starobeshivska TPPs, while the CHPPs of the 
Alchevcky Steel Plant, the Central Electric Blower Plant of Makiivsky 
Steel Plant as well as four Crimean CHP plants (Simferopolska, 
Sevastopolska, Sakska and Kamysh-Burunska) will be decommissioned. 
 
As a result, Ukraine has chosen the alternative pathway for 
meeting the requirements of the Directive (2001/80/EC), as envisioned 
by the Ministerial Council of the Energy Community.253 In particular, 
parties are allowed to use national emission reduction plans up to 31 
December 2027, which impose national emission caps for certain 
pollutants (SO2, NOx, dust) for all power plants taken together, rather 
than imposing emission limit values on each large combustion plant. 
                                                        
253 Decision D/2013/05/MC-EnC approved in 2013. 
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Ukraine submitted its National Emissions Reduction Plan (NERP) 254 by 
the deadline of 31 December 2015.255 Implementation of the NERP is 
planned from 1 January 2018, to 31 December 2028 for SO2 and dust, 
and to 31 December 2033 for NOx. This long implementation period 
(contrary to the Ministerial Council of the Energy Community decision 
mentioned above) is due to the schedule of the energy sector 
reconstruction, as envisioned in the current Energy Strategy.256 To 
avoid interruptions in power supply, no more than five installations 
(out of 90 TPP units) can be stopped at any given time for 
reconstruction or replacement.  
Industrial emissions Directive. Although the national legislation 
of Ukraine partly meets the requirements of this Directive 
(2010/75/EC), much work needs to be done to develop the required 
by-laws and regulations, which will be partially covered by technical 
assistance projects. According to the implementation plan approved by 
the Cabinet of Ministers in 2015, most of these activities should be 
undertaken during 2016-17.  
Estimates indicate that the administrative and operational costs 
at the stage of legislation approximation will be relatively modest.257 As 
regards implementation costs, estimates are only available for a 
number of the largest sectors as there are more than 30 industrial 
sectors and sub-sectors concerned. In addition to the large combustion 
plants described above, the modernisation of the metallurgy sector is 
expected to cost between €1.6 and €1.9 billion; €1.8 billion for the coking 
industry; and for glass factories between €260 and €300 million. These 
data are for 2013 and include major industrial plants in the East Donbas 
regions, which are not currently controlled by Kyiv.   
Seveso Directive on dangerous substances. Ukraine’s national 
legislation is now partially compliant with the provisions of the Seveso-
III Directive (2012/18/EU).258 However, certain provisions in the 
                                                        
254 See 
http://mpe.kmu.gov.ua/minugol/doccatalog/document?id=244996563. 
255 According to a press release of the Energy Community of 7 January 2016. 
256 See http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0002120-13/paran3#n3. 
257 See www.sbs-envir.org/images/documents/ 
Indicative_cost_assessment_draft_Feb_2015.pdf. 
258 Through the Law No. 2245-III “On high-risk objects” of 18.01.2001, 
Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 956 “On the identification and 
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current legislation still need to be improved, in particular procedures 
for informing the population in the case of an accident at high-risk 
projects such as chemical plants, and for the interaction between 
operators of high-risk projects and state bodies.259 Ukraine has 
registered more than 9,000 high-risk projects. According to the Action 
Plan for the implementation of this Directive,260 required draft laws and 
regulations should be developed and submitted for consideration by 
the Cabinet of Ministers by December 2017.  
Landfill Directive. Ukraine’s waste management system differs 
significantly in its definitions from that of the EU. Landfills are often 
overfilled and a long way from complying with EU standards. A 
working group on resource and waste management was established by 
the Cabinet of Ministers in 2014.261 Legislative approximation should 
be completed within two years, but practical implementation measures 
are planned for 2018-20.  
The landfill Directive (1999/31/EC) is likely to be one of the most 
challenging and costly, both in terms of administrative costs for the 
development of the required regulations and for their technical 
implementation. Estimates of the administrative and operational costs 
at the stage of legislative approximation indicate that they are likely to 
be relatively modest. However, funds needed for the development of a 
large-scale waste management infrastructure, the rehabilitation or 
decommissioning of existing landfills, introduction of recycling, etc. are 
likely to be much higher (in the range of €3 to €5 billion) and will have 
to be mostly funded from state and municipal budgets,262 with possible 
contributions from the EIB and EBRD. 
Ambient air quality framework Directive. Current legislation is 
considered to be partially compliant with the provisions of the air 
quality Directive (2008/50/EC).263 However, the air quality monitoring 
                                                        
declaration of high-risk objects” of 11.07.2002, and Resolution No. 847-р as of 
17 September 2014.  
259 See http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/847-2014-%D1%80#n12. 
260 Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 132 as of 25 February 2015 
(www.kmu.gov.ua/kmu/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=247983863&cat_
id=247984327). 
261 Order of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 385 as of 1.12.2014. 
262 See www.sbs-envir.org/images/documents/ 
Indicative_cost_assessment_draft_Feb_2015.pdf. 
263 See www.menr.gov.ua/docs/activity 
adaptation/Table%20of%20Concordance_Dir_2008_50_ambiant_03.11.11.pdf. 
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system requires certain improvements as it dates back more than 20 
years. Key legislative and institutional measures defined in the 
Implementation Plan should be completed by 2017. However, the 
technical re-equipment of existing air quality monitoring stations and 
the development of air quality improvement plans is scheduled for 
2016 to 2019, with the aid of technical assistance projects. 
Water framework Directive. According to the Implementation 
Plan, the transposition of the water framework Directive (2000/60/EC) 
into national legislation of Ukraine should be completed by 2017. 
Important steps have already been taken with the establishment of an 
interdepartmental working group by the State Water Resources 
Agency in 2015. 264 A draft law265 amending current texts on integrated 
approaches to water basin management was registered by the 
parliament on 9 December 2015, and it was approved in the first 
hearing on 19 May 2016.  
Natural Habitats.  Ukrainian legislation on the conservation of 
natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora is partly compliant with 
the habitats and birds Directives (92/43/EC and 2009/147/EC). Both 
directives should be transposed into national legislation by the end of 
2017, with certain organisational and coordination measures to be 
performed by 2018. Ukraine is party to a number of international 
conventions in this area, and its national legislation largely meets the 
requirements of the birds Directive, but certain aspects should be 
clarified or complemented. A working group on environmental 
protection was established by the Ministry of Ecology and Natural 
Resources in 2014,266 which in September 2015 discussed a draft law on 
amending the current Laws on the animal world, the protection of 
animals from cruelty, among others.   
Emissions trading system (ETS). While emissions trading is 
theoretically the most economically efficient environmental policy 
instrument for emissions reduction because it allows polluters to 
optimise their abatement costs, it is also one of the most complicated. A 
sophisticated legislative basis has to be developed and tested to ensure 
the proper monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of emissions 
reductions for an ETS to achieve real environmental improvements. 
                                                        
264 Order of the State Water Resources Agency No. 26 as of 06.03.2015.  
265 See http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=57335. 
266 Order of the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources No. 321 as of 
16.10.2014. 
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The AA requires Ukraine (in Annex XXX) to approximate to the EU ETS 
(Directive 2003/87/EC) within two years.  
In addition, linking Ukraine’s ETS to that of the EU would bring 
benefits for both parties. Considering that the EU industries are in 
many cases more technologically advanced than Ukrainian ones, the 
former will usually face higher abatement costs than the latter. Thus, 
EU companies will be able to buy cheaper allowances on the Ukrainian 
market, while Ukrainian companies will be able to raise the funds 
required for modernisation. However, this will only be possible when 
the Ukrainian ETS passes through its pilot phase and the MRV system 
becomes fully compliant with the latest EU standards. 
Ukraine does not have previous experience of operating any 
similar policy mechanism. A huge amount of work is therefore 
required to establish an effective ETS. The Ministry of Ecology and 
Natural Resources267 established a working group, and certain draft 
laws are being developed. However, it is unlikely that the ETS Directive 
will be fully transposed by August 2016, as required by the Action Plan 
for the implementation of the Association Agreement.268 A possible 
prolongation of the approximation period, by several years, is currently 
being discussed. 
 
Chernobyl. In 1986, the world’s most catastrophic nuclear accident took 
place at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in northern Ukraine near the 
Belarus border. The EU has subsequently played a leading role in funding 
work to repair the site and contain contamination, including a huge 
‘shelter’ or ‘sarcophagus’ to cover the failed reactor. The EU has so far 
committed €600 million out of a total of €2.1 billion to the Chernobyl 
Shelter Fund, which is managed by the EBRD. The AA makes only a 
passing reference to Chernobyl, but the operations for securing the site 
are ongoing, with new commitments of €70 million made by the EU in 
2015.   
 
Donetsk and Lugansk separatist regions. A substantial part of 
Ukraine’s heavy industry lies in the separatist regions, which are 
currently out of the control of the Ukrainian government. Information 
about accidents at energy infrastructure and high-risk industrial objects 
                                                        
267 Order of the Ministry of Ecology and natural Resources No. 286 as of 
30.07.2015. 
268 Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 847-р as of 17 September 2014 
(http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/847-2014-%D1%80#n12). 
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appear in the media from time to time but the Ukrainian government 
does not have access to the site to organise repair, or collect reliable 
information about the level of environmental contamination. One 
study based on satellite images and the on-site sampling of water and 
soil at the territories, released by the Ukrainian army, presents evidence 
of the devastating environmental consequences of military operations 
in 2013 and 2014. 269 As a result of intensive shelling at certain sites, 
concentrations of noxious substances in the air and water increased to 
several times above the limit values, soil was heavily contaminated by 
heavy metals and protected natural areas trapped in the area of military 
operations were heavily damaged by machinery and fire. For the time 
being there is no possibility for Kyiv to implement environmental 
standards in the separatist regions where, theoretically, many of the 
environmental reconstruction and modernisation costs arise.   
 
Environment at a glance 
The effective implementation of the ambitious environment chapter of the 
Agreement would upgrade Ukraine to the level of the top 30 countries 
globally in terms of environmental performance indicators. 
This huge improvement of environmental standards is only likely to be 
observed in the long run because just the legal transposition of the EU 
directives will take several years, while their technical implementation will 
take up to 18 years in certain cases.  
Some directives are straightforward acts of policy modernisation and will 
help establish effective environmental quality and resource management 
systems. Others are very challenging in terms of economic costs (for 
example, the large combustion plants and industrial emissions Directives).  
The EIB and EBRD are among the major financial institutions capable of 
making substantial contributions to the funding of necessary investments, 
leveraging in other public and private sources. These investments in 
environmental quality will generate payback in terms of improved 
production efficiency and health benefits for both present and future 
generations. 
If the timetables for implementation of specific EU directives prove to be too 
fast it is possible for them to be extended, if agreed by the two parties in the 
Association Council.  
                                                        
269 See http://epl.org.ua/attachments/article/1713/ 
1817_WEB_EPL_Posibnuk_ATO_Cover_Ukrainian.pdf. 
 175 
 
 
19. THE DIGITAL SECTOR 
This chapter deals with the ‘digital’ 
family of chapters and sub-chapters of 
the Agreement on electronic 
communications and postal services, the 
information society and audio-visual 
policy. Ukraine is already showing 
encouragingly positive trends in this 
broad sector of strategic importance for 
an internationally competitive economy. 
 
Provisions of the Agreement 
Electronic communications. The provisions on electronic 
communications fall under the special category of service sectors that 
are treated within the DCFTA as having a specific roadmap for securing 
‘full internal market treatment’. As described in chapter 9 on services, 
there is an explicit procedure, set out in Annex XVII, for checking 
whether Ukraine complies with its commitments to approximate to EU 
legislation.     
For electronic communications there are complex provisions in 
Arts 115 to 124, laying the ground rules for a competitive and well-
governed sector. These concern the regulatory authority, principles for 
the authorisation of licences to service providers, the rights of access to 
interconnections with other service providers and principles for 
governing the allocation of scarce resources, such as radio frequencies. 
Existing EU legislation with which Ukraine should comply within 4 
years is specified in Annex XVII-3, which includes a set of key 
Directives adopted in 2002 and amended in 2009: 
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 Framework Directive 2002/21/EC (as amended in Directive 
2009/140/EC) on electronic communications networks, which 
defines the products covered and the need for an independent 
administrative capacity of the national regulator.  
 Directive 2002/20/EC (also as amended by Directive 
2009/140/EC) on the authorisation of licences for operators in 
the sector. 
 Directive 2002/19/EC (also as amended by Directive 
2009/140/EC) on the requirements that operators with 
significant market power assure open access to network facilities 
and control for non-discriminating interconnection charges.  
 Universal service Directive 2002/22/EC (as amended by 
Directive 2009/136/EC), which requires respect for the interests 
and rights of users, such as ‘number portability’ between 
operators.  
Postal and courier services. Regulatory rules aim to prevent anti-
competitive practices in this sector, license provisions for universal 
service providers and maintain the independence of the regulatory 
body. Several directives are specified in Annex XVII of the internal 
market regulation for postal services. Courier services in the EU are 
increasingly subject to criticism for their high costs, and action on this 
account is planned.  
Information Society. The objective here is to ensure the 
widespread availability of information and communication 
technologies (ICT) with quality services at affordable prices. In 
particular, there should be broadband access for citizens, business and 
public administration through services of e-business, e-health, e-
government and e-learning. Joint research projects are envisaged under 
the Horizon 2020 programme. Specific EU legislation for 
approximation by Ukraine within three years includes the E-commerce 
Directive (2000/31/EC) and a framework law on electronic signatures 
(Directive 1999/93/EC). 
Audio-visual services. Ground rules for the regulation of 
television broadcasting are laid down in the audio-visual media 
services Directive (2007/65/EC, 2010/13/EU). Ukraine will implement 
these provisions within two years. 
Digital Single market. This broad ‘digital’ domain, including 
electronic communications, information society and audio-visual 
markets are together witnessing the fastest rate of technological change 
and development of any sector in the economy.  This means that the 
stock of EU laws and regulations in this field, as represented in Annex 
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XVII-3 of the Agreement, is also subject to rapid change. The European 
Commission has set out directions for the next developments in its 
comprehensive 2015 policy paper “A Digital Single Market for 
Europe”.270 This addresses the agenda for action under three broad 
headings: i) better online access for consumers and businesses, ii) 
creation of the right regulatory conditions for advanced digital 
networks and iii) building the digital economy through investment, 
interoperability and standardisation. Sixteen specific action points are 
highlighted, several of which will see amendment to the laws cited in 
the Agreement for approximation, including reform of the Directives 
on electronic communications, copyright regimes, consumer 
protection, courier services, audio-visual services and a Priority ICT 
Standards Plan. 
Implementation perspectives 
Ukraine’s growing IT sector. The share of IT industry in Ukraine’s 
economy is estimated at 3% GDP in 2015.271 Ukrainian IT industry 
employs 74,000–100,000 people (software developers, engineers, 
architects, QA engineers and testers, business analysts, project 
managers, etc.) with the majority of specialists working in IT 
outsourcing. In 2014, ICT entrepreneurs earned about UAH 18 billion 
($851 million) – an average monthly gross salary of $2000. The average 
monthly software engineering salary was $1,600 in 2015.272 In 2014, ICT 
services accounted for 31% of the total service exports.273 
In 2013, there were 3,292 institutions in Ukraine providing IT 
services.274  The ICT sector has 2,114 certified ICT operators, 1,482 legal 
entities that provide access to the internet. Overall 44% of Ukrainian 
citizens had access to the internet, 148 universities trained ICT 
specialists, and there was almost complete coverage of the territory of 
                                                        
270 Communication COM(2015)192 final, of 6 May 2015. 
271 “Ukrainian IT in figures” (http://dou.ua/lenta/columns/it-in-figures/) 
(DOU is an online community of Ukrainian ICT professionals). 
272 IT Ukraine, 2016 edition (www.uadn.net/files/ua_hightech.pdf). 
273 World Development Indicators (databank.worldbank.org). 
274 Ukraine, “ICT environment, innovation policies & international 
cooperation” (http://eeca-ict.eu/images/uploads/pdf/EECA_counires_ 
reports_NEW/ICT-Env_Inno-policies_and_Inter-
coop_report_UKRAINE.pdf).  
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Ukraine by mobile networks. Every year Ukrainian universities 
graduate about 15,000 IT specialists.275 
According to some estimates, Ukraine’s IT industry is valued at 
over $5 billion;276 it also has over 2,000 start-ups. Ukraine is a popular 
destination for IT outsourcing due to a large number of skilled 
developers and moderate costs compared to the US or Western 
Europe.277 According to a survey of small and medium IT companies 
carried out in August 2015, 77% of CEOs responded that during the 
previous two years, their companies grew and only 8% said that their 
volumes decreased.278 
To develop the industry, Ukrainian IT companies are creating IT 
clusters in major Ukrainian cities (Lviv, Kharkiv, Lutsk, Dnipro and 
Odesa) with the support of the Ukrainian government. These clusters 
aim to increase the quality of IT education in local universities, offering 
programming courses and conducting advocacy and popularisation 
campaigns.  
In April 2015, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the 2015 Action 
Plan on supporting the national IT industry.279 The government needs 
to draft laws to correct various deficiencies: to introduce definitions of 
software, supply of software and online service in Ukraine’s Tax Code; 
to simplify the regulatory procedures for the provision of IT services to 
non-residents; and to improve provisions for the allocation of 
intellectual property rights in computer programmes and databases 
created by Ukrainian employees and contractors. At the time of writing, 
no information on the completion of these obligations was available. 
Overall, Ukraine’s digital sector is developing fast and showing 
encouraging signs of becoming a successful and dynamic branch of the 
economy, with good export prospects via outsourcing business.  
Approximation process. Ukrainian laws on telecommunications 
and radio frequency resources already partly comply with EU 
legislation, but lack compliance in the distribution of responsibilities on 
policy development, regulation, licensing, market analysis, technical 
neutrality, and the provision of universal services. To rectify this the 
                                                        
275 IT Ukraine, 2016 edition (www.uadn.net/files/ua_hightech.pdf). 
276 See http://igniteoutsourcing.com/publications/best-ukrainian-it-
startups/. 
277 See http://igniteoutsourcing.com/publications/ukraine-top-outsourcing-
destinations/. 
278 See https://hh.ua/article/17518.  
279 See http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/338-2015-%D1%80. 
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State Service of Special Communication and Information Protection, 
together with the National Commission for State Regulation of 
Communications and Information (NCRCI) need to develop a roadmap 
for changes to Ukrainian legislation, introduce European terminology 
and definitions for electronic communications, and increase the 
independence of the national regulator. Furthermore, these two 
administrative bodies have to develop legislation to support the 
infrastructure for information society (high-speed broadband access 
and information protection). 
The NCRCI developed and submitted to Parliament the draft 
law on electronic communications and amendments to some of 
Ukraine’s laws in order to increase the independence and 
administrative capacity of the national regulator in the 
communications sphere.  
A draft law on postal services that would implement the EU 
Directive on universal services is also being developed, and for postal 
and courier services, the Ministry of Infrastructure developed a 
roadmap on the harmonisation of Ukrainian legislation to that of the 
EU as well as an action plan on the implementation of Directive 
97/67/EC on common rules for the postal services market. 
Within the information society, Ukraine adopted a law on e-
commerce in September 2015 that complies with Directive 2000/31/EC 
and designed a draft law on electronic trust services that complies with 
Regulation 910/2014 on electronic identification and trust services for 
electronic transactions. The draft law has been submitted to the 
Parliament.  
The State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting 
developed a new draft law on television and radio broadcasting that 
would incorporate the norms of the European Convention on 
Transfrontier Television and EU Directive 2007/65/EC on audio-visual 
media services and presented it for public discussion. 
 
The digital sector at a glance 
This broad sector, embracing electronic communications and the entire ICT 
economy, is a vital, strategic part of the economic reform and modernisation 
process in Ukraine.  
Ukraine has quite advanced human capital skills in this field, which is the 
basis for rapid development of the sector, including earnings from 
outsourcing business.  
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The Agreement provides for comprehensive alignment on EU regulatory 
practices, mostly within four years. The approximation programme is 
progressing well. 
This fast-changing technological environment will mean comparable 
dynamics for regulatory systems in both the EU and Ukraine.  
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20. CONSUMER PROTECTION 
Provisions of the Agreement 
EU legislation is intended to ensure a 
high and consistent level of protection 
for the health and safety of consumers by 
means of strict common safety rules and 
standards for products and services 
circulating within the internal market 
(see. Arts 203-204 on geographical 
indications). Many EU policies directly 
affect consumers. This is especially the 
case in such areas as telecommunications, digital, energy, transport and 
food. The EU has also adopted measures to increase the transparency 
and access to retail financial services and to facilitate the switching of 
bank accounts. This trend of mainstreaming consumer protection is 
reflected in the Association Agreement, which integrates the interests 
of consumers into its policies. 
Chapter 20, on consumer protection, nevertheless lays down a 
number of general commitments. The most fundamental of these is that 
the parties to the Agreement “shall cooperate in order to ensure a high 
level of consumer protection and to achieve compatibility between their 
systems of consumer protection” (Art. 415). This requires, among 
others, the exchange of information on consumer protection systems; 
providing expertise on legislative and technical capacity to enforce 
legislation and market surveillance systems; improving information 
provided to consumers; and encouraging the development of 
independent consumer associations (Arts 416 and 418). 
Crucially, it also requires Ukraine to approximate its legislation 
to the EU acquis, as set out in Annex XXXIX to the Agreement, while 
avoiding barriers to trade. Generally speaking, Ukraine has committed 
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to stricter implementation timeframes than Georgia (three instead of 
five years). 
Product safety is an important achievement of consumer policy. 
Within three years of the entry into force of the Agreement, Ukraine is 
expected to have transposed into its legal order the provisions of the 
main acts in this field, i.e. the general product safety Directive 
2001/95/EC and Directive 87/357/EEC concerning products which, 
appearing to be other than they are, endanger the health or safety of 
consumers. Certain products whose composition, manufacture or use 
may pose a risk to consumers are subject to more specific provisions. 
It is worth noting that in 2013, the European Commission 
adopted a Product Safety and Market Surveillance Package that aims 
to improve further product safety, in particular through enhanced 
product identification and traceability. At the same time, the 
Commission has adopted measures to reinforce safety in the food 
chain. Regarding the safety of cosmetic products, new rules entered 
into force in mid-2013. 
Ukraine must also transpose the unfair commercial practices 
Directive 2005/29/EC and Directive 98/6/EC on the indication of the 
prices of products offered to consumers. 
To protect consumers from unfair contract terms, the general 
Directive 93/13/EEC has to be incorporated, as well as, inter alia, 
Directive 97/7/EC on the protection of consumers in respect of 
distance contracts. 
Other EU legal acts to be approximated concern doorstep selling, 
package holidays and consumer credit. 
Finally, in terms of the enforcement of consumer rules, the 
provisions of Directive 98/27/EC on injunctions for the protection of 
consumers’ interests have to be transposed into Ukrainian legislation 
within three years of the entry into force of the Agreement, whereas the 
provisions of Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on Cooperation between 
national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer 
protection laws have to be implemented within five years. 
Ukrainian legislators should be aware that thanks to Directive 
2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution and Regulation (EU) 
524/2013 on online dispute resolution simple, fast and low-cost, out-of-
court procedures for consumers to seek redress will also soon become 
available throughout the EU. 
DEEPENING EU-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS: WHAT, WHY AND HOW?  183 
 
Implementation perspectives 
Although a system for the protection of consumer rights in Ukraine was 
first set up more than 25 years ago, further efforts are necessary to 
ensure that the system is effective, efficient and aligned with EU 
regulations.  
For Ukraine, the key task is to find a proper balance among 
consumer rights protection, a reduction in the administrative burden 
on businesses and the elimination of corruption incentives associated 
with state control functions. For instance, in 2016, a moratorium on 
state inspections of entrepreneurs with a turnover below UAH 20 
million was introduced. This decision was welcomed by businesses 
while being lambasted by representatives of consumer rights 
protection organisations who claimed that it undermined consumer 
safety.  
Recently, several public inspections and services were 
reorganised into a single State Service on Food Safety and Consumer 
Protection (SPSA) to streamline the control functions of the state and 
reduce the control burden on businesses. The SPSA was officially 
launched in 2016 as a key public body responsible for implementing 
consumer rights protection policy. It is subordinated to the Ministry of 
Agrarian Policy and Food, which raised doubts about the competence 
of the supervisory authority to implement consumer rights protection 
over non-food products.  
There is no specific agency responsible for consumer rights 
protection in the field of finance, which, given the very low level of 
financial literacy of the population is a highly sensitive issue. Several 
draft laws to improve the system of consumer rights protection in 
financial services and enhance the role of the central bank in minimum 
requirements regarding financial information disclosure are currently 
considered by the Parliament.280  
Apart from the SPSA, several other public authorities are 
responsible for consumer rights protection in specific areas, for 
example:  
 National Commission for the State Regulation of 
Communications and Information281 – communication services; 
                                                        
280 See www.bank.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/ 
printable_article?art_id=27325737&showTitle=true.  
281 See http://nkrzi.gov.ua/index.php?r=site/index&pg=77&language=uk.  
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 State Labour Services282 – social services; 
 State Administration on Medical Products283 – pharmaceutical 
products; 
 State Inspection on Architecture and Construction284 – 
construction norms; and 
 State Inspection on Maritime and River Transport Safety – 
maritime and river transportation.  
The law ‘On Consumer Rights Protection’ (1991; last amended in 
2015)285 remains a key legal act regulating the mutual rights and 
obligations of consumers and providers of goods and services, as well 
as consumer protection mechanisms.  
However, recent reforms in the areas of technical standards for 
industrial and food products (TBT and SPS) bring Ukraine’s legislation 
much closer to the EU legislation. In 2015, a new edition of the Law on 
General Product Safety286 was passed in Ukraine, aligned with the 
respective EU directive. There are several other important laws 
enhancing consumer protection, including: 
- Law on State Market Surveillance and Control over Non-Food 
Products (2010, last amended 2015),287  
- Law on Key Principles and Requirements regarding Food Safety 
and Quality (1997, last amended 2015),288  
- Law on Liability for Damage Caused by a Defect in the Product 
(2011).289  
Ukraine has also made significant progress in the adoption of 
technical regulations and standards harmonised with the EU norms.  
Although more efforts are necessary to harmonise legislation, an 
urgent task is to ensure adequate state control over the implementation 
of consumer protection norms executed by the SPSA and other 
                                                        
282 See http://dsp.gov.ua/.  
283 See www.diklz.gov.ua/control/main/uk/index. 
284 See http://dabi.gov.ua/.  
285 See http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1023-12.  
286 See http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2736-17.  
287 See http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2735-17.  
288 See http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/771/97-%D0%B2%D1%80.  
289 See http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3390-17.  
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involved authorities. These efforts also require the establishment of an 
adequate quality infrastructure.  
The involvement of civil society activists in consumer rights 
protection is an important complement to the public authorities. There 
are multiple NGOs involved in consumer rights protection, including 
the All-Ukrainian Federation of Consumers ‘Puls’; the All-Ukrainian 
Association in Consumer Rights Protection Issues; the Civic Control of 
Consumer Rights Protection; the Institute for Consumer Expertise; and 
the All-Ukrainian Union of Consumers of Ukraine etc. Most of these 
NGOs have a network of regional representative offices.  
There is also the Spojivach.info newspaper, disseminated both in 
paper and electronic versions,290 which discusses issues related to 
consumer rights protection and the efforts of producers to improve 
product safety and quality.   
One of the most well-known consumer rights public campaigns 
is the Youth for Consumer Rights movement organised by students of 
Kyiv National University of Trade and Economics.291 The 
representatives of this movement conducted comparative testing of 
products, wide awareness-raising campaigns, consultations on 
consumer rights protection and organised several ‘Consumer Fests’. 
 
Consumer Protection at a glance  
Ukraine started building a system of consumer rights protection since 
independence, but with questionable success. A key task is to find a proper 
balance among consumers rights protection, a reduced administrative 
burden on businesses and the elimination of corruption. 
AA requires approximation to relevant EU acquis in the consumer 
protection field within 3 years of the entry into force of the Agreement.  
Ukraine’s obligations in the area of consumer protection under the AA can 
be divided into several categories. First: general commitments related to 
information exchange and improvement of information provided to 
consumers, etc. Second: obligations related to an approximation of 
legislation concerning product safety, but also institutional and 
administrative procedures of protection of consumers and the enforcement 
of consumer rights. 
                                                        
290 See http://spojivach.info/.  
291 See http://consumer.at.ua/.  
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21. COMPANY LAW 
To further support Ukraine’s transition 
to a fully functioning market economy 
and to create a stable environment for 
investment, the Association Agreement 
includes a brief chapter on company 
law, corporate governance, accounting 
and auditing.292 This chapter entails a 
relatively soft provision on Ukrainian 
cooperation with the EU in these areas.  
Company law. In the area of 
company law, to improve the protection of shareholders, creditors and 
other stakeholders, Ukraine “undertakes” to approximate a list of EU 
company law directives, included in Annex XXXIV. In particular, 
Directive2009/101/EC293 requires companies with limited liability to 
disclose basic information and documents relating to, for example, their 
instruments of constitution and statutes, annual accounts and other 
rules for the management of the company. This information has to be 
recorded in a file opened in a central register, commercial register or 
company register, made available in electronic format and published in 
a national gazette or by other means.  
Ukrainian legislation in 2016 complies with most if not all the 
rules of this Directive. In 2014 and 2015, parliament revised the law on 
company registration.294 As a result, the registration of companies 
became easier, with the goal of completing formalities in 24 hours. It 
                                                        
292 See Title V Chapter 13. 
293 Directive 2009/101/EC replaced Directive 68/151/EEC. 
294 In November 2015, parliament recast the business registration law in a new 
edition. See Law 835-VIII from 26 November 2015 
(http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/835-19/). 
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also added annual accounts and foundation documents to the business 
registries. Access to business registry information was extended and 
includes the disclosures required by Directive 2009/101/EC. Ukrainian 
corporate law also seems to comply with the rules on formation and 
nullity of companies. 
Another important area of company law, covered by Directive 
2012/30/EU,295 aims at protecting shareholders and creditors of public 
limited liability companies (PLCs) by fixing rules for creating and 
running companies and for increasing or reducing their capital. It 
requires that the company statutes include certain information, such as 
the objectives of the company, the details of its share capital and various 
rules for managing the company. The Directive sets the minimum 
capital requirement for an EU PLC at €25,000. It also regulates the 
distribution of dividends as well as the issue and acquisition of shares.  
Ukrainian corporate law296 largely complies with the key 
provisions of Directive 2012/30/EU and also Directive 2004/25/EC on 
takeover bids. There are some provisions that are not completely 
harmonised. For example, there are no rules in Ukrainian corporate law 
on indirect ownership of own shares by a company. Also, the list of 
issues that have to be decided at a shareholders’ meeting is rather 
vague. The National Securities and Stock Market Commission 
(NSSMC) prepared a draft law that is supposed to implement the EU 
rules on corporate governance and shareholders’ rights, including 
Directive Nos. 2012/30/EU and 2007/36/EC, as well as Commission 
Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC297 (explained 
below) and published it for comments. As of May 2016, this draft law 
has not progressed through parliament.  
Ukrainian law also has basic provisions regarding single-
member companies, notably on those that are single-member limited 
liability companies, but there are gaps regarding single-shareholder 
stock companies. A draft law integrating Directive 2009/102/EC, 
which clarifies the status of these companies and actions by a sole 
shareholder, was circulated for comments by the Ministry of Economic 
                                                        
295 Directive 2012/30/EU replaced Directive 77/91/EEC. 
296 In addition to the Business Registration Law (see above), other important 
corporate laws are the Company Law (Law 1576-XII of 19 September 1991, 
http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/1576-12), Stock Company Law (Law 514-VI of 
17 September 2015) and the Commercial Code 
(http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/436-15). 
297 See the website of the NSSMC (http://nssmc.gov.ua/law/19903). 
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Development and Trade in July 2015.298 So far, no further action on this 
draft law has been reported. 
In addition, Annex XXXIV includes several other EU directives 
in the area of company law that Ukraine has to put into effect within 
two to four years after the Agreement enters into force (Table 21.1). 
Table 21.1 EU Directives on company law in the EU-Ukraine Agreement 
Directive Substance 
Council Directive 78/855/EEC 
concerning mergers of PLCs 
(replaced by Directive 2011/35/EU) 
Deals with mergers between PLCs 
in a single EU country. 
Council Directive 82/891/EEC 
concerning the division of PLCs (as 
amended by Directive No. 
2007/63/EC) 
Deals with the division of PLCs in 
a single EU country. 
Council Directive 89/666/EEC 
concerning disclosure 
requirements in respect of 
branches opened in a member 
state by certain types of companies 
governed by the law of another 
state  
Introduces disclosure 
requirements for foreign branches 
of companies. 
Directive 89/667/EEC on single-
member private limited liability 
companies (repealed by Directive 
2009/102/EC) 
Provides a framework for setting 
up a single-member company (in 
which all shares are held by a 
single shareholder). 
Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover 
bids 
Establishes minimum guidelines 
for the conduct of takeover bids 
involving the securities of 
companies, where all or some of 
those securities are admitted to 
trading on a regulated market.  
                                                        
298 See the website of the Ministry for Economic Development and Trade 
(www.me.gov.ua/Documents/Detail?lang=uk-UA&id=d90c5b29-d47e-41ec-
bc50-
b2612c6438df&title=ProektZakonuUkrainiproVnesenniaZminDoDeiakikhZak
onodavchikhAktivUkrainiSchodoTovaristv-
YakiSkladaiutsiaZOdnogoUchasnika). 
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Directive 2004/109/EC on the 
harmonisation of transparency 
requirements in relation to 
information about issuers whose 
securities are admitted to trading 
on a regulated market (amended by 
Directive 2013/50/EU)  
Seeks to improve information 
supplied to investors about issuers 
of securities admitted to trading on 
a regulated market. This 
transparency Directive was 
amended in 2013 by Directive 
2013/50/EU, which aims at 
reducing the administrative 
burden for SMEs. 
Directive 2007/36/EC on the 
exercise of certain rights of 
shareholders in listed companies 
Establishes rules to help exercise 
shareholders’ rights at general 
meetings of companies that have 
their registered office in an EU 
country and are listed on an 
official stock exchange. 
Source: Annex XXXIV of the EU-Ukraine Agreement. 
Accounting and auditing. Here Ukraine is to harmonise its 
legislation with Council Directive 78/660/EEC on the annual accounts 
of certain types of companies and Council Directive 83/349/EEC on 
consolidated accounts. These two directives have since been replaced 
by Directive 2013/34/EU, which simplifies and reduces the 
administrative burdens for firms. It is intended to facilitate greater EU 
cross-border comparability of accounts. It also introduces mandatory 
requirements for disclosing payments by companies in the extractive 
and logging of primary forest industries to government agencies.  
Ukraine will also need to approximate Regulation 
1606/2002/EC on the application of international accounting 
standards. This regulation requires EU companies to prepare their 
accounts in accordance with international accounting standards (IAS) 
and international financial reporting standards (IFRS). These standards 
are issued by the International Accounting Standards Board. Ukrainian 
law already requires reporting based on IAS and IFRS for public 
companies, including all banks. The government introduced draft Law 
4646 to parliament, which covers those provisions of Directive 
2013/34/EU that have not yet been incorporated into Ukrainian 
legislation, including IFRS reporting requirements for companies in 
extractive industries, simplified reporting for microenterprises as 
defined by EU rules and a reduction of the required primary 
documents. As of May 2016, this draft law had not progressed through 
parliament. 
190  PART III. ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
 
Corporate governance. The EU and Ukraine agreed to cooperate 
on the further development of corporate governance policy in line with 
international standards (i.e. the OECD Principles on Corporate 
Governance), as well as gradual approximation to the EU legislation 
listed in Annex XXXVI. This includes Commission Recommendation 
2004/913/EC on fostering an appropriate regime for the remuneration 
of directors of listed companies and Recommendation 2005/162/EC on 
the role of non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies 
and the committees of the supervisory board. After the financial crisis, 
these two recommendations were completed by Recommendation 
2009/385/EC. With regard to the structure of the policy on directors’ 
remuneration, these recommendations require a balance between fixed 
and variable remuneration, with the allocation of the variable 
component conditioned on performance criteria. Termination 
payments (‘golden parachutes’) should also be subject to various 
limitations. Each listed company should publish a statement on these 
aspects of its remuneration policy.  
In 2014, the Ukrainian securities regulator (NSSMC) approved a 
new version of the Corporate Governance guidelines,299 which seems 
to be based on the OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance. The 
rules on the remuneration of directors and independent board 
members are yet to be implemented in Ukraine, but they are partially 
addressed in the 2015 revision of stock company law that took effect in 
May 2016. Corporate law now allows independent directors to be 
appointed to a supervisory board of a company. Independent directors 
are optional for private sector corporations, but state-controlled ones 
are required to appoint at least two independent directors. 
Independent directors have to chair and constitute a majority of 
members in the audit and remuneration committees of supervisory 
boards for state-controlled companies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
299 See the NSSMC Decision 755 of 25 July 2014 and 
http://nssmc.gov.ua/law/18922. 
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Company law at a glance 
The Association Agreement does not impose strict obligations on Ukraine 
in the area of company law, corporate governance or accounting. Instead, it 
provides a framework of EU company law for Ukraine to implement.  
Ukraine has moved to transpose EU rules relatively quickly. Some 
provisions have already been incorporated and draft changes to legislation 
have been prepared for some of the remaining key provisions. 
Alignment with these provisions of EU company law will improve 
Ukraine’s business climate and help to create a transparent environment for 
companies, including an appropriate level of protection for company 
shareholders and creditors. 
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22. AGRICULTURE 
 
Sometimes referred to as ‘the bread 
basket of Europe’, Ukraine’s expanses of 
rich black earth endow it with both a 
huge capacity and potential in the 
agricultural and food sectors. Necessary 
reforms to the farm sector were slow to 
get under way in the post-Soviet period, 
but are now progressing well.  
 
Provisions of the Agreement 
The text states that: “the Parties shall cooperate to promote agricultural 
and rural policies, in particular through progressive convergence of 
policies and legislation”. It goes on to list general objectives, such as 
improving competitiveness, exchanging best practices and promoting 
modern and sustainable agricultural production (Arts 403-404).  
Art. 405 says that “the parties will support gradual 
approximation to relevant EU law and standards”, in particular those 
listed in Annex XXXVIII, which contains 58 EU laws that constitute the 
essence of the EU’s agricultural policy (see Box 22.1). These include the 
mechanisms of market organisation and support measures for specific 
commodities and rules for direct income support payments for farmers.  
There are no timeframes stipulated for approximation, however, 
and the texts are careful to say that the listed regulations “constitute the 
legislative references when gradual approximation of legislation in a 
specific sector or product is considered by the Ukrainian side” 
(introductory phrase in Annex XXXVIII).  
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Box 22.1 Summary of EU agricultural policy laws referred to in the 
Agreement 
Quality policy, 7 regulations. These set the rules for the protection 
of geographic indications and traditional specialities. 
Organic farming, 3 regulations that set rules for organic 
production and the labelling of organic products. 
Genetically modified crops, 1 recommendation offering guidelines 
for the coexistence of genetically modified crops and conventional and 
organic farming. 
Biodiversity, 1 regulation that establishes a programme in the EU 
for conservation of genetic resources in agriculture. 
Marketing standards for plants and derived products, fruit and 
vegetables, 33 regulations and directives. These mostly set technical 
standards for the marketing of specific commodities, as well as basic 
regulations on the organisation of markets and direct support schemes.  
Marketing standards for live animals and animal products, 14 
regulations and directives that mostly set technical standards for the 
marketing of specific commodities, as well as for the common 
organisation of markets.  
 
The subsequently agreed Association Agenda document of 16 
March 2015 defines the approach as follows: “The Parties cooperate to 
support Ukraine … to prepare for implementation of EU acquis 
mentioned in relevant annexes of the Association Agreement, in 
particular through enhanced activities of the established agricultural 
dialogue”.  
While the texts might suggest different legal interpretations of 
precisely what commitments Ukraine is undertaking, the overall 
message is that Ukraine retains much flexibility over how far or how 
fast to replicate elements of EU farm policy. 
The policy dialogue, which takes place in a Sub-Committee of 
the Association Council, is supported by technical assistance projects. 
One of these supports the improvement of the land market in line with 
best EU practices, concerning land law, the land cadastre and related 
administrative structures (€1.8 million). Another aims to strengthen the 
capacity of the Ministry of Agrarian Policy to implement its 2015-20 
strategy (€3 million).  
The EU can also help with funding and investment; for example 
in October 2015 the European Investment Bank (EIB) agreed to provide 
€400 million of loan funding for projects to modernise Ukraine's 
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agricultural infrastructure and to develop aquaculture. Key investment 
gaps to be addressed include agricultural field machinery; drying, 
storage, processing and logistics capacity; and investments in 
aquaculture. The loan will also be available for investment in public 
sector infrastructure, such as testing laboratories, research and 
vocational training facilities and fish-stock monitoring capacity that 
supports the sustainable flow of produce from producer to consumer 
along these value chains. 
Developments in Ukraine’s agriculture sector and 
policy 
Ukraine’s natural resources are well suited for agricultural production, 
with 69% of its territory allocated to agriculture, much of which is the 
especially fertile chornozem soil (black earth). Another important 
advantage is the year-round access to deep port capacities on the Black 
Sea coast, which are crucial for grain exports. A well-developed crop 
production sector provides cheap feed and raw materials for animal 
farming and the food industry. Ukraine is already the world’s largest 
sunflower oil exporter and a leading wheat and poultry exporter.  
On the other hand, a continuing lack of financial resources at the 
enterprise level, an underdeveloped infrastructure and arbitrary state 
regulations hold back productivity growth. Average yields of wheat, 
corn, rape seed and sunflower seed are all lower than in neighbouring 
Poland, despite better natural conditions. Changes in agricultural 
policy could remove the factors hampering the huge potential of 
Ukraine’s agricultural production. 
The most crucial agricultural reform in the history of 
independent Ukraine took place in the 1990s, when the land of former 
collective farms was distributed among workers and rural employees. 
The distribution of formerly collectively owned land continued until 
2001, and in 2002 the government imposed a moratorium on the sale of 
agricultural land, which is still in force at the time of writing. As of 2016 
there are 13 million landowners, with farms averaging 2.5 hectares in 
size. The majority of these landowners are of retirement age and only 
have limited access to credit resources because of high interest rates, 
the underdeveloped system of agricultural credits and lack of collateral 
security. As a result, the majority of owners do not cultivate the land 
themselves, but rent it to enterprises. 
Another important element of agricultural policy is financial 
support for producers. Due to the constant shortage of budgetary 
resources, Ukraine built a support system that relies not on direct 
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payments but on tax privileges and exemptions. Specifically, the 
Parliament established a fixed agricultural tax in 1999, which allowed 
producers to reduce their tax payments. Further, in 2009 Parliament 
adopted a special VAT regime for farmers, allowing them to keep the 
VAT collected on their sales, instead of passing it to the state. Together, 
according to OECD estimates, the fixed agricultural tax and special 
VAT regime constituted 93% of all support to agriculture in 2014. 
Expert opinions differ about the effectiveness of this system. According 
to one expert,300 this support is adequate and at EU level, if account is 
also taken of the very low rent prices for agricultural land in Ukraine. 
Another expert301 finds that since 2011 support is insignificant, given 
the absence of VAT refunds for grain exporters. Overall, Ukrainian 
agricultural policy in 1991-2013 lacked consistency and transparency. It 
only partly managed to reform the system left by Soviet-era 
agricultural regulation. 
However, in 2014-15, several important reforms were 
undertaken. They were guided by the Coalition Agreement and by the 
“Strategy for Sustainable Development: Ukraine-2020” document, 
drawn up in compliance with a memorandum of understanding with 
the IMF. Also, in 2015 the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food, with 
the support of Ukrainian and EU experts, developed a strategy and 
action plan for 2015-20 to guide agricultural reforms over the next five 
years.302 
Decentralisation measures dominated the agricultural reforms of 
2014-15, cancelling much unnecessary legislation with immediate effect 
and mostly without creating new regulations. Overall, 56 agricultural 
permits and procedures were cancelled, creating estimated savings of 
12 billion UAH for Ukraine’s economy. In particular, Parliament 
cancelled grain quality certificates, the mandatory certification of 
warehouses on compliance of services for grain and the licensing of 
import of plant protection products. The issuing of the phytosanitary 
certificates was accelerated and the registration of nitrogenous 
fertilisers simplified. Various other permits regarding transportation of 
                                                        
300 See http://agroportal.ua/views/blogs/ekonomika-agrarnoi-
gospodderzhki-es-i-ukrainy/. 
301 See http://voxukraine.org/2015/02/23/is-ukrainian-agriculture-
subsidized/. 
302 Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine, “Single and 
Comprehensive Strategy and Action Plan for Agriculture and Rural 
Development in Ukraine for 2015-2020”, October 2015.  
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plant products, the import of agrichemicals, livestock certification, food 
safety, fisheries etc. were also cancelled.  
Much work was undertaken to harmonise Ukraine’s agri-food 
legislation with that of the EU. Parliament adopted laws on food safety, 
feed quality control, identification and registration of animals and 
animal by-products. As a result, Ukrainian dairy produce and egg 
exporters gained access to the EU market in 2015. This harmonisation 
also facilitated successful negotiations regarding the export of dairy 
products from Ukraine to China. Also, in February 2016 companies 
already exporting poultry to EU received the permission to export their 
products to the United Arab Emirates. In future, the harmonisation of 
Ukrainian laws with those of the EU will open the EU market for the 
export of Ukrainian pork and beef products and grain seeds. 
Other agricultural reforms include expanding the access to 
financial support for small and medium producers (the refund of 
building costs related to animal farming); creating a single institution 
responsible for consumer protection, sanitary and epidemiological 
service, veterinary and phytosanitary service; and preparing 86 state-
owned agricultural companies for privatisation. These reforms will 
improve enterprises’ access to financial resources, decrease 
administrative burdens on producers and lead to better management 
of land resources. 
On the other hand, some aspects of agricultural policy in 2015 
were controversial. One of the most notable was the prolongation of the 
moratorium on land sales until 2017. As a result, farmers are still unable 
to use their land as collateral security for loan finance and therefore 
have restricted access to financing. According to the 2020 strategy 
documents, there should be a land market pilot project in 2016. Its 
implementation remains to be seen. 
Another issue generating heated debate was the reform of the 
agricultural tax system. Specifically, Parliament decided to cancel the 
special VAT tax regime for agricultural producers from 2017, and from 
2016 reduce the amount of VAT that producers are allowed to keep for 
themselves (by 85% for producers of grains and technical cultures, by 
20% for animal producers and by 50% for producers of other 
agricultural products). At the same time, Parliament approved the 
restoration of VAT refunds to grain exporters. These changes to the tax 
system, which were demanded by the IMF, will contribute to the 
creation of a more transparent tax system.  On the other hand, the 
special VAT regime was the most crucial part of the state support for 
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agriculture. Its cancellation needs to be matched by the increased 
efficiency of direct state support to the sector. 
According to the Strategy Action Plan, the main topics of 
agricultural policy in 2016 will be: reform of various governmental 
structures; continuation of deregulation and harmonisation with EU 
laws; preparation for launching the land market; privatisation of state 
enterprises; the abolition of food price regulations and the 
implementation instead of a direct support system. 
In the first half of 2016 agricultural reforms lost momentum due 
to increased political uncertainty and the dismissal of the government. 
Consequently, there have been no significant legislative changes, only 
the implementation of reforms that started in 2015. However, in April 
2016 the new government was elected, with a new minister for 
agriculture. There is hope that agricultural reforms will restart from 
June 2016. 
 
Agricultural policy at a glance  
Ukraine has a huge capacity and potential in the agri-food sector. 
Reforms in the post-Soviet period got off to a slow, but are now seriously 
under way. 
The contribution of the Agreement is essentially through policy dialogue, 
supported by technical assistance and investment finance. 
The Agreement contains many references to EU agricultural legislation, 
but there is flexibility in the extent to which this should be applied, with no 
binding timetables. 
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23. EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL 
POLICY 
This chapter of the Association 
Agreement seeks to promote cooperation 
over a large part of EU labour law and 
related conditions of work, much of 
which is closely related to the content of 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
conventions. A major reform of the 
Ukrainian Labour Code is currently 
before the parliament and is long 
overdue, modernising the Code 
inherited from the Soviet period.  
Provisions of the Agreement 
The Agreement sets out (in Annex XXIX) a comprehensive agenda for 
gradual approximation under three basic headings: labour law, anti-
discrimination and gender equality and health and safety at work. The 
first two headings cover basic principles of the labour code, which leave 
a wide margin of flexibility as to how onerous the implementing 
provisions may be. For example, one can compare the broad range of 
actual policies followed by different EU member states, all of which are 
in conformity with EU law. This is important when considering how to 
ensure that approximation of the EU legislation does not impose 
excessive costs in Ukraine.   
There is a close relationship between the content of many EU 
directives and ILO conventions, as explained in Box 23.1.  
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Box 23.1 Relationships between EU employment and social directives and 
ILO conventions 
Quotation from an official EU document: 
“There is an interplay between EU labour law, the European 
Social Charter and ILO Conventions: EU law, in particular the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, takes into account the European Social Charter 
and ILO Conventions and in turn influences the evolving content and 
monitoring of the latter instruments. 
All EU member states are also members of the ILO. The EU is 
committed to promoting the ILO’s Decent Work agenda to promote 
rights at work, encourage decent employment opportunities, enhance 
social protection and strengthen social dialogue on work-related issues.  
All EU countries have ratified the core labour standards – that is, 
the fundamental ILO Conventions on freedom of association, collective 
bargaining, forced and child labour, equal remuneration and the 
elimination of discrimination. EU countries have also ratified the ILO 
Governance Conventions on labour inspection, employment policy and 
tripartite consultations, as well as a considerable number of other ILO 
Conventions.  
While ILO standards cover a wider range of areas than those in 
which the EU is competent to legislate and EU law often goes beyond 
the minimum provisions of ILO Conventions, the principles that 
underlie the action of both organisations are similar. There is much 
common ground in the content of EU Directives and ILO Conventions, 
with EU law reinforcing ILO standards. Directives on issues such as 
working time and young workers (see Chapter 3) explicitly seek to take 
into account relevant ILO standards. 
The protection, realisation and enforcement of core labour 
standards as well as the promotion of the ratification and effective 
application of other up-to-date ILO Conventions underpinning the 
Decent Work Agenda, are part of a growing number of bilateral 
agreements between EU and third countries, such as the new generation 
of EU free trade agreements. The follow-up mechanisms of these 
agreements include monitoring mechanisms involving social partners.”  
Source: Extracted from: “Labour law and working conditions”, Social Europe Guide, 
Vol. 6, European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs 
and Inclusion, February 2014. For a detailed analysis, see “Analysis – in the light of 
the European Union acquis – of ILO up to date Conventions”, European Commission 
Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, June 2013. 
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Labour law. The individual employment conditions Directive 
(991/533/EEC) establishes the employer’s obligation to inform 
employees in writing of the conditions applicable to the contract or 
employment relationship. The aim of the Directive is to provide 
employees with improved protection, to avoid uncertainty and 
insecurity about the terms of the employment relationship and to create 
greater transparency on the labour market.  
The fixed-term contract Directive (1999/70/EC) aims to improve 
the quality of fixed-term work by ensuring the application of the 
principle of non-discrimination and to prevent abuses arising from the 
use of successive fixed-term employment contracts. The part-time 
contract Directive (97/81/EC) sets out to eliminate unjustified 
discrimination against part-time workers and improve the quality of 
part-time work. It also aims to facilitate the development of part-time 
work on a voluntary basis and contribute to the flexible organisation of 
working time in a way that takes account of employers’ and workers’ 
needs.  
The Directive on collective redundancies (98/59/EC) sets out 
requirements for the information to be given to workers on the reasons, 
the numbers and categories of workers concerned, and of redundancy 
compensations payments. The public authorities have to be notified, 
and the redundancies cannot be effective within 30 days of this 
notification.  
These directives require approximation within three to four 
years.  
Anti-discrimination and gender equality. This section includes 
four directives aiming at anti-discrimination and gender equality in 
general terms, with two more specific directives concerning parental 
leave and conditions for pregnant workers.  
The employment equality framework Directive (2000/78/EC) is a 
key part of EU labour law, which aims to combat discrimination in 
conditions of work or contract on grounds of disability, sexual 
orientation, religion or belief and age in the workplace. This framework 
directive accompanies the equal treatment Directive on gender 
(2004/113/EC) and the racial equality Directive (2000/43/EC). 
The equal treatment Directive on gender prohibits any less 
favourable treatment of men or women by reason of gender, or of 
women due to pregnancy or maternity. It also prohibits sexual 
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harassment. A detailed analysis of this directive has been published by 
the European Commission.303  
The racial equality Directive implements the principle of equal 
treatment between people, irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. It gives 
protection against discrimination in employment and training, 
education, social protection and gives victims of discrimination a right 
to make a complaint through a judicial or administrative procedure. It 
further provides for the establishment of organisations to promote 
equal treatment and assistance to victims of racial discrimination.  
The Directives on parental leave (96/34/EC) provides for three 
months of leave; the Directive on pregnant workers (92/85/EEC) 
prohibits work that risk engendering health and safety and also for 
leave before and/or after confinement of 14 weeks.   
Health and safety at work.  The centrepiece is the Framework 
Directive for health and safety at work (89 /391/EEC). The scope of the 
directive is expansive, applying to all sectors including industry, 
agriculture, commerce and services. The Directive describes employer 
obligations, which include providing workers with information and 
safety training, taking necessary measures for first aid and fire-fighting. 
This Directive is limited to setting out general principles. It is to be 
approximated by Ukraine in a relatively short period of three years, but 
its concrete implementation will depend more on a family of 27 
implementing directives, specifying which the safety requirements for 
particularly dangerous products, such as carcinogens or explosives, or 
the working environment in specific industries such as construction 
sites or underground mineral extraction.  
Some examples illustrate the substance of the specific directives. 
The Directive for protection against asbestos (83/18/EEC) reduces the limit 
value for occupational exposure of workers to asbestos at 0.1 fibres per 
cm3, while the Directive for safety against noise (2003/10/EC) sets the 
exposure limit value at 87 decibels. An example of particular 
significance for the coal mining industry in Ukraine, which suffers a 
high incidence of tragic mining accidents, is a Directive on the minimum 
requirements for improving the safety in surface and underground mineral-
extracting industries (92/104/EEC), which sets out a comprehensive set 
of minimum standards. 
                                                        
303 Susanne Burri and Sacha Prechal, “EU Gender Equality Law - Update 2013”, 
European Network of Legal Experts in Gender Law, European Commission, 
Directorate-General for Justice Unit JUST/D/1 , Theme - Equal Treatment 
Legislation. 
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Implementation perspectives 
According to the Association Agreement Ukraine should ensure 
“gradual approximation” of its labour regulation to the EU law, as well 
as ratify ILO conventions. The parties agreed to “strengthen their 
dialogue and cooperation on promoting the decent work agenda, 
employment policy, health and safety at work, social dialogue, social 
protection, social inclusion, gender equality and non-discrimination” 
(Art. 419). Important legislative reforms are currently under way in 
Ukraine, which will be largely consistent with the provisions of the 
Agreement.  
Ukraine has already ratified all fundamental ILO conventions 
and core standards, which are mostly taken into account in the effective 
legislation. 
The main legislative act regulating the labour market in Ukraine 
is the Labour Code, inherited from the former Soviet Union.304 It was 
amended many times since Ukraine became independent. However, it 
remained very rigid, providing de jure little flexibility on the labour 
market. It focuses on rights and guarantees for employees, while 
paying little attention to employers (dismissal of employees is very 
difficult). The Code does not have specific provisions on mass 
redundancies. Actual rigidities are lower in practice as law enforcement 
is poor, which leaves employees without adequate protection and puts 
employers at risk of penalties if a violation is identified.305  
Heated debates on the approval of new Labour Code have been 
ongoing for many years, but a new law taking account of the new 
realities of the market economy and modern labour market 
requirements has not yet been approved. A new Draft Code was 
submitted to Parliament at the end of 2014 (draft law No. 1658), and 
approved in its first reading on 5 November, 2015. The new law 
envisages more flexibility in labour relations and more rights provided 
to employers. According to the Ministry of Social Policy, the provisions 
of the draft Labour Code comply with EU legislation. At the same time, 
Ukrainian trade unions announced their plans to refer it to the 
European Commission to analyse its compliance with the Association 
                                                        
304 The current Labour Code was approved in 1971 (the Law No. 322-VIII, from 
10 December 1971. 
305 O. Betliy and L. Feiler (2011), “Flexicurity and the Role of Lifelong Learning 
in Ukraine”, European Training Foundation. 
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Agreement.306 Taking into account the lack of consensus between major 
stakeholders (government, trade unions and representatives of 
employers), on 12 November 2015 the text of the draft Labour Code was 
sent to the ILO with the request to analyse its compliance with 
international standards and ILO Conventions. The ILO position on the 
draft is expected by July 2016, hopefully unblocking the process for 
adopting the new Labour Code adoption. 
The major differences with the current version of the Labour 
Code include: - Written contract become compulsory. - Employers will have a right to dismiss employee for skills 
mismatch, publication of official secrets and violation of labour 
safety rules.  - The working week is to be limited to 40 hours, but could be 
increased to 44 hours upon the agreement of both sides. - There will be regulation of flexible work schedule and work from 
home. - There is a provision against gender discrimination. - The list of reasons for fixed-term contracts is to be extended.  - The redundancy payment is to be increased.  
Overall, these changes seem to be mostly in compliance with the 
Association Agreement. However, the Rada failed to include an article 
on the prohibition of discrimination based on person’s sexual 
orientation at the labour market. Instead, on November 12, 2015 
members of the Rada introduced this provision into the current version 
of the Labour Code in order to fulfil obligations taken in the Visa 
Liberalisation Action Plan. It was promised that the provision on the 
prohibition of discrimination based on a person’s sexual orientation 
would be included in the new Labour Code before it is put to vote in 
the second reading. 
Another essential regulation of labour relations is the Law on 
Employment of the Population, which was finally approved in 2012 
after long discussions,307 replacing the law of 1991.308 This law regulates 
                                                        
306 Trade unions claim that protection of employees’ rights decline in the draft 
Labour Code as compared to the effective Labour Code. In particular, they refer 
also to poor law enforcement and possible abuse by new provisions on the side 
of employers, which might result in worse protection of employee’s rights. 
307 The Law No. 5067–VI from 5 July 2012, became effective in 2013.  
308 Law on employment of the population, No. 03-XII from 1 March 1991. 
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many labour market issues, such as rights of employees, guarantees in 
case of job loss, condition for unemployment benefits and various 
active labour market. The law also contains provisions on collective 
redundancies, which comply with the respective EU directive.309  
Health and safety at work. The Constitution of Ukraine states 
that every person has a right to safe and healthy work conditions (Art. 
43). Major legislative acts that regulate safety at work include the Law 
on Labour Protection, the Law on Compulsory State Insurance in Case 
of Working Accidents and Occupational Diseases, and a number of 
normative acts.  
The Law on Labour Protection was approved in 1992, revised in 
2002 and later amended several times.310 According to the law 
employers should inform an employee of the working conditions, and 
the presence at the workplace of hazardous and harmful factors. There 
are provisions for special clothing, footwear and other personal 
protective equipment for those working in dangerous environments. 
The employer is also responsible for financing regular medical checks 
and work safety measures. Such provisions mostly comply with the EU 
Framework Directive for health and safety311 (including Directive 
92/104/EEC for mineral-extracting industries), although the Directive 
has a larger list of employers’ responsibilities than Ukrainian 
legislation. However, law enforcement remains low, especially in the 
coal mining sector, which sees many deaths due to violation of work 
safety requirements.312 There is no real procedure to prosecute people 
guilty of causing accidents at work. Moreover, the system of work 
accident insurance is inefficient.313 Firms have no incentive to invest in 
work safety as their insurance premium remains unchanged.  
The Cabinet of Ministers has approved a list of measures 
required for the implementation of the EU directives that should be 
                                                        
309 This Law defines the definition of the collective (mass) redundancies and 
broadly defines policies related to these issues. In turn, current Draft Labour 
Code envisages measures that could be taken by employers to reduce the risk 
of collective redundancies.  
310 Law on labour protection, No. 2694-XII from 14 October 1992. 
311 Directive 89/391/EEC from 12 June 1989. 
312 E.g. not all miners carry gas meters with them and cannot check whether the 
gas level exceeds safety norms.  
313 “Reforming the work accident insurance in Ukraine: Introducing economic 
incentives and private sector competition”, Policy Paper V20, GAG/IER. 
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incorporated into national legislation by August 2017.314 The Ministry 
of Social Policy has already approved the implementation plans of 
these directives.315 National legislation is already mostly compliant 
with EU norms (see Table 23.1). Moreover, the State Labour Service has 
already approved the implementation plan of several individual 
directives316 related to the Framework Directive for health and safety 
(89/391/EEC),317 including those concerning display screen equipment 
(90/270/EEC), temporary or mobile construction sites (92/57/EEC), 
mineral-extracting industries (92/104/EEC and 92/91/EEC) and use of 
work equipment (2009/104/EEC).  
Table 23.1 Implementation plans of EU directives on labour issues 
Directive 
Status of compliance of 
national legislation 
with the provisions of 
directives 
Deadline for 
implementati
on 
Directive 2001/23/EC: 
safeguarding of employees' rights in 
the event of transfers of 
undertakings 
Partial compliance 2016 
Directive 2002/14/EC: informing 
and consulting employees Mostly in compliance*  
December 
2016  
Directive 97/81/EU: part-time 
work Mostly in compliance* 
Additional 
analysis might 
be conducted 
in 2016 
Directive 91/383/EЕС: fixed-
duration or temporary employment 
relationship 
Mostly in compliance 2015 
                                                        
314 The CMU Resolution No. 847-р, 17 September 2014 
(http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/847-2014-%D1%80).  
315 See www.mlsp.gov.ua/labour/control/uk/publish/article?art_id= 
171876&cat_id=168553.   
316 Namely, Directive 90/270/EEC from 29 May 1990, Directive 92/57/EEC 
from 24 June 1992, Directive 92/104/EEC from 3 December 1992, Directive 
92/91/EEC from 3 November 1992 and Directive 2009/104/EEC from 16 
September 2009. 
317 The CMU Resolution No. 745-р from 17 July 2015 
(http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/745-2015-%D1%80).   
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Directive 91/533/EЕС: obligation 
to inform employees Partial compliance 2016 
Directive 1999/70/EC: fixed-term 
employment In compliance 
Additional 
analysis might 
be conducted 
in 2016 
Directive 98/59/EC: collective 
redundancies Mostly in compliance*  2015 
Directive 2004/113/EC: equal 
treatment between men and women Mostly in compliance 2016 
Directive 2010/18/EC: parental 
leave Mostly in compliance 2017 
Directive 92/85/EЕС: pregnant 
workers (10th individual Directive 
within the meaning of Art. 16 (1) 
of Directive 89/391/EEC) 
Mostly in compliance 2015-16 
Directive 79/7/EЕС: social 
security Mostly in compliance 2015 
Directive 2000/43/EC: racial 
equality Mostly in compliance 2016 
Directive 2000/78/EC: 
employment equality framework Mostly in compliance 2016 
Directive 2003/41/ЄС: 
institutions for occupational 
retirement provision 
Mostly in compliance 2016 
* Some of the provisions of these directives are already included in the draft Labour Code. 
Source: Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine.  
Overall, the evidence shows that the biggest problem in Ukraine 
relates to law enforcement more than the incorporation of required 
provisions into legislation.  
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Employment and social policy at a glance 
The Association Agreement calls for Ukraine to ratify ILO conventions and 
approximate EU directives. Ukraine has already ratified all major ILO 
conventions.  
A new draft Labour Code is currently (May 2016) before Parliament and a 
new law on Employment mostly complies with the EU regulation.  
Overall, the implementation of the Association Agreement is likely to help 
move Ukrainian labour regulation towards best international practice.  
Still, anti-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation remains the issue 
as it is still to be incorporated into the draft Labour Code before the second 
reading.  
Attention should be focused not only on legislative work, but also on 
measures that would ensure law enforcement.  
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24. EDUCATION, TRAINING AND 
CULTURE 
Education and training  
The Association Agreement sets out 
basic aims for the education system, 
notably its reform, modernisation and 
convergence in the field of higher 
education on the Bologna Process and 
the enhancement of the quality and 
relevance of higher education. While the 
Agreement is largely silent on the 
instruments for doing this, the 
Association Agenda document is more substantial.  
Several indices on Ukraine’s educational standards and human 
capital endowment show its current rankings to be “very high”. The 
human capital index calculated by the World Economic Forum (WEF) 
is the most favourable, placing Ukraine at 31 out of 124 countries in 
2015, alongside its immediate neighbours Poland, Hungary and 
Slovakia, and ahead of most of the EU’s southern member states (such 
as Portugal, Spain, Italy and Romania). The UNDP’s education index 
ranks Ukraine 36 out of 188 countries, alongside Austria and slightly 
behind other East European countries. The UNDP’s education index for 
Ukraine has been improving steadily since 1980, similar to 
developments observed in its immediate neighbours. Thus, unlike 
Ukraine’s economic performance, its relative performance in education 
and human capital endowment is comparable to its EU neighbours, 
such as Poland and Hungary. This suggests a human capital basis for a 
major recovery in economic performance.  
The EU supports the implementation of the new 2014 Ukrainian 
Law on Higher Education, with a view to further integration into the 
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European Higher Education Area in line with the Bologna Process. The 
main objective of the Bologna Process since its inception in 1999 has 
been to ensure more comparable, compatible and coherent systems of 
higher education in Europe. Ukraine joined the Bologna Process in May 
2005, leading to the adoption of the three-cycle higher education system 
(bachelor, masters and doctorate). The new law will bring Ukrainian 
universities into compliance with the Bologna Agreement, recognise 
foreign degrees and introduce several other reforms (decentralise 
administration and simplify bureaucracy, give more control to 
universities, expand student self-governance and promote 
transparency). The full implementation of the Bologna model, 
however, remains challenging. Numerous regulations have to be 
adopted, and avoiding contradictions and erroneous interpretations of 
these regulations is a major task. Important reforms are also necessary 
in quality assurance through introducing the National Qualification 
Framework, in alignment with the European Qualifications 
Framework, as well as in making use of the European Credit System 
for Vocational Education and Training. The Association Agenda also 
promotes the introduction of international assessment criteria and the 
professionalisation of higher education management. 
The EU’s largest direct contribution is through the Erasmus+ 
programme for educational exchanges, training, youth and sport. For 
the period 2014-20, there is a total budget for the EU itself plus third 
countries of €14.7 billion. In the field of higher education, Erasmus+ 
supports the following main actions: 
- International credit mobility of individuals, with the Erasmus 
Mundus Joint Master Degrees promoting the mobility of 
students and staff from and to partner countries;  
- Capacity-building projects in higher education to modernise and 
internationalise higher education institutions and systems in 
partner countries, with a special focus on those neighbouring the 
EU;  
- Support to policy dialogue through the network of Higher 
Education Reform Experts in partner countries neighbouring the 
EU, an international alumni association and promotion events; 
- Jean Monnet activities to stimulate teaching and research in the 
field of European Union studies worldwide.318 
                                                        
318 See http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/documents/ 
erasmus-plus-programme-guide_en.pdf. 
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Institutional arrangements to support the implementation of the 
ERASMUS+ Programme include the National ERASMUS+ office 
(NEO), which was officially registered in the Ministry of Economic 
Development and Trade in March 2015. The NEO’s responsibility 
covers all issues dedicated to supporting, promoting, monitoring and 
disseminating activities related to the Erasmus+ activities in higher 
education open to cooperation with partner countries.319 
During the 2014-20 period, more than 4,000 young Ukrainians 
are expected to benefit from university exchanges, and 7000 Ukrainians 
will have the opportunity to take part in youth exchanges under the 
European Voluntary Service programme.  
The AA encourages the development of vocational education 
and training as well as professional life-long learning (in line with 
Recommendation 2008/C111/01), taking into account the European 
Quality Assurance Reference framework for Vocational Education and 
Training. 
Culture 
The cultural cooperation between Ukraine and the EU is based on the 
promotion of exchanges and the mobility of arts and artists. Ukraine 
participates fully in the EU’s Creative Europe programme for cultural 
and creative sectors, signing an agreement to this effect with the 
Commission in November 2015.320 Participation in this programme will 
help Ukrainian cultural and creative organisations to collaborate with 
partners from all over Europe and access funding for cultural 
cooperation projects, literary translation schemes, cultural networks 
and platforms. For the Ukrainian audio-visual sector it will be also 
opportunity to obtain funding for training, festivals, audience 
development and market access activities.321 
The parties also pledge to cooperate in the framework of 
UNESCO and the Council of Europe, in order to sustain cultural 
diversity and preserve and valorise cultural and historical heritage. 
Concrete projects of cultural cooperation are being implemented with 
the EU’s Eastern neighbours under the Culture Programme II, 
launched in September 2015. The programme has a budget of €4.95 
                                                        
319 See www.erasmusplus.org.ua/en/. 
320 The Verkhovna Rada ratified the agreement in February 2016.   
321 See http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/news/2015/1119-
ukraine-joins-creative-europe_en.htm 
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million and has two components: i) EU support for capacity building 
and the inclusion of culture on the political agenda; and ii) Joint EU and 
Council of Europe support for 6-12 historical towns for the 
development of urban strategies with the rehabilitation of heritage.322 
 
Education, training and culture at a glance  
Ukraine’s human capital endowment is rated as ‘high’ in international 
comparisons, comparable to its immediate European neighbours, but with 
worrying evidence of relative decline in recent decades. 
Basic education reforms are supported in the Association Agreement, 
notably for Higher Education through the Bologna Process and European 
Higher Education Area and with concrete programmes such as Erasmus+ 
benefiting large numbers of Ukrainian students. 
Ukraine has now joined the EU’s culture programme with a new agreement 
signed in November 2015. 
 
                                                        
322 See http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/documents/news/2015/ 
20150918_01_en.pdf 
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25. SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND 
SPACE 
Science and technology: The Agreement 
sets out wide-ranging objectives for 
cooperation in the area of science and 
technology, aiming to strengthen 
research capacities, human potential and 
the sharing of scientific knowledge. It 
intends to facilitate the involvement of 
Ukraine in the European Research Area. 
While the terms of the Agreement are 
mostly quite general, it has already been 
followed up by an important operational 
agreement signed in March 2015 for Ukraine’s full participation as 
‘associated country’ in the Horizon 2020 – the EU Framework 
Programme for Research and Innovation for the period 2014-20, which 
was ratified by the Ukrainian Parliament in July 2015.  
The Horizon 2020 programme is the centrepiece of the EU’s 
scientific research activity, endowed with very substantial funds (€80 
billion) for the period 2014-2020. The areas eligible for project funding 
by Horizon 2020 cover both the natural and social sciences, under three 
main thematic pillars (see Table 25.1 below):323 
Ukraine’s associate membership of Horizon 2020 allows it to 
participate as if an EU member state, including participation in the 
Horizon 2020 Programme Committees. It also allows Ukrainian teams 
to take the role of leading partner within consortia. Membership comes 
with an obligation to make financial contributions, but half of this can 
                                                        
323 See https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/h2020-sections and 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/horizon2020/pdf/proposals/horizon_2020_im
pact_assessment_report_executive_summary.pdf#view=fit&pagemode=none. 
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be covered by using the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) 
funds earmarked for Ukraine.  
Table 25.1 Main thematic priorities of Horizon 2020 
Excellent science Industrial leadership Societal challenges  
European Research 
Council (ERC) 
Future and Emerging 
Technologies 
Marie Skłodowska-
Curie actions career 
development 
Research 
infrastructures 
(including e-
infrastructure) 
Leadership in enabling 
and industrial 
technologies (LEITs): 
nanotechnologies, 
materials, 
biotechnology, 
manufacturing, ICT, 
space 
Access to risk finance 
Innovation in SMEs 
Health, demographic 
change 
Food security, 
sustainable 
agriculture, marine 
research  
Energy, transport, 
climate action 
Europe in a changing 
world;  protecting 
freedom and security  
 
In the preceding Framework Programme (FP7) Ukraine was one 
of the top ten most performing third countries, with a total number of 
274 successful participations in several priority areas (environment, 
climate change, transport, aeronautics, nanotechnologies, materials 
technologies, biotechnologies, food and agriculture and space). Its 
enhanced status now in Horizon 2020 should open the way for an even 
stronger performance.  
During 2014-15, Ukrainian teams submitted 394 applications, 
while 42 were successful (10.7%), winning funding of €7.1 million. To 
support participation in the Horizon 2020 a network of Ukrainian 
National Contact Points (NCPs) was established, comprising 
universities and institutions of National Academy of Sciences of 
Ukraine. As of May 2016, there are 40 NCPs and 12 Regional CPs.324 
The Agreement encourages the EU and Ukraine to organise joint 
measures and events dedicated to scientific and technological 
advancement. The EU-Ukraine Association Agenda specifically refers 
to the need to facilitate partnerships between research and industry, 
and to work towards the marketability of research products.  
 
 
                                                        
324 See http://mon.gov.ua/activity/mizhnarodni-zvyazki/uchast-u-
programax-es-erazmus-ta-gorizont-2020/gorizont-2020.html. 
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Box 25.1 Examples of collaborative EU-Ukraine research projects 
ERA-PLANET325 (European Network for Observing Our Changing Planet) 
aims to strengthen European leadership within the Global Earth 
Observation System of Systems (GEOSS). ERA-PLANET will provide 
advanced decision support tools and technologies to better monitor our 
global environment in different domains of Earth Observation. The project 
budget is €11 million for the period 2016-20 for the consortium, which 
includes about 40 institutions. Ukrainian teams: the Space Research 
Institute of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and the State Space 
Agency of Ukraine.  
AMMODIT326 (“Approximation Methods for Molecular Modelling 
and Diagnosis Tools”) project in the area of applied mathematics with 
emphasis on medical and life science applications. Budget: €823,500. 
Ukrainian teams: Institute of Mathematics, NAS of Ukraine, Institute of 
Hydromechanics, NAS of Ukraine, Taras Shevchenko National University 
of Kyiv, National Technical University of Ukraine, Kyiv Polytechnic 
Institute. 
UKRAINE327 (“UKraine Replication, Awareness and INnovation 
based on EGNSS”). The UKRAINE project was established in January 2015, 
following the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Agreement in the field of Global 
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). Key components of the project will 
see development of solutions for multimodal transport logistics, with 
opportunities for commercial relationships between EU and Ukrainian 
enterprises. Budget: €1,429,252. Ukrainian teams: National Aviation 
University, National Technical University of Ukraine, Kyiv Polytechnic 
Institute, State Space Agency of Ukraine. 
The BLACK SEA HORIZON328 (BSH) project aims to support the 
EU’s external relations with the target region by contributing to ongoing 
bi-regional and regional science, technology and innovation (STI) policy 
dialogues. Budget: €1,499,503. Ukrainian team: Institute for Economics and 
Forecasting of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine. 
Space: The EU’s most important tool for space exploration is the 
European Space Agency (ESA), of which Ukraine is not a member, but 
with which it has had a cooperation agreement since 2008. In early 2014 
this agreement was extended until 2019. The ESA focuses on 
cooperation in satellite systems; earth observation and global 
                                                        
325 See www.era-learn.eu/network-information/networks/era-planet. 
326 See http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/194356_en.html.   
327 See www.project-ukraine.eu/. 
328 See https://blacksea-horizon.eu/project. 
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monitoring; space science and applied space technologies. In July 2015, 
the Ukrainian State Space Agency and ESA started consultations on 
cooperation between Ukrainian rocket-and-space industry enterprises 
and European companies within ESA projects. Major possible 
directions of bilateral cooperation under consideration include Earth 
Remote Sensing (ERS) and rocket carriers. Concretely, the ESA’s new 
Vega-class rocket carrier, which launches low-earth orbit cargo 
weighing from 300 to 1500 pounds, uses the RD-843 engine for the 
upper stage of this rocket, developed by the Yuzhnoye State Design 
Office and the Yuzhmash enterprise.329 Currently Ukraine takes further 
steps towards becoming a full member of the ESA. 
Ukraine may benefit from Horizon 2020 projects that support 
space research based on the principles set out in the Commission’s 
Communication on “EU Space Industrial Policy: Releasing the 
Potential for Growth in the Space Sector”.330 The EU prioritises, among 
other things, the European Global Navigation Satellite System 
(EGNSS), the setting up of a Space Surveillance and Tracking system 
(SST) and general support for space science and exploration as well as 
industry’s competitiveness. 
 
Science, technology & space at a glance 
In accordance with the Association Agreement, in 2015 Ukraine became a 
full participant in the EU’s main research funding instrument Horizon 
2020.  
Ukraine has considerable traditional strengths in some important scientific 
domains, including medicine, physics, astronomy, biology, chemistry, 
material sciences, space and earth sciences. 
Participation in Horizon 2020 should enable stronger performance in these 
areas. 
 
                                                        
329 See http://open4business.com.ua/ukrainian-government-esa-preparing-
agreement-formalizing-kyivs-space-integration-plans/. 
330 COM/2013/0108, final, 28 February 2013. 
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26. EU AGENCIES AND 
PROGRAMMES 
The EU operates 46 agencies, which are 
semi-autonomous and specialised 
bodies funded and controlled by the EU, 
with the objective of supporting the 
functioning of EU policies. There are 
also around 45 programmes, most of 
which (but not all) are funded and 
administered by the European 
Commission. Of these a considerable 
number are open to participation by 
Ukraine as partner under the 
Association Agreement, notably the 20 agencies and 19 programmes 
listed in Tables 26.1 and 26.2. The agencies and programmes with 
which Ukraine already has ongoing cooperation at different levels 
(projects, seminars, study visits, etc.) appear in bold in these tables.  
Table 26.1 EU agencies open to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia*  
European Fisheries 
Control Agency (EFCA) 
European Aviation 
Safety Agency (EASA) 
European Maritime 
Safety Agency 
(EMSA) 
European Agency for 
Safety and Health at 
Work (EU-OSHA) 
European Defence 
Agency (EDA) 
European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA) 
European Monitoring 
Centre for Drugs and 
Drug Addiction 
(EMCDDA) 
European Police 
College (CEPOL) 
European Institute for 
Gender Equality 
(EIGE) 
European Union 
Institute for Security 
Studies (EUISS) 
European Union’s 
Judicial Cooperation 
Unit (EUROJUST) 
European Police 
Office (EUROPOL) 
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European Agency for 
the Management of 
Operational 
Cooperation at the 
External Borders 
(FRONTEX) 
European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and 
Control (ECDC) 
European GNSS 
Agency (GSA) 
European Chemicals 
Agency (ECHA) 
European Environment 
Agency (EEA) 
European Network 
and Information 
Security Agency 
(ENISA) 
European Foundation 
for the Improvement of 
Living and Working 
Conditions 
(EUROFOUND) 
European Asylum 
Support Office (EASO) 
 
* Bold text denotes EU agencies open to Ukraine. 
Table 26.2 EU programmes open to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia 
Asylum, Migration and 
Integration Fund 
Copernicus, European 
Earth Observation 
Programme 
Competitiveness of 
Enterprises and SMEs 
(COSME) 
Creative Europe, 
Programme for the 
cultural and creative 
sectors 
Customs 2020 Erasmus+ 
European Maritime and 
Fisheries Fund 
European Statistical 
Programme 
European Territorial 
Cooperation 
Fiscalis 2020 (tax 
administration support) 
Galileo and EGNOS 
Programmes, Global 
satellite navigation 
system 
Health for Growth  
Hercule III Anti-fraud 
Programme 
Horizon 2020 Internal Security Fund 
Life Programme,  
Environment and 
climate change 
Pericles 2020, 
Programme for the 
protection of the euro 
against counterfeiting 
SESAR JU, Air Traffic 
Management 
modernisation 
European Union Civil 
Protection Mechanism 
  
* Bold text denotes EU programmes open to Ukraine. 
Such participation offers a useful means of in-depth integration 
of professional experts and administrative organisations with EU 
counterparts and aids reform processes. 
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Membership of an agency requires negotiation of a specific 
international agreement and a decision on the financial contribution of 
the partner. Cooperation with a programme is carried out on the basis 
of a protocol or specific Memorandum of Understanding stating the 
details of participation for each programme. The participation of 
Ukraine in these EU agencies and programmes is subject to regular 
dialogue and review.  
Membership of the agencies and inclusion in programmes gives 
full access to the infrastructure and governing bodies, but also involves 
costs. To ease the financial burdens on Ukraine, the EU can negotiate 
temporary rebates. Ukraine is also able to pay up to 50% of membership 
fees from EU aid funds. The process of participating in some 
programmes, such as for research projects under Horizon 2020, is 
extremely competitive, but here Ukrainian institutes will normally be 
joining consortia and counterparts in EU member states in these 
initiatives.  
The agencies of most interest to Ukraine include the following:  
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). The State Aviation 
Service of Ukraine (SAS) is one of EASA’s Pan-European Partners 
(PANEP) since 2009. The Working Arrangements cover all aspects of 
the regulation of civil aviation safety and environmental protection of 
products, organisations and personnel. Ukraine's participation in 
EASA was a key precondition for proceeding with the Common 
Aviation Area Agreement (CAA Agreement) between Ukraine and the 
European Union.  
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). Ukraine is in the 
process of developing its cooperation between the European Maritime 
Safety Agency (EMSA) and the state maritime and river transport 
safety inspection (Ukrmorrichinspektsiya). Two main vectors of such 
cooperation have been determined: maritime safety and the prevention 
of marine pollution, with the aim of implementing international 
conventions and improving the quality and coordination of maritime 
administrations in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea partner countries.  
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA). In 
2014 Ukraine became one of the partners of EU-OSHA’s project for 
neighbouring countries. In 2014-16 there has been an opportunity to 
participate in the work of Agency with establishment of a country 
contact point and platform for sharing information and future 
cooperation.331   
                                                        
331 See osha.europa.eu/en/blog/enp-summary/. 
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European Defence Agency (EDA). Cooperation between Ukraine 
and EDA is foreseen in the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, and 
the negotiations for signing the administrative agreement between the 
Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and the European Defence Agency 
(EDA) have been launched. This will cover the main principles, 
activities and mechanisms of the EU-Ukraine cooperation related to 
improving defence capabilities and strengthening military 
cooperation,332 including cooperation between defence firms. 
European Police College (CEPOL). There are ongoing 
negotiations on signing formal agreements on cooperation between 
European Police College (CEPOL) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
of Ukraine. All EU member states expressed support for Ukraine's 
accession to CEPOL. It will open training and learning opportunities 
for law enforcement officers of Ukraine. Training covers topics ranging 
from law enforcement techniques to economic crime. 
European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST). In 
February 2015, the final version of the Agreement on cooperation 
between Ukraine and the EU Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust) was 
concluded. The College (Board) of Eurojust approved the Agreement 
in March 2015. On 28 June 2016, the Agreement was officially signed.333 
European Police Office (EUROPOL). The agreement on 
cooperation between Europol and Ukraine was signed back in 2009. 
The document sets out to coordination efforts of the member states and 
Ukraine in preventing and combating all forms of international crime, 
terrorist threats, human trafficking, drugs and illegal migration. An 
important step was signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with 
Europol in April 2015, setting up a special secured communication 
channel called SIENA for the exchange of information. 
European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX). Cooperation 
between the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and Frontex was 
initiated in 2007, and has been working under a cooperation plan for 
2013-15. Key activities involve the exchange of information, risk 
analysis, joint operations and personnel training. Training projects are 
mostly focused on the detection of stolen vehicles and falsified 
documents, the training of dog handlers, learning English, the 
                                                        
332 According to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. 
333 See www.eurojust.europa.eu/press/PressReleases/Pages/2016/2016-06-
28.aspx 
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implementation of a common core curriculum for border guards and 
preparation of a common web platform for border guards training.  
European Environment Agency (EEA). Cooperation with 
Ukraine started in 2009, but the main focus now is to implement the 
relevant provisions of the Association Agreement, raising cooperation 
to a new qualitative level, including harmonisation of Ukrainian 
legislation with EU laws. A key objective is to develop the 
infrastructure in Ukraine in the framework of the Shared European 
Environmental Information System (SEIS) and identification priorities 
in relation to the Strategy of the State Environmental Policy of Ukraine 
up to 2020. 
 
The EU agencies and programmes at a glance 
There are extensive possibilities for inclusion in EU agencies and 
programmes, with the potential to develop institutional capabilities and 
advance policy reforms. 
Ukraine is taking up a considerable number of these possibilities, for 
example for health and safety standards, policing and justice, research, 
education and culture.   
EU offers financial assistance to contribute to the costs of participation. 
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27. CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION 
Ukraine shares 1,152 km of land borders 
with EU members Poland, Slovakia, 
Hungary and Romania, and about 1,000 
km of border with EU associate 
Moldova, which offers extensive 
opportunities for enhanced cooperation 
at the cross-border regional level. The 
AA calls for cross-border cooperation 
(CBC) in general terms and in specific 
sectors such as transport, energy, 
education, tourism and health and the 
modernisation of cross-border emergency services. 
In most cases Ukrainian border regions have common history, 
traditions and strong personal and business ties to their EU 
counterparts. To maintain these ties Ukraine has signed agreements 
with them that establish special provisions for small/local cross-border 
traffic based on the EU’s Regulation (1931/2006/EC) on local border 
traffic at the external land borders of EU member states. Hungary was 
the first country to sign such an agreement in 2007 which, after entering 
into force in January 2008, gave advantages to Ukrainian citizens 
residing in settlements and towns to visit the border areas in Hungary 
identified in the Agreement. Ukraine and Slovakia signed a similar 
agreement in 2008. The agreement with Poland, signed the same year, 
was modified in 2014-15, and now allows visits to border areas up to 30 
km from the frontier, for up to 90 days. Since May 2015, the agreement 
between Ukraine and Romania entered in force, easing border 
crossings for up to 90 days for about 2 million people residing along the 
Ukrainian-Romanian border.  
In the period 2007-13, the EU spent €950 million on 13 cross-
border cooperation programmes along its eastern and southern 
neighbourhood under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
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Instrument (ENPI).334 For the period 2014-20, the number of 
programmes was increased to 17, 12 of which are for land borders, one 
for a sea crossing and four for sea basin programmes.335 Three of the 
land border programmes are of particular importance for Ukraine, 
namely cross-border cooperation between a) Poland, Belarus and 
Ukraine; b) Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Ukraine; and c) Romania 
and Ukraine. Ukraine is also involved in the Black Sea Basin 
programme. 
In December 2016, the European Commission adopted a Joint 
Operational Programme for Poland-Belarus-Ukraine for the years 2014-
20,336 following a previous programme for 2007-13. The new 
programme contributes to four thematic objectives of the CBC, namely:  
(i) promotion of local culture and preservation of historical 
heritage,  
(ii) improvement of accessibility to the regions, development of 
sustainable and climate-proof transport and communication 
networks and systems,  
(iii) common challenges in the field of safety and security and  
(iv) promotion of border management and border security, mobility 
and migration management.  
The programme’s budget is €201 million, the largest part of 
which (€183 million) comes from the EU. 
Box 27.1 Regional beneficiaries of cross-border cooperation in Ukraine, 
Poland and Belarus 
Ukraine Poland Belarus 
Core areas: Lvivska, 
Volynska and 
Zakarpatska oblasts 
 
Adjoining regions: 
Rivnenska, 
Ternopilska and 
Ivano-Frankivska 
oblasts 
Core areas: Krośnieński and Przemyski (in 
Podkarpackie voivodeship), Białostocki, 
Łomżyński and Suwalski (in Podlaskie 
voivodeship), Bialski and 
Chełmskozamojski (in Lubelskie 
voivodeship) and Ostrołęcko-siedlecki (in 
Mazowieckie voivodeship)  
Adjoining regions: Rzeszowski and 
Tarnobrzeski (in Podkarpackie 
voivodeship); Puławski and Lubelski (in 
Lubelskie voivodeship) 
Core areas: 
Grodno and 
Brest oblasts  
 
Adjoining regions: 
Minsk Oblast 
(including the 
city of Minsk) 
and Gomel 
Oblast 
                                                        
334 See ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/pdf/20141217-enpi-
results-2017-2013.pdf 
335 See eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/financing-the-enp/cbc_2014-2020_ 
programming_document_en.pdf. 
336 See www.pl-by-ua.eu/upload/pl/JOP_PL-BY-UA_2014-2020_FINAL_ 
ENG.pdf. 
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The projects supported by this programme in 2007-13 were 
mainly in the priority areas of: increasing competitiveness, improving 
quality of life and people-to-people cooperation. Some projects aimed 
to improve environmental protection in the infrastructure of Poraż and 
Zagórz in Poland and Horodok in Ukraine. In another, the experience 
of Lublin was used in a project to set up a municipal system for 
processing household electronic and electrical equipment waste in 
Lviv. The development of IT infrastructure for Ukrainian customs and 
border guard services is implemented jointly by Podkarpackie 
Voivodeship Office, Lublin Voivodeship Office (Poland) and the 
Administration of State Border Guard Service of Ukraine. A Museums 
without Barriers project brought together a coalition of Polish and 
Ukrainian museums for adapting them to become accessible to 
disabled visitors.  
Box 27.2 Joint Operational Programme Poland-Belarus-Ukraine, 2007-13 
In the framework of Poland-Belarus-Ukraine programme for 2007-13, six 
umbrella projects were implemented.* Beneficiaries of these projects 
coordinated 56 different micro projects. Representatives of local 
governments, the tourism sector, NGOs, cultural and educational institutions 
and sports organisations were partners of these micro projects. Poland was 
represented by 60 partners, Ukraine by 45 partners and Belarus by 10 
partners. The total project financing was €2.9 million. 
One umbrella project is dedicated to a cross-border labour market support 
centre and aimed to provide professional support to existing and potential 
cross-border labour market participants in their professional development. 
This project embraces 5 micro-projects with the following objectives: 
 increase the competences of teachers, counsellors, psychologists, 
educators and secondary school class teachers from PL and UA in job 
counselling;  
 improve the qualifications of young people from rural areas, to improve 
career planning and personal development support methods and to help 
them find their way in the labour market; 
 increase the chances of young people preparing to enter the labour market 
and to establish cross-border cooperation between schools in PL and UA; 
 foster cross-border cooperation on research into the needs and 
improvement of educational and labour market opportunities for young 
people from BY and UA from border areas planning to study or work in 
PL; and 
 increase the employment opportunities of students from Poland and 
Ukraine.   
Nine large-scale projects were related to the development and construction 
of infrastructure of Ukrainian customs and border guards’ services. 
* For more information, see www.pl-by-ua.eu/. 
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The Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine 2014-20 programme337 
was also adopted by the European Commission in December 2015. This 
focuses on the promotion of local culture and the preservation of 
historical heritage, environmental protection, climate change 
adaptation and disaster management. The programme budget is €81 
million. 
A further programme, for Romania-Ukraine 2014-20 was 
adopted to facilitate economic development and improve quality of life, 
with joint investments in education, economic development, culture, 
infrastructure and health. 338 The programme has a budget of €60 
million.  
All Joint Operational Programmes were developed with the 
broad involvement of stakeholders from participating countries. 
Ukraine is also part of the Black Sea Basin Programme for 2014-
20, which aims to support sustainable growth and improve joint 
environmental protection in the Black Sea region (e.g. through the joint 
reduction of marine litter).  
As part of the Eastern Partnership Territorial Cooperation 
Programmes (EaPTC),339 a Moldova-Ukraine Joint Operational 
Programme was approved in October 2014, with a budget of €3.3 
million, aiming to promote cooperation between border regions and 
social and economic development.  
Three Danube sub-basins, partly located in Ukraine (the Tisza, 
Prut and Siret Basins) pose specific challenges and opportunities in 
terms of cross-border flood prevention, the environment, energy, the 
economy, social and security-related issues. In February 2016, the 
International Commission for the Protection of Danube River (ICDR) 
adopted two plans for water management priorities for the Danube 
River Basin until 2021.340 The Danube River Basin Management Plan 
aims to further protect and enhance the state of waters, to prevent their 
deterioration and to ensure the sustainable, long-term use of water 
resources. The Danube Flood Risk Management Plan addresses aspects 
of flood risk management, focusing on prevention, protection and 
preparedness. As an official contracting partner of ICDR, Ukraine may 
participate in the implementation of the projects under these plans.  
                                                        
337 See www.huskroua-cbc.net/. 
338 See www.ro-ua.ro-ua-md.net/en/. 
339 See www.eaptc.eu/struct_file.php?id_pr=72/. 
340 See www.icpdr.org/. 
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The EU also funds the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova 
and Ukraine (EUBAM) aiming to improve border management (see 
chapter 2). 
During 2007-13, Ukraine participated in two programmes to 
encourage interregional cooperation between European cities and 
regions and enhance their competitiveness and attractiveness, namely 
INTERREG IVC341 and the Central Europe Programme.342  
Box 27.3 Examples of projects in the framework of INTERREG IVC and 
the Central Europe Programme with Ukrainian participation*   
- Sustainable flood management strategies for cross-border river basins  
- ‘Via Regia plus’ - Sustainable Mobility and Regional Cooperation 
along the Pan-European Transport Corridor III 
- Improvement of regions’ accessibility through air transport 
interconnectivity 
- Capitalising on cultural heritage for sustainable development and 
competitiveness of cities and regions 
* For more information, see www.interreg4c.eu/projects/project-details/ 
?project=77-sustainable-flood-management-strategies-for-cross-border-river-
basins& and www.central2013.eu/nc/projects-2007-2013/approved-projects/ 
?L=se%251%20or% 201%3D%25&tx_fundedprojects_pi1[display]=all 
 
The EU also cooperates with Ukraine through its eastern regional 
dimension, the Eastern Partnership,343 which has given rise to new 
platforms for dialogue at the government and expert level (thematic 
platforms), as well as in the fields of parliamentary and participatory 
democracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
341 See www.interreg4c.eu/. 
342 See www.central2013.eu/. 
343 See http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm. 
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Cross-border cooperation at a glance 
Ukraine’s border with Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania in the EU, 
as well as with Moldova and Belarus, offers extensive opportunities for 
business, social and cultural cross-border exchanges. 
The EU cooperates with Ukraine in the framework of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and its eastern regional dimension, the Eastern 
Partnership.  
Joint Operational Programmes are the main tools of cross-border 
cooperation between EU and Ukraine.  
Ukraine also participates in specific programmes to maintain the Danube 
sub-basin. 
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28. CIVIL SOCIETY 
Civil society in Ukraine has long been at 
the forefront of change, from the Orange 
Revolution (2004) to the Maidan 
uprising (2013-14). Ukrainian civil 
society has consistently shown a great 
sense of unity and determination in its 
quest for democracy. The State Registry 
Service of Ukraine revealed that there 
were more than 50,850 civil society 
organisations registered in July 2013, 
and 61,090 by the end of 2014. These 
organisations focus on a wide range of issues such as human rights, 
culture, minorities, women’s rights and sport.   
The EU has long supported Ukrainian civil society. The NGOs 
have functioned both as a watchdog to provide input to the EU on the 
progress of reform in Ukraine and as a pressure group vis-à-vis the 
government, thus acting as a driver of change. According to the EU-
Ukraine Association Agenda, the EU provided €10 million support to 
civil society in 2014. The formal framework of cooperation between 
civil society in Ukraine and the EU consists of three somewhat 
overlapping platforms that work in parallel. These are on the one hand 
the multilateral Civil Society Forum for all six Eastern Partnership 
countries together, and on the other hand the bilateral Civil Society 
Platform and the DCFTA Advisory Group both established under the 
Association Agreement.  
Multilateral Civil Society Forum. One of the major avenues for 
the EU to engage Ukrainian civil society has been the multilateral Civil 
Society Forum of the Eastern Partnership, established prior to the 
signature of the Association Agreement in 2009. The Forum brings 
together the members of civil society from all six countries of the 
Eastern Partnership with individual country platforms. In 2015, the 
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Ukraine National Platform consisted of 215 registered organisations 
and actively participates in all the working groups and sub-groups of 
the Civil Society Forum.  
In November 2013, Platform members expressed their strong 
disagreement with the decision of former President Viktor Yanukovych 
not to sign the Association Agreement at the Eastern Partnership 
Vilnius Summit. His reneging on the Association Agreement triggered 
the Maidan. Many of the civil society organisations included in the 
Platform were active in the process.  
Bilateral Civil Society Platform. This platform was created as 
part of Association Agreement (Arts 443 to 445) and continues the EU’s 
approach of including civil society in the process of reforms in Ukraine. 
This has also created some overlap with the (above) Ukrainian national 
platform within the multilateral Civil Society Forum.  
The Agreement is both general and specific in its provisions 
related to the bilateral Civil Society Platform. It offers a long list of 
general goals, from fostering civil society cooperation as a tool to 
familiarise the societies of the EU and Ukraine with each other, through 
to the involvement of the NGOs in the implementation of the 
Agreement. To this end, the members of the EU-Ukraine Civil Society 
Platform (CSP) have decided to meet in plenary session twice a year, 
with meetings of experts in between. Confirming the official status of 
the Platform, the Agreement pledges regular contacts between it and 
the intergovernmental Association Committee and Parliamentary 
Association Committee "in order to obtain [its] views on how to attain 
the objectives of [the Association] Agreement".344  
The CSP was officially launched on 16 April 2015 with an 
inaugural meeting,345 with a second meeting on 11 February 2016. The 
members of the CSP discussed the state of the implementation of the 
Association Agreement, held a debate and adopted reports on the rule 
of law, with a focus on anticorruption and energy policy. They also 
discussed the future work of the Platform.346 The joint declaration of 
the CSP contains calls for immediate ratification by Ukraine of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and urges the 
Association Committee and the Association Council to give priority in 
2016 to the implementation of EU standards and legislation on 
                                                        
344 EU-Ukraine Civil Society Platform. Rules of Procedure. 
345 See www.kmu.gov.ua/document/248107495/ 
CSP%20statement%2016%2004_EU_UA_official_EN.pdf. 
346 See www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/joint_declaration.pdf. 
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employment and labour, workplace safety, collective bargaining in the 
European multinational companies operating in Ukraine and social 
dialogue.  
In the energy sphere, the CSP members invited the EU to assess 
critically the compliance of the Nord Stream II project with EU law and 
to prioritise cooperation with Ukraine on the implementation of the 
Southern Gas Corridor project. 
However, the Agreement is considered by many NGOs to be too 
rigid when it comes to the composition of the Civil Society Platform. 
The agreement states that the Platform “shall consist of members of the 
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) on the one hand, 
and representatives of civil society on the side of Ukraine, on the other, 
as a forum to them to meet and exchange views” (Art. 469 (2)). The CSP 
is made up of 30 members, 15 from each side, representing the EESC 
and Ukrainian civil society and three sectors - trade unions, employers 
and other civil society organisations.  The civil society organisations of 
Ukraine claim that the EESC imposes its tripartite structure on the 
Platform. The civil society organisations working especially on the 
human rights and democracy issues argue the need to go well beyond 
the EESC’s conception of social dialogue. Trade unions, on the other 
hand, welcome recognition of their role as communicators between 
society and the government. Criticism of the civil society organisations 
did not produce any substantial change, however.  
Advisory Group of the DCFTA. Ukrainian civil society should 
also participate in monitoring the DCFTA through a so-called Advisory 
Group. The Commission’s DG Trade has made it general practice to 
consult civil society organisations over its free trade agreements. The 
Advisory Group should include NGOs and representatives of 
employers and workers’ organisations. They are expected to meet once 
a year at an open Civil Society Forum (not to be confused with the Civil 
Society Forum of Eastern Partnership mentioned above) to discuss 
issues related to sustainable development. The mechanism of 
cooperation and distribution of roles between the Civil Society 
Platform and the Civil Society Forum (of the Association Agreement) is 
not specified and creates ambiguity. This was the main reason why 
neither the Advisory Group nor the Civil Society Forum has been 
formed yet.  
Current status of Ukrainian civil society organisations. 
Ukrainian civil society experienced rapid growth after the Maidan (or 
Revolution of Dignity) of 2013-14. An example of a civil initiative 
arising during the Maidan was the Reanimation Package of Reforms 
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(RPR),347 which unites different NGOs with the aim of monitoring and 
stimulating reforms in the country. It serves as a coordination centre 
between the civil society and the government drafting laws and 
lobbying reforms in the Parliament. In early 2016 there were 48 NGOs 
registered as RPR members, who work in 26 expert groups in specific 
areas. However, the most active are expert groups where the NGOs 
already had expertise in areas such as anti-corruption, judicial and 
media reform. In other sectors, like health care reform, culture or 
education, the NGO network is either absent or underdeveloped and 
currently seeks to organise teams of experts. 
In November 2015, a survey of the participants of the Civil 
Society Development Forum in Kyiv assessed the efficiency of NGO 
influence on solving the problems in the country as being mostly 
effective (43.7%).348 The Top-3 tasks of the NGOs in Ukraine were 
named control over the government, civic education, support and 
stimulation of reforms.349   
To influence European policy-makers, in March 2014 Ukrainian 
think tanks organised the Ukrainian Think Tanks Liaison Office in 
Brussels.350 The Office helps think tanks to organise conferences and 
expert discussions on topical Ukrainian issues in Brussels and in EU 
member states, to present and promote its members’ research and 
establish communication channels between members and EU 
institutions. Currently there are 21 members of the Liaison Office. 
Think tanks are important for promoting reforms in Ukraine. 
They are more flexible than the state research centres and more trusted 
by society, and they generate new ideas. However, their development 
is hampered by the unwillingness of the state institutions to cooperate 
with think tanks.351 The 2015 “Global Go to Think Tanks Index 
Report”352 listed 47 think tanks in Ukraine. 
 
                                                        
347 See http://rpr.org.ua/en/. 
348 See http://cd-platform.org/forum/cdforum2015/1647-opytuvannia-
uchasnykiv-forumu-rezultaty. 
349 See http://ednannia.ua/177-vektor/11791-trendy-rozvytku-
hromadianskoho-suspilstva-na-2016-rik. 
350 See http://ukraine-office.eu/. 
351 See http://iac.org.ua/analitichna-revolyutsiya-chi-analitichna-evolyutsiya-
kontekst-progresivnogo-rozvitku-ukrayini/. 
352 See http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=think_tanks. 
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Civil society at a glance 
Civil society in Ukraine has been active in advocating for democracy and 
human rights since the country’s independence.  
Ukrainian NGOs seek to influence the Ukrainian reform agenda through 
drafting laws and lobbying reforms in the Parliament.   
The EU has supported Ukrainian civil society organisations, considering 
them both a driver for democratic change in Ukraine and a watchdog of 
government activities.  
The EU’s structured cooperation with the Ukrainian civil society has 
several somewhat overlapping and conflicting platforms, causing some 
frustration among Ukrainian NGOs. 
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29. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
The Agreement has two different 
dispute settlement mechanisms (DSM); 
one that covers disputes related to the 
agreement in general but excluding the 
DCFTA; and another more detailed one 
that covers the DCFTA itself.  
The general dispute 
settlement mechanism 
This mechanism is defined in quite 
simple terms in Arts 476 to 478 of the Agreement. It concerns disputes 
over the interpretation, application or implementation of the non-
DCFTA parts of the Agreement. It is based on a traditional ‘diplomatic’ 
approach, under which the Association Council has the key role. 
A party can initiate this DSM by sending a formal request to the 
other party and the Association Council. The parties shall then try to 
resolve the dispute by entering into good- faith consultation within the 
Association Council or other relevant bodies (i.e. the Association 
Committee, or a specific sub-committee). The Association Council can 
eventually settle the dispute, after a consultation period, by way of a 
binding decision. Because the Association Council takes decisions “by 
agreement”,353 both the EU and Ukraine would need to approve the 
decision to resolve the dispute.  
As long as the dispute is not resolved, it shall be discussed at 
every meeting of the Association Council. If an agreement cannot be 
reached in the Association Council after three months, the complaining 
party is allowed to take “appropriate measures” such as the suspension 
of parts of the agreement, but not of the DCFTA part (except in the 
                                                        
353 Art. 465(3) EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. 
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special case of violations of the ‘essential elements’ of the Agreement – 
see further below). In the selection of appropriate measures, priority 
shall be given to those which least disturb the functioning of the 
Agreement.354  
The ‘essential elements’ clause. As in other Association 
Agreements concluded by the EU, the EU-Ukraine Agreement includes 
a suspension clause (in Art. 478(3)) relating to ‘essential elements’ of the 
Agreement (defined in Art. 2). This refers to “Respect for democratic 
principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms”, as defined in 
several international agreements and conventions, and “respect for the 
principle of the rule of law, the principles of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, inviolability of borders and independence and countering the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction…” 
In the event of violation of these fundamental principles the 
complaining party can immediately suspend the agreement, including 
rights and obligations under the DCFTA.355  
In practice the EU very rarely uses these suspension clauses. If 
an EU reaction is required to address a specific human rights situation 
in the territory of the partner country, it prefers to act through 
diplomatic means (e.g. in the Association Council or annual summit 
meetings), or by using limited restrictive measures such as arms 
embargoes, asset freezes or visa bans. Total suspension or termination 
of an Agreement is viewed as the ‘nuclear’ option – best not used.  
Recent EU-Ukraine relations actually clearly saw violations of 
many of the ‘essential elements’ by the administration of former 
President Yanukovych. The predecessor of the Association Agreement, 
namely the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), already 
included an ‘essential elements’ and suspension clause. In 2013, the 
Yanukovych administration was heavily criticised for ‘selective justice’ 
over the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko. 
Instead of suspending the PCA, however, which would have had little 
impact, the Union threatened to postpone the signature of the 
Association Agreement unless the Tymoshenko and other cases of 
‘selective justice’ were corrected. In a second phase, the Yanukovych 
administration’s use of force against the Maidan demonstrators in 2013-
                                                        
354 The requirement of a 3-month consultation period and the condition that the 
measures may not include the suspension of any DCFTA rights or obligations 
do not apply in the case of violation of the essential elements, referred to in Art. 
2 of the AA (and further explained below). 
355 Art. 478(3) EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. 
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14 escalated with Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. In this fast-moving situation, the EU adopted 
sanctions against Russia and Ukrainian persons involved and also 
suspended negotiations with Russia on a ‘New Agreement’. Overall, 
these episodes illustrate the kind of circumstances under which the 
‘essential elements’ suspension provisions might be activated, even if 
the very specific conditions of these recent developments made its use 
inappropriate.  
The DCFTA dispute settlement mechanism 
Arbitration. For disputes concerning the interpretation and application 
of DCFTA provisions, a separate and more sophisticated DSM is laid 
down in a long and detailed chapter (Arts 303-323) of the DCFTA. The 
mechanism is largely inspired by the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU). If there is a dispute regarding the interpretation 
and application of DCFTA provisions, the parties shall first seek to 
come to an agreement through consultations.  
If these consultations fail, the complaining party may request the 
establishment of an arbitration panel to rule on the dispute. The panel 
shall be composed of three arbitrators chosen by the parties. The 
arbitrators must be independent, serve in their individual capacity, not 
take instructions from any government and comply with a Code of 
Conduct annexed to the Agreement. One party cannot block the 
establishment of an arbitration panel, because if the parties cannot 
agree on the composition of the panel, the panellists will be drawn by 
lot from a permanent list of arbitrators.356  
Rulings of the arbitration panel shall be binding and each party 
must take the necessary measures to comply with them. If the party to 
whom the complaint was addressed fails to comply without offering at 
least temporary compensation, the other party is entitled to suspend 
obligations arising from the DCFTA at a level equivalent to the 
violation (e.g. by imposing again the MFN tariff on specific products). 
Again, in practice the EU very rarely relies on the DSM in its FTAs to 
resolve a trade dispute. It prefers to use diplomatic means (e.g. by 
discussing this in bilateral meetings such as the Association Council or 
                                                        
356 The Trade Committee has to establish a list of 15 experts who are willing and 
able to serve as arbitrators. Each of the parties has to propose five individuals 
and the two parties shall also select five individuals that are not nationals of 
either party and who shall act as a chairperson to the arbitration panel. 
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in unilateral statements) or, in some cases, the WTO DSU. For example, 
in April 2016 the EU Delegation in Kyiv issued a statement criticising 
Ukraine’s proposal to increase its export duties on metal scrap, as it 
considers that this would be in breach of Ukraine’s DCFTA 
commitments (see chapter 4). The use of the DSM was not triggered.357 
This DCFTA DSM is without prejudice to possible dispute 
settlement under the WTO. However, the parties are not allowed to 
pursue dispute settlement under both systems at the same time.  
The DCFTA DSM includes several specific features. First, several 
elements of the DCFTA are excluded from this DCFTA DSM, such as 
parts of the chapter on Trade Remedies,358 and chapters on Trade and 
Sustainable Development359 and Antitrust and Mergers.360 Secondly, as 
regards energy disputes, the DCFTA DSM foresees quicker procedures 
if one party considers that dispute settlement is urgent because of an 
interruption of the transport of gas, oil or electricity, or a threat of 
interruption. This procedure, obviously tailored to the challenges of the 
EU-Ukraine-Russia triangular energy relationship, should allow the 
parties to react in a swift manner to any future energy disputes. Third, 
there is a procedure that obliges the arbitration panel to ask the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for a binding preliminary 
ruling when there is a dispute concerning the interpretation and 
application of EU law (i.e. EU legislation annexed to the Agreement).361 
This procedure aims to ensure a uniform interpretation and application 
of the Agreement’s annexed EU legislation without jeopardising the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU to interpret EU law.  
Mediation. A separate, lighter mechanism is included (in Arts 
327 to 333) for ‘mediation’ rather than ‘arbitration’, which the parties 
can use to tackle market access problems, including non-tariff 
measures. This mechanism functions through the appointment of a 
single mediator who can advise and propose a non-binding solution 
within 60 days. The aim of the mediation is not to review the legality of 
a measure, but to find a quick and effective solution to market access 
problems without recourse to litigation. If the solution is agreed by the 
two parties it will be adopted as a decision of the Trade Committee. 
                                                        
357 EU Delegation to Ukraine, “EU Delegation in Kyiv criticises Ukraine 
proposal to raise export duties on metal scrap”, 29 April 2016. 
358 Art. 52 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. 
359 Art. 300(7)) EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. 
360 Art. 261 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. 
361 Art. 322 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. 
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This mediation mechanism does not exclude the possibility, if a 
solution is not agreed, to have recourse to the dispute settlement 
mechanism with arbitration.  
Transparency. In addition, the DCFTA includes detailed rules 
on transparency (in Arts 281 to 288). Ukraine has to establish “an 
effective and predictable regulatory environment for economic 
operators doing business in its territory, due account being taken of the 
requirements of legal certainty”. For example, laws, regulations, 
judicial decisions and administrative rulings that have an impact on the 
AA (i.e. measures of general application) must be properly and timely 
published and communicated. A contact point has to be established 
that responds to enquiries from interested persons regarding such 
measures of general application (proposed or in force). This chapter 
also includes rules on administrative and ‘review and appeal’ 
procedures. According to the latter, each party shall establish or 
maintain impartial and independent courts, or other independent 
tribunals or procedures, for the purpose of the prompt review and, 
where warranted, correction of administrative actions in areas covered 
by the DCFTA.  
 
Dispute settlement at a glance 
There are two basic dispute settlement mechanisms: a ‘general’ one 
applicable to all parts of the Agreement except the DCFTA and a second one 
applicable to the DCFTA itself.  
The ‘general’ mechanism relies on the two parties finding a mutually agreed 
solution in the Association Council, failing which the aggrieved party may 
take ‘appropriate measures’.  
For DCFTA-related disputes there is a more elaborate system that provides 
two alternative tracks: either binding arbitration, or softer mediation for 
consensual solutions.   
There is also provision for the special case of violation of the ‘essential 
elements’ of the Agreement (i.e. basic political principles), which can lead to 
suspension of the entire Agreement. 
In practice these procedures are rarely used as the EU prefers the ‘diplomatic 
approach’. 
The DCFTA rules on transparency oblige Ukraine to establish and maintain 
a transparent and predictable legal environment to do business. 
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30. INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The institutional arrangements for 
reviewing and controlling the 
implementation of the Agreement are 
well developed. Only the final step in 
the ratification of the Agreement has 
still to be completed, although almost all 
of the elements of the Agreement are 
provisionally in force.  
Ratification and provisional 
application. Several procedural steps 
had – or still have – to be taken before 
the Agreement enters fully into force, but the Agreement’s ‘political’ 
chapters were signed on 21 March 2014, and the remaining chapters, 
including the one on the DCFTA, on 27 June 2014. The European 
Parliament had to give its consent, which it did on 16 September 2014, 
simultaneously with the Verkhovna Rada’s ratification. Moreover, 
because the Agreement is a ‘mixed agreement’ (i.e. it includes 
provisions falling under the competences of EU member states), all EU 
member states also have to ratify it according to their national laws and 
procedures.  
In order to avoid ratification delays, the EU and Ukraine agreed 
to apply large parts of the agreement ‘provisionally’, namely most 
provisions that fall within the Union’s competences. The scope of this 
provisional application is exceptionally broad and covers almost the 
entire DCFTA and many chapters on general principles, political 
dialogue, the rule of law and numerous items of sectoral cooperation. 
The provisional application started on 1 November 2014, with the 
exception of the DCFTA part, which only started on 1 January 2016. The 
delay for the DCFTA was the result of a trilateral meeting between the 
EU, Ukraine and Russia on 12 September 2014, when it was decided – 
under Russian pressure – to delay its provisional application. However, 
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the EU’s autonomous trade preferences (i.e. the unilateral 
implementation of the DCFTA tariff section) were applied in the 
intervening period, so, overall, little was lost in these delays.  
For the provisional application, any reference to “the date of 
entry into force of the agreement” in the text of the Agreement, 
including the Annexes on legislative approximation, are replaced by 1 
November 2014 for its non-DCFTA part, and by 1 January 2016 for its 
DCFTA part. Therefore, the respective transitional periods foreseen on 
the agreement, for example for legislative approximation, started 
already on these dates.   
All member states have since ratified the Association Agreement, 
with the notable exception of the Netherlands. In an advisory 
referendum held in the Netherlands on 6 April 2016, over 61% of voters 
rejected the ratification of the Association Agreement. The Dutch 
government now has to decide how it will act on the outcome of the 
referendum, which had a low turnout of 32% because as long as it does 
not ratify the Association Agreement, it cannot fully enter into force.362 
In the meantime, however, the provisional application of the agreement 
will continue to apply with no time limit.  
Institutional framework. The Agreement establishes a 
comprehensive institutional framework, which will play a crucial role 
in the monitoring and implementation process. The annual EU-Ukraine 
summits are given a clear legal basis, which was not the case in the 
previous Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The highest level of 
political dialogue is in evidence at these summits; they provide overall 
guidance for the implementation of the Agreement and an opportunity 
to discuss any bilateral or international issues of mutual interest.  
Below the summit level the key institution is the Association 
Council, composed of members of the EU Council and Commission on 
the one hand and members of the government of Ukraine, on the other. 
The Association Council meets at least once a year at ministerial level 
and is the core institution to monitor the application and 
implementation of the Agreement. Furthermore, it examines any other 
                                                        
362 For a commentary on this Dutch referendum, see G. Van der Loo, “The 
Dutch Referendum on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: Legal options 
for navigating a tricky and awkward situation”, CEPS Commentary, 8 April 
2016 (www.ceps.eu/publications/dutch-referendum-eu-ukraine-association-
agreement-legal-options-navigating-tricky-and).  
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major issues in the relationship between the two parties. The last 
meeting was held in December 2015.363  
The Association Council can take ‘binding’ decisions where 
provided for by the Agreement. This means that the EU (and its 
member states) and Ukraine are obliged to implement these decisions. 
It can also adopt non-binding recommendations, such as the 
‘Association Agenda’ document, which goes through the 
implementation process in detail.364 Both decisions and 
recommendations are taken by consensus between the parties. The 
scope of decision-making powers is rather strict as this joint institution 
can only take decisions where its competence is provided for in the 
Agreement.  
The Association Council is assisted by an Association 
Committee, composed of representatives of the parties at senior official 
level, which in turn is assisted by specific sub-committees. At its first 
meeting on 15 December 2014, the Association Council adopted rules 
of procedure for itself, the Association Committee and sub-
committees.365 It also established sub-committees on Freedom, Security 
and Justice and on Economic and Sector Cooperation.366 The 
Agreement already established a Trade Committee to address all issues 
related to the DCFTA,367 complemented by several sub-committees 
(e.g. SPS, Customs and Trade and Sustainable Development).368  
                                                        
363 The latest Association Council took place on 7 December 2015 in Brussels. 
The Association Council “took stock of developments in EU-Ukraine relations 
since the first Association Council held in December 2014 and welcomed the 
significant progress realised since”.  
364 EU-Ukraine Association Agenda to prepare and facilitate the 
implementation of the Association Agreement as endorsed by the EU-Ukraine 
Association Council on 16 March 2015 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/docs/st06978_15_en.pdf).  
365 Decision 1/2014 of the Association Council adopting its Rules of Procedure 
and those of the Association Committee and of Sub-Committees. 
366 Decision 2/2014 of the Association Council adopting on the establishment 
of two sub-committees. 
367 Art. 465(4) EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. 
368 See, respectively, Arts 74, 83 and 300 of the EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement. 
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Finally, the Agreement established a Parliamentary Association 
Committee, consisting of Members of the European Parliament, the 
Verkhovna Rada and a Civil Society Platform (see chapter 28).  
Dynamic approximation. These joint institutions also play a 
crucial role in the process of Ukraine’s (dynamic) approximation to EU 
legislation (i.e. the continuous updating of the list of EU directives or 
regulations in the many annexes to the Agreement, in light of the 
relevant legislative developments in the EU itself). As indicated in 
earlier chapters, numerous EU acts listed in the annexes of the 
Agreement have already been replaced or amended in the EU. 
Therefore, the agreement includes a general provision attributing to the 
Association Council the competence to update or amend the annexes 
“taking into account the evolution of EU law”.369 However, this 
provision does not give the Association Council a ‘carte blanche’ to 
modify other annexes not related to legislative approximation. 
Moreover, as the Association Council decides by consensus, both the 
EU and Ukraine need to agree on the updating of the annexes. Several 
chapters of the DCFTA include specific provisions to update the 
annexed EU legislation (e.g. SPS, Services and Public Procurement).370 
In December 2014 the Association Council delegated to the Trade 
Committee the competence to amend or update the DCFTA annexes 
related to export duties, safeguard measures on passenger cars, TBT, 
Customs and Trade Facilitation, Services and Public Procurement.371 
While the Association Council has broad powers to amend the 
annexes, it cannot change the main body of the Agreement since, being 
a Treaty, this would require opening up once again the complex 
procedures of ratification according to the internal procedures of the 
EU and Ukraine.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
369 Art. 463(2)/(3) EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. 
370 See, respectively, Art. 74(2), Annex XVII and Art. 153(2) EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement. 
371 Decision 3/2014 of the Association Council on the delegation of certain 
powers by the Association Council to the Association Committee in Trade 
configuration. 
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Institutional and final provisions at a glance 
The Association Agreement is largely provisionally applied, partly since 1 
November 2014 and, for the DCFTA, since 1 January 2016. All member 
states have ratified it, with the notable exception of the Netherlands.  
A comprehensive joint institutional framework will monitor the 
implementation of the agreement and provides a platform for political 
dialogue. 
The Association Council has a broad competence to amend the annexes of 
the Agreement, but not the main body of the Agreement. 
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